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How can Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) improve its 
capabilities for military assistance (MA) in order to increase the strategic utility of both 
NORSOF and MA?  
After examining and analyzing the broader literature, a more specific body of 
literature about NORSOF, the results of an already existing survey of NORSOF 
personnel, and comments contained within both the respective literature and the survey 
results, we recommend establishing a national SOF doctrine to strengthen NORSOF 
niches in the global SOF network, seek synergy between national tasks and MA, increase 
NORSOF “vertical implementation” in operations, use the MA capability in support of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and establish an “MA Network of Practice” across NORSOF 
units. This capstone concludes with three new courses of action that demonstrate how 
NORSOF’s enhanced MA capabilities can be pursued in order to achieve strategic 
objectives for Norway in the realms of deterrence, reassurance, and conflict resolution. 
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A. SPONSORS AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Norwegian Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) was established in 
January 2014. NORSOCOM is a strategic-level Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
command element that guides future development of Norwegian Special Forces 
(NORSOF),1 advises strategic leaders on employment of SOF, and expands and 
maintains an international SOF network.2 
In 2012, NORSOF teamed up with the Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment (FFI) to strengthen its capacity for strategic research, analysis, and 
development. FFI subsequently established the Special Operations Research Team 
(SORT) to combine and integrate the efforts of FFI scientists and NORSOF officers.3 
Since the 1970s, FFI has provided strategic analyses to the Norwegian defense 
community and has refined its method of scenario-based analysis for long-term defense 
planning. A key element is the use of scenarios to prepare for future missions and tasks.4  
As part of NORSOCOM and FFI’s joint future development of NORSOF, they 
invited Norwegian students enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Defense 
Analysis Curriculum 699, “Irregular Warfare and Special Operations,” to address the 
following research question during the first half of 2016: “How can Norwegian Special 
Operations Forces (NORSOF) improve its capability for military assistance (MA) in 
order to increase the strategic utility of both NORSOF and MA?” Answering this 
research question is the purpose of this capstone report. 
                                                 
1 NORSOF consists of two tactical Norwegian Special Operations Forces (SOF) units: the Army SOF 
unit Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) and the Navy SOF unit Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK).  
2 Eirik Kristoffersen, “Small States, Smart Solutions: Investing in National Joint Special Operations 
Command” (strategy research project, United States Army War College, April 2015). 
3 Espen Berg-Knutsen and Nancy Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025” (Technical report, 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 1. http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47444/
NPS-DA-15-001.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
4 Sigurd Glaerum and Alf C. Hennum, J-DARTS—An End-to-End Defence Planning Tool Set, Seminar 
Paper, NATO Science and Technology Organization, RTO-MP-SAS-081 AC/323(SAS-081)TP/329, 1st ed. 
(Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment [FFI], 2010). 
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B. DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS OF “CAPABILITY” 
A key concept in the research question is capability. Defining capability and its 
underlying elements is, therefore, important for the establishment of a framework and 
methodology for this study. Since this capstone is about improving a specific military 
capability for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country, we have decided to 
use NATO’s definition from ACT 80–7, Managing Transformation: “A Capability can be 
defined as the ability to produce an effect that users of assets or services need to 
achieve.”5  
Since the purpose of our sponsor’s research question is to discover ways to 
increase the strategic utility of NORSOF, we assume that the “users of [NORSOF] assets 
or services” will be at the (military) strategic level in Norway, or within the NATO 
alliance if command/control over a NORSOF capability is transferred.  
In order to break down a capability into functional components that can be studied 
and improved, we are using the U.S. definition from the instructions for the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) as a baseline. According to 
that definition, “A Capability will consist of one or more functional components: 
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Leadership and education, 
Facilities and finally Policy (DOTMPLF-P).”6 
Not all of these functional components are relevant for analyzing the NORSOF 
Military Assistance capability; for example, we do not address the physical elements 
“materiel” and “facilities,” but instead focus the institutional functional elements of 
“doctrine” and “organization,” the functional human elements of “training and education” 
and “personnel,” and last “policy.”  
Consequently, the functional elements of an MA capability that we examine in 
this capstone are “DOTP-P” 
                                                 
5 NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Managing Transformation— ACT 
Directive Number 80–7, 80–7/2005 ed. (Brussels, Belgium: NATO, 2005). 
6 Joseph Dunford, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), CJCSI 3170.O1I 
(Arlington, VA: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015). 
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 Doctrine: NORSOF’s doctrinal framework for Military Assistance (MA), 
or those fundamental principles that guide NORSOF MA operations in 
support of strategic objectives.  
 Organization: How organizational structure and solutions affect NORSOF 
MA capability. 
 Training and education: How changes in training, exercise and education 
may strengthen NORSOF’s MA capability.  
 Personnel: How NORSOF can develop its personnel through recruitment, 
selection, and career management in order to improve NORSOF’s MA 
capability. 
 Policy: For the purpose of this capstone, we define policy as the declared 
objectives that a government seeks to achieve in the pursuit of national 
security.  
In order to enhance NORSOF’s strategic utility, we discuss how the NORSOF 
MA capability can be used to further pursuit Norway’s national security objectives, and 
we propose possible courses of action (COA).  
C. THE RISE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR NORSOF 
FFI and NORSOCOM’s focus on improving NORSOF’s MA Capability is 
timely. The role of MA in missions/tasks like Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID), and Security Sector Reform (SSR) has received significant 
attention in Norway over the last decade. But this has only been after a slow start. In 
2000, Norway published its first Joint Military Doctrine. MA was mentioned as a 
possible mission for NORSOF during “peace support operations”; the doctrine also 
noted, however, that “MA will usually be carried out by special forces from allied 
countries.”7 The Land Doctrine that followed in 2004 also did not mention MA as a task 
for Special Forces.8 Subsequently, in 2007, the Norwegian Chief of Defence, Sverre 
                                                 
7 Forsvarets Overkommando, Joint Doctrine Part B—Operations [Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine 
del B-Operasjoner], 1st ed. (Oslo, Norway: Forsvaret, 2000), 204. 
8 Forsvarsstaben, Doctrine for Land Operations [Forsvarets doktrine for landoperasjoner], 1st ed. 
(Oslo, Norway: Forsvarsstaben, 2004), 77. 
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Diesen, stated that Special Reconnaissance (SR) and Direct Action (DA) were the most 
important tasks for NORSOF, and that MA was a lower priority.9 
In 2006, Tom Robertsen argued, in an NPS thesis, that NORSOF possessed only 
direct capabilities: SR and DA. He identified indirect capabilities (like MA) as an 
important gap that needed to be closed in order to increase NORSOF’s strategic utility in 
the future. He also proposed an organizational solution to close this gap.10  
Since 2007, NORSOF has, more or less, been continually heavily involved in MA 
activities. NORSOF has partnered, mentored, and assisted the buildup of a Special Police 
counterterrorism unit (Crisis Response Unit [CRU]) in Kabul, Afghanistan.11 This effort 
has included assisting the CRU through a large number of high-profile attacks (HPAs) in 
Kabul province. From 2014, NORSOF has conducted similar MA operations in Baghdad, 
Iraq.12 NORSOF mentors have also conducted MA operations to improve SOF 
capabilities in Latvia and Lithuania.13 A NORSOF officer has been in charge of the 
establishment of the NATO Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC) in Georgia and 
achieved remarkable results over a short period of time.14 From 2016 on, as part of 
                                                 
9 Tor Joergen Melien, Our Secret Soldiers: Norwegian Special Operations Forces 1940–1942 [Vaare 
Hemmelige Soldater. Norske Spesialstyrker 1940–2012], 1st ed., vol. 1 (Oslo, Norway: Spartacus, 2012), 
note 1070; Forsvarsnett, IFS Launching Seminar—Norwegian CHOD on Norwegian Special Operations 
[IFS lanseringsseminar—norske spesialstyrker—av Sverre Diesen], IFS.2I/2-07.13/2-07: ed. (Oslo, 
Norway: Forsvarsnett, 2007). 
10 Tom Robertsen, “Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006). 
11 CRU has responsibility for security in Kabul and is the first responder for high-profile attacks that 
threaten the capital. 
12 Information released from Norwegian Joint Headquarters (Norway), December 2015. See also 
“Press Release: Norwegian Soldiers to Iraq,” Regjeringen, March 3, 2015, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/
aktuelt/norske-soldater-til-irak/id2398389/.  
13 “Special Operations Forces without Borders,” Forsvaret, accessed May 25, 2016, 
https://forsvaret.no/aktuelt/grenseloese-spesialstyrker.  
14 “Trains Georgian Forces on Behalf of NATO,” Forsvaret, accessed May 23, 2016, 
https://forsvaret.no/aktuelt/trenergeorgiskestyrker; “NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation Center 
(JTEC),” NATO, accessed May 23, 2016, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/
20150827_150827-jtec-georgia.pdf.  
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Operation Inherent Resolve, NORSOF will train, assist, and advise local Syrian groups 
that fight ISIL in Syria.15 
In parallel with NORSOF’s MA efforts, Norwegian conventional forces (CF) 
have been heavily involved in SFA, via efforts like Operational Mentoring Liaison 
Teams (OMLTs), NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), and Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in northern Afghanistan. Since 2014, Norwegian elite 
infantry have also been training Kurds in Erbil, Iraq, to support their fight against ISIL.  
In her New Year’s speech for 2016, the Norwegian prime minister expressed her 
gratitude to the Norwegian Forces who train and assist Afghan and Iraqi forces in 
fighting terrorists in their respective countries and said that this activity also contributed 
to Norway’s security.16  
In 2016, the main effort of most Norwegian military operations abroad entails 
some kind of military assistance to indigenous forces, or groups, a trend that is likely to 
continue. It is therefore our hope that this capstone will contribute to further develop 
NORSOF’s MA capability.  
D. METHODOLOGY/OUTLINE 
In Chapter II, we provide an overview of relevant research and literature 
concerned with the functional elements (DOTP-P) of an MA Capability. The intent of 
Chapter II is to establish a point of departure. Drawing on our review of the literature, we 
derive potential challenges, dilemmas, and opportunities for a small state’s SOF, relevant 
to the development of its SOF MA capability. 
In Chapter III, we compare the DOTP-P findings identified in our literature 
review with the results from a recent quantitative study conducted by FFI.17 This survey 
was designed to identify DOTP-P gaps based on the past decade of NORSOF MA 
                                                 
15 “Facts Related to the Norwegian Armed Forces’ Efforts in the Fight against Terrorism and Violent 
Extremism,” Regjeringen, April 2, 2016, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nytt-bidrag/id2499023/.  
16 Erna Solberg, Norwegian Prime Minister’s New Year’s Speech 2016 [Nyttårstalen 2016] (Oslo, 
Norway: NRK, 2015). 
17 See Appendix for an English version of this survey (our translation).  
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operations. The 85 NORSOF members who respond in the FFI survey participated at 
different levels and in different functions in the previously mentioned NORSOF MA 
operations. We also make use of the qualitative comments from these NORSOF 
practitioners when we make our recommendations for a future DOTP design. Several of 
the responders are current subject matter experts, leaders, or future leaders in NORSOF, 
and they will shape how NORSOF capabilities evolve.  
In Chapter IV, we summarize our findings and make recommendations about how 
the DOTP functions could be strengthened in order to increase the strategic utility of 
NORSOF MA operations.  
In Chapter V, we address the last P: Policy. How can NORSOF MA capability 
create strategic effects in new ways? We outline three core Norwegian security policy 
objectives and present three new MA COAs in which NORSOF could be used in pursuit 
of those objectives.  
In Chapter VI, we conclude this report with a visualization of what an improved 
NORSOF MA capability might look like in 2025. The visualization is based on the 
findings and recommendations in this report and may be described as a “best case 
scenario” for a decade from now. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of relevant research and draw on official 
documents concerning the functional elements (DOTP-P) of an MA capability. The intent 
of this chapter is to establish a point of departure for this report. Drawing on our review 
of the literature, we derive potential challenges and dilemmas that NORSOF will face in 
the future development of its MA capability. Some of these challenges and dilemmas are 
then discussed in relation to the findings of the FFI survey on NORSOF and MA in the 
next chapter. When appropriate, we deviate from the literature review format and directly 
discuss some of the findings in relation to NORSOF. 
A. DOCTRINE  
Doctrine is defined as “fundamental principles by which military forces guide 
their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in 
application.”18 In this section, we review literature relevant to the principles and 
objectives in play as NORSOF develops its future MA capability.  
1. National Doctrines 
In 2000, Norway created its first Joint Military Doctrine (FFOD). Together with 
SR and DA, MA was described as one of three principal tasks for NORSOF, particularly 
during peace-support operations. The doctrine noted, however, that “MA will usually be 
carried out by Special Forces from allied countries,”19 implying that other NATO SOF 
would be more responsible for MA than NORSOF. Perhaps this reflected MA’s relatively 
low priority  vs. SR and DA at the time. The different types of MA operations described 
were borrowed from NATO doctrine. Worth nothing is that, “establishment, rehearsal 
and support of escape and evasion networks,” “support to peace-support operations, 
including other forces’ security assessments,” and “liaison with the different parties in 
                                                 
18 NATO, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-06, 2015 ed. (Brussels, Belgium: NATO 
Standardization Office, 2015), 2-D-B.  
19 Forsvarets Overkommando, Joint Doctrine Part B, 204.  
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peace support operations”20 were important tasks for NORSOF during the conflicts in the 
Balkans in the late 1990s.21 FFOD 2000 now listed these tasks as SOF MA missions. 
These were also tasks that clearly underscored the strategic shift just after the Cold War: 
“NATO has shifted its focus from military defense and defense planning (near area) for 
security cooperation and conflict prevention extending beyond the original Alliance 
borders (out of area).”22  
Following the first issuance of the Joint Doctrine in 2000 came the first Maritime 
Doctrine in 2002, which defined MA for Naval Special Operations Forces (NAVSOF) in 
very broad terms, simply as “other missions requiring special competence.”23 The first 
Land Doctrine (2004) did not describe MA at all.24 Neither of these service-based 
doctrines have been revised. A new Land Doctrine is in the pipeline and will describe 
SFA operations.25 We do not know to what extent SOF’s MA roles will be covered in 
this version. Norwegian Joint Doctrine was revised in 2007 and 2014, however. The 2007 
version is a copy of the 2002 version with regards to MA,26 while the 2014 version is 
essentially a version of MA as described in NATO SOF doctrine with the focus on 
“escape and evasion” and “security for other forces” removed. Instead emphasis is on 
building partner capacity with indigenous forces, a natural shift given the prior ten years 
of NORSOF operations in Afghanistan.27 In sum, at least within the MA field, it seems 
that national joint doctrines are somewhat reactive; they tend to describe the types of MA 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 206. 
21 See, for example, John Inge Hammersmark, “The Development of Norwegian Special Forces: 
Symbolic or Functional Utility?” (master’s thesis, Forsvarets stabsskole, 2010), 40.  
22 Forsvarets Overkommando, Joint Doctrine Part A—General [Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine 
Del A-Grunnlag] (Oslo, Norway: Forsvaret, 2000), 84.  
23 Forsvarets Overkommando, Norwegian Defense Doctrine for Maritime Operations [Forsvarets 
doktrine for maritime operasjoner], Vol. 1 (Oslo, Norway: Forsvaret, 2002), 92.  
24 Forsvarsstaben, Doctrine for Land Operations [Forsvarets doktrine for landoperasjoner], 77. 
25 Based on mail correspondence with Norwegian Staff College personnel, January 2016. 
26 Forsvarets Overkommando, Norwegian Joint Doctrine [Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine 
(FFOD)], 2nd ed. (Oslo, Norway: Forsvarets Overkommando, 2007), 125. 
27 Forsvarets Overkommando., Norwegian Joint Doctrine [Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine 
(FFOD)], 3rd ed. (Oslo, Norway: Forsvarets Overkommando, 2014), 121.  
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operations that have been conducted by NORSOF in the recent past, rather than offering 
principles and general objectives for future MA operations.  
Norway established NORSOCOM in 2014, but does not yet have its own SOF 
doctrine. Nevertheless, Norway has ratified NATO’s Doctrine for Special Operations, in 
which MA is one of three obligatory tasks. The fourth task, which is not a NATO 
requirement, is “Additional National Activity.” For NORSOF, this national activity can 
be described as “Maritime and other Counterterrorism (CT) support to the Police, 
Hostage Rescue Operations (HRO), Support to Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), 
and Close Protection.”28 In addition, NORSOF is responsible for classified tasks in the 
national defense of Norway. Not surprisingly, maintaining capabilities for these national 
tasks ties up considerable time and resources in NORSOF. 
2. NATO 
In lieu of a national SOF doctrine, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.5 is 
NORSOF’s ratified SOF doctrine and defines MA as follows: 
MA is a broad category of measures and activities that support and 
influence critical friendly assets through organizing training, advising, 
mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations. The range of MA 
includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security 
forces, engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or 
organizations, and civic actions supporting and influencing the local 
population. SOF conducts MA within their field of expertise. More 
specifically, MA activities may include:  
Training. These are activities that train designated individuals and units in 
tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and 
maritime skills, provide assistance to designated leaders, and provide 
training on tactics, techniques, and procedures, thus enabling a nation to 
develop individual, leader, and organizational skills.  
Advising. These are activities that improve the performance of designated 
actors by providing active participation and expertise to achieve strategic 
or operational objectives.  
                                                 
28 These tasks are not available in one single unclassified document and thus have been derived from 
Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” 26.  
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Mentoring/Partnering. These are activities conducted by small teams of 
subject matter experts who are tasked to work closely with designated 
personnel and provide direction and guidance, which may concern the 
conduct of military or security operations.29 
As depicted in Figure 1 from AJP 3.5, MA is a SOF activity across the spectrum 
of conflict as defined by NATO. MA has particular relevance in both “peacetime”30 and 
Crisis and Stabilization Operations, addressing what the U.S. Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) describes as “Gray Zone Challenges,” “Competitive interactions 
among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and 
peace duality.”31 
 
Figure 1.  NATO Doctrinal SOF Tasks Throughout the Spectrum of Conflict32 
                                                 
29 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3.5, version A, 1st ed. (Brussels, 
Belgium: NATO Standardization Agency, 2013), 2–1, emphasis added. 
30 NATO has no definition of a “Phase 0” in the spectrum of conflict, hence the use of quotation 
marks to point out that “peacetime” is a relative and contested concept. 
31 USSOCOM, The Gray Zone, white paper (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 2015), 1.  
32 Source: NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 1–2.  
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3. Comparison of NATO and U.S. Doctrine 
MA is treated differently in U.S. SOF and NATO doctrine. Since NORSOF has 
strong relations with and commitments to both NATO and U.S. SOF, interoperability 
with both of these organizations is important for NORSOF capability development.33 As 
depicted in Figure 1, NATO scales operations based on intensity, as if peace and conflict 
are cyclic conditions over time. In contrast, U.S. SOF doctrine scales operations based on 
purpose, themes, or functions, perhaps an indication that aspects of these operations, for 
example intelligence production for CT or Counter-Deproliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction [CDWMD]), are global constants. The resulting difference is that NATO 
defines three broad SOF tasks that may be applied to any kind of operation, while U.S. 
SOF doctrine lists 12 thematic and functional operations as SOF core tasks; however, 
MA is not listed as a core task in its own right.  
Figure 2 compares NATO and U.S. SOF tasks. Although most U.S. thematic 
operations might involve both Direct Action and Military Assistance, Counterinsurgency 
and Military Information Support Operations are highlighted as prominent in both 
domains. SR and Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance are obviously prerequisites in 
several kinds of operations. (We do not describe the different U.S. mission types in detail 
in this report, and would simply note that Civil Affairs Operations [CAO] and Military 
Information Support Operations [MISO] are not SOF tasks in NATO doctrine.) 
 
Figure 2.  Comparison of Special Operations Tasks According to NATO and 
U.S. Doctrine 
                                                 
33 Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” 26. 
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Other scholarly literature on SOF claims there are two principal doctrinal modes 
in which special operations forces accomplish their tasks: the direct action approach, 
which brings SOF directly into contact with the enemy, and the indirect action approach, 
which influences the enemy or operational environment by, with, or through the use of 
indigenous forces.34 A common argument among SOF scholars is also that the strategic 
effect of SOF is relatively higher when indirect approaches are used, compared to direct 
approaches.35 Indirect capabilities are critical, not only for reshaping the socio-political 
environment in which terrorists and insurgents thrive, but also indirectly addressing the 
root causes of conflict with the help of surrogate forces or actors. The argument is that 
these capabilities create more sustainable solutions than a direct kinetic approach: hence, 
the relatively greater strategic effect. If this direct/indirect approach to SOF operations is 
used as a framework, one way of organizing the different tasks is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  SOF Doctrinal Tasks Separated in Direct Action and Indirect Action 
Capabilities 
Thus, to understand how MA may be applied in operations, numerous functional 
and thematic doctrines may serve as guidelines for NORSOF. Some examples include JP 
                                                 
34 See, for example, Anna Simons, “Why Firewall?” (unpublished policy paper, Naval Postgraduate 
School, December 2006), or, Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge 
of Unconventional Warfare (Hove, England: Psychology Press, 1998), 
35 See, for example, David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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3–22, Foreign Internal Defense;36 JDN 1–13, Security Force Assistance;37 and JP 3–24, 
Counterinsurgency.38 
Figure 4 displays the relationship between thematic and environmental operations, 
in which MA may be considered a key component.39 
 
Figure 4.  Relationship Between Special Operations and Irregular Warfare40 
4. Thematic Doctrines: Norway 
Several NORSOF studies address thematic operations with implications for 
development of the MA capability. Most of them are focused on counterinsurgency 
                                                 
36 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense (Joint Publication 3–22), 1st ed. 
(Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010). 
37 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Force Assistance (Joint Doctrine Note 1–13), 1st ed. 
(Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). 
38 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency (Joint Publication 3–24) (Washington, DC: 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). 
39 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (Joint Publication 3–05) (Washington, DC: 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), II-2.  
40 Source: Ibid. 
 14
(COIN) operations. In 2008, Petter Hellesen studied changes that should be made to 
enhance NORSOF’s efficacy in COIN operations. He argued that MA should receive 
increased attention from NORSOF and explained why NORSOF needs better intelligence 
regarding the human domain, including increased Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 
capability.41 
In 2009, Gimmingsrud and Pedersen constructed a Norwegian model for 
counterinsurgency operations based on a comprehensive review of Norwegian military 
and civilian resources.42 Their report included recommendations for the use of NORSOF 
in COIN, both in the DA role but also for training other special operations forces. The 
need for better Norwegian information operations (IO) capability was another important 
recommendation.43  
In 2009, Torgeir Gratrud made a concrete proposal to include thematic sub-
doctrines in the Norwegian national doctrine hierarchy. He argued it was time to develop 
a Norwegian national COIN doctrine based on the experiences of NORSOF and 
conventional units in out-of-area operations over the past decade. He also argued that the 
Norwegian Department of Defense (DOD) should continue to support the entire range of 
MA missions with its Special Forces, and that NORSOF should intensify its preparations 
for such tasks.44 
5. National vs. International Tasks 
An obvious dilemma for NORSOF is how best to balance the time and resources 
dedicated to training and conducting exercises for national missions vs. international 
missions and tasks. In some ways, this dilemma can also be regarded as a conflict 
between focusing on the direct (e.g., SR and DA) vs. indirect approaches (e.g., MA). 
                                                 
41 Petter Hellesen, “Counterinsurgency and Its Implication for the Norwegian Special Forces” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 55–62.  
42 Trond Gimmingsrud and Hans-Marius Pedersen, “Small Nation, Big Difference: How the 
Norwegian Armed Forces Should Conduct Counterinsurgency Operations” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Torgeir Gratrud, “Norwegian Special Operations Forces: Their Role in Future Counterinsurgency 
Operations (master’s strategic research project, U.S. Army War College, 2009). 
 15
Such a choice is based on the assumption that most of NORSOF’s national tasks are 
direct in nature and most international tasks are indirect in nature.45  
It is beyond the scope of this report to analyze trends in government White Papers 
and intelligence services’ “over the horizon assessments” to make educated assessments 
about where NORSOF’s focus should lie in the future. One reason is that Norwegian 
foreign policy (along with Norway’s allies) is still in flux at the time of this writing.46 
Indeed, in these turbulent times, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has 
launched Project Veivalg (“Path”) with the intent to produce what will be only the third 
government White Paper on Norwegian foreign policy in 28 years.47 Obviously, 
Norwegian foreign policy has been characterized by continuity, but given events in 
Europe and beyond, modifications are expected later in 2016. 
We do, however, want to take into account three trends. Norway’s first Joint 
Doctrine (FFOD 2000) sought to define new international roles for the Norwegian DOD 
in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in support of the United Nations (UN) and 
NATO.48 The importance of national defense was downplayed, a stance that was 
reversed in the latest version of FFOD (2014), in which credible deterrence, NATO 
collective defense, and other national tasks are listed as the six most important tasks for 
the Norwegian DOD.49 Multinational crisis-response and peace support fell to priority 
number seven.50  
In 2015, the convening of the Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and 
Defense Policy reflected the recognition of the need to take significant measures to 
                                                 
45 See, for example, Tom Robertsen, Making New Ambitions Work: The Transformation of Norwegian 
Special Operations Forces, Defence and Security Studies no. 1 (Oslo: The Norwegian Institute for Defense 
Studies, 2007), 69. 
46 The U.S. military is striving for its Pacific shift, Donald Trump is running for president, and the EU 
project is more fragile than ever.  
47 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Choices in Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy,” 
January 27, 2016, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/utenrikssaker/sikkerhetspolitikk/meldst_veivalg/
id2472157/.  
48 Forsvarets Overkommando., Norwegian Joint Doctrine—Part A [Forsvarets Fellesoperative 
Doktrine (FFOD)—Del A], 1st ed. (Norway: Forsvarets Overkommando, 2000). 
49 Forsvarsstaben, Norwegian Joint Doctrine, 3rd ed. (Oslo: Forsvarsstaben, 2014). 
50 Ibid., 32–38. 
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strengthen Norway’s defense capabilities, in pursuit of both national and societal 
security.51 The report issued by the commission notes that NORSOF has an important 
supporting role to play in domestic counterterrorism. Other analysts argue that a limited 
“hybrid” attack by Russia against Norway will likely be directed against its energy 
production capabilities: oil, gas, and power plants,52 exactly the kind of infrastructure 
protection NORSOF has been preparing for in a CT role. In short, there has been a clear 
trend recently to focus more on national tasks for NORSOF.  
For instance, according to the 2015 Expert Commission, “Russia will remain the 
defining factor of Norwegian defense planning in the foreseeable future.”53 Beadle and 
Diesen likewise argue that Norway will have to take greater responsibility for deterring 
outside aggression. “This is not a result of fundamental changes in the relationship with 
Russia, or because the world is likely to become less peaceful. It is mainly caused by 
growing uncertainty surrounding allied support to Norway in the most likely crisis 
scenarios.”54 Historically, Norway’s relations with Russia have consisted of a delicate 
balance of deterrence through NATO membership and reassurance through self-imposed 
military and nuclear restraints, diplomacy, and cooperation whenever possible. 
Reassurance might be described as Norway’s strategic niche. Before the Baltic countries 
became members of NATO, Norway was the only NATO country that bordered Russia. 
General Philip Breedlove (former Supreme Allied Commander Europe [SACEUR]) 
describes Norway’s strategic role this way: “In NATO, we see Norway’s leadership in 
the way it handles relations with Russia. Norway has a long history of working with 
Russia in the border areas. You have experiences that we can learn from in NATO.”55 
                                                 
51 The Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, Unified Effort (Oslo, Norway: 
Norwegian Department of Defense, 2015). 
52 Per Olav Vaagland, “Hybrid War and Consequences for Norway,” Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 186, 
no. 1 (2016): 28. 
53 Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, Unified Effort, 5. 
54 Alexander William Beadle and Sverre Diesen, Global Trends toward 2040: Implications for the 
Norwegian Defence Forces’ Roles and Relevance (Oslo, Norway: FFI, 2015), 4  
55 Aashild Langved, “Interview with SACEUR General Philip M. Breedlove, Titled: ‘Bakkestyrker Er 
Nøkkelen Til Suksess’ (Ground Forces Is the Key to Success),” Dagens Næringsliv, February 3, 2016. 
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Deterrence and reassurance of Russia can thus be said to still be of critical policy 
importance. It is not likely this will change in the foreseeable future for obvious 
geographic and geopolitical reasons. Given the immense military asymmetry between 
Norway and Russia, NORSOF has no deterrent effect as a force-in-being. However, 
NORSOF may contribute to a more credible deterrent posture through indirect action. In 
fact, we will argue that NORSOF may be able to play an important role regarding 
reassurance, and in Chapter V will sketch the two Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) for 
how NORSOF’s MA capability can be used to pursue Norway’s dual policy objectives of 
deterrence and reassurance regarding Russia.  
Another trend of importance is simply that the political demand for deployable 
MA capabilities will continue to increase.  
U.S. president Barack Obama and NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg 
recently described an increased requirement for building local military capacity in the 
frontline states facing Russia, and in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Libya and North Africa, 
to name just a few.56 
As Beadle and Diesen argue, the relevance of using Norwegian military means 
abroad in a globalized world will increase, regardless of changes in the threats at home. 
This will occur at the same time that increased military costs are causing the conventional 
armed forces to reduce their size and to focus on national defense.57 In such a situation, 
we believe politicians will be tempted to use NORSOF as an investment in political 
credibility and status abroad, while addressing threats together with NATO at the threat’s 
place of origin. However, balancing between national and international tasks in the future 
could lead to the possibility of NORSOF being misused, especially since, as 
Hammersmark points out, NORSOF has both functional and symbolic importance.58  
                                                 
56 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President and Secretary General 
Stoltenberg of NATO after Bilateral Meeting,” April 4, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/04/04/remarks-president-and-secretary-general-stoltenberg-nato-after-bilateral.  
57 Beadle and Diesen, Global Trends Towards 2040, 4. 
58 Hammersmark, “Development of Norwegian Special Forces,” 70, 75. 
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In other words, to sum up this section, the literature suggests there will be an 
increased demand for NORSOF capabilities in both national and international operations 
in the future. Consequently, the requirement to balance across demands will grow. 
NORSOF will need to seek efficiencies in both direct and indirect approaches. Affirming 
synergies between these two mission sets thus seems more important than ever before; 
otherwise, NORSOF might find itself subject to imbalance and overstretch.  
One source of synergy can be found if both types of missions—the direct and 
indirect—are conducted by the same people who share the same professional expertise. 
MA-specific traits and skills will be discussed later in this report. In the next section, we 
look at where to find synergies between different national and international operations. 
6. NORSOF Expertise, Norwegian Strategic Niches 
NATO SOF doctrine prescribes that “SOF conducts MA within their field of 
expertise.” Defining this field of expertise is, therefore, important for NORSOF. 
NORSOF’s expertise is closely linked to the unique Norwegian environment: think 
arctic, winter, littorals, and mountainous terrain, as well as Norway’s large merchant 
fleet, and gas and oil platforms (GOPLATS).59  
NORSOF has 30 years of experience providing maritime and other CT support to 
the national police. When conducting these tasks, NORSOF operates under police 
mandate and rules of engagement (ROE), and NORSOF personnel are used to working in 
a joint environment. Similarly, we can turn to NORSOF’s role in establishing, mentoring, 
and assisting a national police counterterrorism unit, the crises response unit (CRU) in 
Afghanistan. The latter, too, serves as an example of a near perfect fit with regard to MA 
within NORSOFs field of expertise. The same expertise has been on display in 
NORSOF’s advising of Latvian and Lithuanian SOF. During the counterpiracy operation 
Atalanta of the Somali coast, there is the example of NORSOF conducting maritime MA 
with the Seychelles coast guard.60 One conclusion to be drawn from these examples is 
                                                 
59 Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” 28–29. 
60 “Missions: EU NAVFOR,” EU, accessed December 11, 2015, http://eunavfor.eu/mission/. 
Information released from Norwegian Joint Headquarters SOF section for this report. 
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that the experience required to conduct NORSOF national missions has provided a solid 
foundation of military expertise that has proved especially relevant in MA operations. 
Another conclusion would be that in cases when military and political decision-makers 
have accepted NORSOF senior leadership’s advice concerning partners and modus 
operandi, the outcome has been positive. However, military advice regarding the use of 
NORSOF has not always been followed. We will return to this point later in this report. 
One question to be posed as NORSOF’s MA capability is further developed is 
whether the professional expertise derived from maintaining national capabilities is 
sufficient to “increase the strategic utility of NORSOF” for MA. Without question, 
NORSOF’s military expertise helps provide relevant guidance as to which type of tactical 
units NORSOF should ideally mentor, train, and advise abroad. But from a functional 
perspective, is NORSOF always contributing to achieving strategic effects for Norway? 
What is Norway’s strategic utility in the international environment? What are Norwegian 
strategic niches? Basically, how can NORSOF’s MA capability best contribute to 
strategic success?  
While NATO SOF doctrine prescribes that SOF conducts MA within its field of 
expertise, our argument is that NORSOF should conduct MA within Norwegian fields of 
expertise according to Norwegian security interests, and NORSOF MA capability should 
be used to increase Norwegian strategic net-results.  
Here is one example of the kind of strategic effect Norway can take ever better 
advantage of in the future. It is often argued that small-state Norway “punches above its 
weight” in international affairs, especially with regards to conflict resolution. What has 
made Norway useful and important to the great powers after the Cold War has been its 
policy of involvement.61 Norwegian involvement in a series of negotiation processes is 
what has given the country stature, standing, and access beyond its size. Since 1993, 
Norway has been involved in conflict negotiations in South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Somalia, 
                                                 
61 Benjamin Carvalho and John Harald Sande Lie, “A Great Power Performance: Norway, Status, and 
the Policy of Involvement,” in Small States and Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing, 
ed. Benjamin Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann (New York: Routledge, 2014), 62. 
 20
the Philippines, Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Myanmar, Guatemala, Colombia, Afghanistan/
Taliban, and Libya.62  
The end result of some peace agreements and, in some cases, even a prerequisite 
for a peace agreement to be reached, is that one or more of the opposing actors engages in 
some kind of security sector reform. This might require FID and/or SFA, both of which 
are MA missions.  
Norway has had quite substantial success with defense security sector reform 
(DSSR) projects when the DOD and MFA have worked closely together. For instance, 
Haaverstad analyzed two Norwegian DSSR projects in the West Balkans, one in Serbia 
and one in Montenegro. Both were said to enhance stability and development in the 
Western Balkans, a key Norwegian policy objective.63 Indeed, the DSSR projects in 
Serbia and Montenegro may serve as archetypes for the types of operations that Norway 
is well suited to pursue. Arguably, Norway is better positioned than any other country to 
create strategic effect in conflicts between or within small states, by utilizing diplomatic 
networks and Norway’s reputation. 
In fact, as a “superpower” when it comes to conflict resolution, with well-
developed diplomacy, reputation, financial resources, patience, endurance, and a network 
for this activity,64 Norway also has small, but well educated, trained, and equipped 
military forces, including NORSOF. A strategic deficit exists when these two sectors do 
not coordinate to pursue strategic goals together, as some of the literature suggests.  
Following this line of thought, we sketch a generic CONOPS in Chapter V that 
seeks to utilize NORSOF’s MA capability in support of Norwegian conflict negotiations 
in order to increase Norwegian strategic net-results in the future. 
                                                 
62 Norwegian Government, “Norway’s Engagement in Peace Processes Since 1993,” July 26, 2013, 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/innsiktsmappe/
peace_efforts/id732943/; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Choices in Norwegian Foreign—and 
Security Policy.” 
63 Terje Haaverstad, “Defense Security Sector Reform: Organization, Intentions, and Results” 
(master’s thesis, Norwegian Defense College), 5.  
64 See, for example, Jan Hanssen-Bauer, “The Norwegian ‘Model’ for Conflict Resolution” (speech, 
Lisbon, October 28, 2005), 4. 
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7. Summary 
This chapter has discussed NORSOF MA in light of doctrine. That is, what 
principles and objectives are at play when NORSOF develops its future MA capabilities. 
Norwegian doctrine will always need to consider special national requirements, 
describe circumstances not covered in NATO doctrines, and clarify national perspectives 
that differ from those in NATO.65 No Norwegian doctrine currently addresses the special 
use of NORSOF for national purposes, and current doctrinal guidance for MA is not 
linked to specific Norwegian strategic interests. Rather, Norwegian doctrine’s 
consideration of MA is retrospective. 
We have described a general argument found in U.S. SOF literature: that indirect 
approaches yield relatively larger strategic effects than direct approaches. The question is 
whether this argument also holds true for NORSOF, which has to balance between 
national and international tasks? We have also provided a comparison of NATO and U.S. 
SOF tasks within the framework of direct/indirect approaches.  
We have argued that the demand for both national (mainly direct) capabilities and 
international (mainly indirect) capabilities will increase for NORSOF, and we predict a 
“imbalanced overstretch” in the future.  
NORSOF can increase the strategic utility of its MA capabilities, for Norway’s 
long-term strategic purposes, by investigating cost-effective indirect approaches in 
pursuit of deterrence and reassurance. (CONOPS proposals will be presented in Chapter 
V).  
For purposes of strategic utility, NORSOF should increase its contributions 
abroad, but should do so carefully. One way NORSOF can increase the strategic utility of 
its MA capability is by supporting select Norwegian conflict negotiations via military 
expertise, preferably in small countries. Finally, with the likely increased demand for 
NORSOF, and NORSOF at a historic peak in political popularity, the literature suggests 
                                                 
65 Forsvarets Overkommando, Norwegian Joint Doctrine—Part A, 18. 
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that the misuse of NORSOF might also increase, which could be dangerous for NORSOF 
and for Norway. 
B. ORGANIZATION: WHO DOES WHAT 
In this section, we review literature regarding the organization of SOF in general, 
and NORSOF in particular, as a function of its capabilities. We also analyze NORSOF 
from an organizational structure perspective, using Mintzberg’s dimensions of 
organizational design as a framework.66 
1. Research on NORSOF Organization 
The organization of NORSOF has been the subject of a few unclassified research 
projects over the past decade, mainly in the form of theses or research papers from SOF 
officers at military institutions. 
In 2008, Kjetil Mellingen recommended in an NPS thesis that NORSOF should 
establish a national-level joint SOF command to ensure and optimize the strategic 
utilization of NORSOF. NORSOCOM was established in 2014 and is the sponsor of this 
report. Another recommendation, the reorganization of MJK/NORNAV SOF from Level 
5 to level 3, was realized in 2012.67 These changes impacted MJK in regard to chain of 
command and resource allocation, since this resulted in a more elevated position in the 
Norwegian military system than previously.  
After the realization of a strategic-level NORSOCOM in 2014, Eirik Kristoffersen 
argued that the Norwegian model could serve as an example of a small nation’s 
development of a strategic-level SOCOM, and described its challenges, roles, and 
responsibilities.68 Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of the U.S. global SOF 
network (GSN) as an expansion of the SOF organization for small states, and commented 
on how SOF reach and utility could be expanded through this SOF network of trust.  
                                                 
66 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research (Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979). 
67 Kjetil Mellingen, “Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
68 Kristoffersen, “Small States, Smart Solutions.” 
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Tom-Erik Kihl and Jonas Carling expanded on the GSN issue in 2015 and 
described how Norway and Sweden could utilize their membership in the GSN more 
effectively. They argued that GSN membership could provide those at the policy level 
with an alternative security cooperation forum that would have access to information and 
resources.69 For the purpose of this report, we aim also capitalize on the GSN when 
discussing NORSOF future MA capabilities, as we believe the GSN could and should be 
viewed as extending NORSOF capabilities. For instance, the CONOPS proposed in 
Chapter V seeks to use GSN capabilities in the pursuit of Deterrence. 
In 2014, Tommy Olsen and Marius Thormodsen tackled NORSOF’s current 
organizational culture and suggested a leadership approach to unify NORSOF’s two 
tactical units and the newly established NORSOCOM in order to improve organizational 
efficiency.70 
2. “Vertical Split” 
However, the most relevant examination of the strategic utility of NORSOF’s 
capabilities remains Tom Robertsen’s NPS thesis from 2006.71 Using the dichotomy of 
direct action vs. indirect action capabilities as a framework, he hypothesized that an 
organizational structure with two tactical SOF units with largely overlapping direct 
capabilities (SR/DA) was inconsistent with future roles and missions. Analysis of the 
forces’ history, the security environment and the strategies adopted to deal with current 
and future threats, led Robertsen to conclude that NORSOF would increase its relevance 
by acquiring competency in indirect action capabilities. His organizational 
recommendation was to cede the main responsibility for direct capabilities to MJK and 
responsibility for indirect capabilities to FSK.72 In this report, we use the term “vertical 
split” to describe this kind of organizational solution. 
                                                 
69 Tom-Erik Kihl and Jonas Carling, “The Global Special Operations Forces Network from a Partner-
Nation Perspective” (capstone report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015). 
70 Tommy Olsen and Marius Thormodsen, “Forging Norwegian Special Operation Forces” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).  
71 Robertsen, “Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces.”  
72 Ibid., 89–93. 
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Robertsen based his arguments for an organizational split between indirect and 
direct capabilities in NORSOF largely on the U.S. SOF scholarly literature, which seems 
to almost unanimously suggest that a split is the best solution. For instance, David Tucker 
and Christopher Lamb argue that the direct action approach tends to be overemphasized 
and indirect action downplayed when applied in the same unit, an argument also made by 
Thomas Adams.73 Anna Simons, a social anthropologist, researcher, and lecturer on SOF, 
argues that direct and indirect approaches appeal to very different individuals, require 
very different skill sets, unfold along very different timelines, and offer markedly 
different rewards. She makes a solid argument for why “maintaining a firewall between 
(direct and indirect forces) is the only way to ensure that the division of labor remains 
congruent with where individuals’ talents and interests lie up and down the chain of 
command.”74  
Other NATO allies are also considering establishing permanent units of advisors. 
Guro Lien argues that for smaller nations, which may have difficulty deploying a large 
number of combat troops, this could be a way to contribute to operations and be a force 
enabler through supplying a niche capability.75 Citing Jan Erik Haug, she also cites the 
discussion in the UK about the possibility of forming permanent capabilities for military 
assistance, security, and development tasks.76  
Apart from differences in size, an obvious organizational difference between U.S. 
SOF and NORSOF is that those elements of U.S. SOF that have an indirect approach as 
their main capability are also regionally aligned in support of geographical regional 
Component Commands (COCOM). Simons argues that regional proficiency for SOF  
                                                 
73 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, “Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging 
Threats,” Strategic Forum, no. 219 (January 2006): 1–6; Robertsen, “Transforming Norwegian Special 
Operation Forces,” 89. 
74 Anna Simons, “Why Firewall?” 
75 Guro Lien, “Military Advising and Assisting Operations,” in International Military Operations in 
the 21st Century: Global Trends and the Future of Intervention, eds. Per M. Norheim-Martinsen and Tore 
Nyhamar (New York: Routledge, 2015), 86 (Kindle Reader version). 
76 Jan Erik Haug, “The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team Program as a Model for Assisting 
the Development of an Effective Afghan National Army” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, 2009); Lien, “Military Advising and Assisting Operations,” 86. We do not know if 
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only is possible “if people stay put for long periods of time and engage in serious, career-
long study of the areas of responsibility.”77 NORSOF has no such regional alignment, 
and predicting where future NORSOF missions may take place in order to develop 
NORSOF regional proficiency seems futile. However, given Norway’s geostrategic 
position as a NATO flank state in the High North bordering Russia, regional proficiency 
for NORSOF in its own region should be at least be considered. We follow this line of 
thought in chapter V, when discussing possible MA CONOPS for NORSOF in support of 
“reassurance” of Russia. 
3. “Organizational Fit” 
One set of academic considerations that is missing from the unclassified literature 
concerning NORSOF capabilities is organizational theory. Robertsen’s analysis of FSK 
and MJK was based on their historical development. Tommy Olsen and Marius 
Thormodsen focused on organizational culture. But, organizational structure remains 
unaddressed. Analyzing FSK and MJK from an organizational theory perspective could 
offer critical insights as to the extent to which “organizational fit” might matter, 
especially if dividing responsibilities for direct and indirect capabilities remains on 
NORSOCOM’s agenda. 
Detailed organizational research on NORSOF would obviously have to be 
classified. Unclassified research has tended to describe the two tactical units in NORSOF 
as near equal in size, structure, and capabilities, with a slight tilt toward their service-
affiliation (Navy/Army).78 We contend that this description is incomplete. We also think 
that one kind of “organizational configuration” might be relatively better fitted for the 
indirect approach (including MA), as opposed to a different configuration, better suited 
for direct approaches. For example, if we use Mintzberg’s “Dimensions of Organizational 
Design” as a framework, our assumed differences become easier to highlight, as indicated 
by the red text in Figure 5. 
                                                 
77 Anna Simons, “Seeing the Enemy (or Not),” in Rethinking the Principles of War, ed. Antony D. 
McIvor (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 340.  
78 We assume that this is done for OPSEC reasons. 
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Figure 5.  Mintzberg’s Dimensions of Organizational Design79 
Based on such a framework, we further contend that the two units could be 
identified more or less as two of Mintzberg’s five archetype organizations: “professional 
bureaucracy” and “adhocracy with operating core.” 
Our working assumption is that both units have the same level of professionalism, 
but we contend there are differences in other dimensions. For instance, it is likely that 30 
years of national CT readiness as the core task for FSK has shaped its organization 
relatively more toward being a “professional bureaucracy.”  
Professional bureaucracy has the operating core as its key part, uses 
standardization of skills as its prime coordinating mechanism, and 
employs vertical and horizontal decentralization. The organization is 
relatively formalized but decentralized to provide autonomy to 
professionals.80 
What receives priority in both training and exercises is “the CT system,”81 
comprised of a large Joint organization with FSK as the operating core. Hostage rescue 
                                                 
79 Source: Richard L. Daft, ed., Organizational Theory and Design, 8th ed. (Cincinnati, OH: South-
Western, 2004), 17–20. For a full overview of Mintzberg’s structural configurations, see Mintzberg, 
Structuring of Organizations, 330 
80 Fred C. Lunenburg, “Organizational Structure: Mintzberg’s Framework,” International Journal of 
Scholarly, Academic, Intellectual Diversity 14, no. 1 (2012), 5.  
81 In Norwegian, “System Kontraterror.” 
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operations (HRO) are also conducted using this same type of system. FSK administrative 
and support ratios are relatively higher and the operational elements are larger.82 To 
minimize the complexity of the environment, high value infrastructure and other possible 
targets are mapped, plans are devised, exercises are undertaken and results are filed. 
When incidents occur, plans are hastily adjusted based on deviations derived from 
available intelligence. “Deviation analysis” is actually a term in FSK. “Thoroughness 
breeds confidence” is FSK’s motto, invoking images of drills and standardization. For 
national missions, FSK operates under police mandate and ROEs. As Mintzberg suggests, 
an organization formalizes its behavior to  
reduce its variability, ultimately to predict and control it. One prime 
motive for doing so is to coordinate activities. The fully formalized 
organization, as far as possible, is the precise organization. There can be 
no confusion. Everyone knows exactly what to do in every event.83  
This is necessary for systems doing large-scale CT operations. 
The assumption that FSK’s three decades of national CT standby and training 
have developed it into a more formalized organization than MJK is supported by the 
findings of Olsen and Thormodsen when they examined organizational culture in 
NORSOF: “Members of FSK think they are significantly more efficient on the following 
four points: readiness, overall organizational performance, the quality of their staff/
support, and resource allocation,”84 all qualities related to FSK as a system.  
In the same survey, MJK members scored themselves as “significantly more 
efficient on innovation, quality of the selection course, TTP development and quality of 
the operators,”85 all qualities related to the effectiveness of individuals and the team. 
Relative to FSK, it is possible that MJK has moved more in the direction of being an 
“adhocracy with operating core.” According to Mintzberg, such organizations seek “in 
                                                 
82 As dictated by the nature of the high value infrastructure like oil platforms, cruise ships at sea, 
hotels, and government buildings, such an attack force is never large enough. The availability of infiltration 
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83 Mintzberg, Structuring of Organizations, 83.  
84 Tommy Olsen and Marius Thormodsen, “Forging Norwegian Special Operation Forces,” 45. 
85 Ibid. 
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complex environments …(to) engage sophisticated specialists, especially in their support 
staffs, and require them to combine their efforts in project teams coordinated by mutual 
adjustment.”86 Also, “The structure tends to be low in formalization and decentralization. 
The primary goal is innovation and rapid adaptation to changing environments. 
Adhocracies typically are medium sized, must be adaptable, and must use resources 
efficiently.”87  
As Olsen and Thormodsen indicate, MJK escaped being restricted by national CT 
readiness prior to 2015, and could therefore indulge in experimentation with new 
capabilities.88 Some of MJK’s supporting (specialist) capabilities are cutting edge, but 
this may not be apparent to outsiders.89 Within MJK the prime level of focus has 
traditionally been the MJK patrol, not the MJK system at large. Given MJK’s slightly 
different focus and history, it is possible that initiative is valued more highly in selection 
and training.90 Also, decision-making is possibly more egalitarian.91 The natural 
conclusion would be to think that the MJK patrol is a relatively more autonomous unit, 
possibly with a higher quantity of skills at the patrol level than their FSK counterpart, an 
assumption based purely on time available for picking up skills.92 Unlike FSK, MJK has 
a separate SOF-related curriculum at the Naval academy, and possibly a broader 
exposure to higher education to include King’s College and NPS.93 In addition it is 
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relevant to point out that MJK is a smaller unit, with less control-span and less 
administrative support than FSK.94  
We believe both MJK and FSK are mainly “professional bureaucracies” in 
garrison, and that both units (as with most SOF units) do move in the direction of 
“adhocracy with an operating core” when task organized and deployed on exercises and 
operations.95 We have argued, however, that a classified structural analysis of these 
forces based on Mintzberg’s framework would likely identify FSK as more of a 
“professional bureaucracy” even when deployed, and that MJK remains more of an 
“adhocracy with operating core.” The recent Afghanistan investigation report presented 
to the Norwegian government supports our hypothesis:  
[In the beginning in Afghanistan], the differences in training, modus 
operandi and culture were too large. While one community (MJK) is 
influenced by a maritime conflict environment, where lower commanders 
for practical reasons often get a lot of liability, the other (FSK) is 
increasingly characterized by tighter planning, command and control.96 
We mention these distinctions to raise the question: What are the implications if 
NORSOCOM still seek a “vertical split” between FSK and MJK? Theoretically speaking, 
working indirectly by, with, or through indigenous forces demands more relational, 
flexible, and innovative methods of conducting operations than do direct approaches; this 
often calls for a different type of individual operator as an advisor.97 If our hypothesis 
and assumptions about the organizational differences between FSK and MJK are 
confirmed, we would expect MJK to provide a better organizational fit for indirect 
approaches over FSK, which has a better organizational fit than MJK for direct 
approaches. 
                                                 
94 Control-span is defined as “the number of persons that reports to one leader/supervisor in an 
organization,” see: Richard L. Daft, ed., Organizational Theory and Design, 8th ed. (Cincinnati, OH: 
South-Western, 2004) 
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96 Godal et al., NOU 2016, 62. 
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4. “Horizontal Development” and “Vertical Implementation” 
As previously mentioned, the literature in support of an organizational, vertical 
split between indirect and direct approaches mainly focuses on the world’s largest SOF 
community, that of the United States. The size of the entire NORSOF community 
amounts to about 1% of U.S. SOF. NORSOF is also significantly different in that 
NORSOF personnel have the possibility of serving for much longer.98 The NPS strategic 
design project NORSOF 2025 took these Norwegian particularities into account and 
recommended a career management system with three separate tracks: The subject matter 
expert (SME) track focusing on deep knowledge to include MA experts; the warrior-
diplomat track, to include senior MA advisors, negotiators, and high level liaisons; and 
the traditional command track.99 As the NORSOF 2025 report suggests, NORSOF 
personnel would begin as “warriors” early in their career, mainly focusing on SR/DA 
missions, and evolve into “warrior-diplomats” at later stages in their careers, as they gain 
education, maturity, and experience. In this report, we refer to this organizational solution 
as “horizontal development.” NORSOF 2025 did not reach a conclusion about an optimal 
organizational structure, but identified five possible options. Only one of these resembles 
what we have described as “vertical split” in this report.100 
Another organizational trend in special operations forces is that the number and 
range of skills individual operators/teams are expected to master is increasing. On one 
hand, this increase might degrade the intensity and level of skills which Tugwell and 
Charters describe as characteristic for SOF.101 On the other hand, the increased use of 
experts and enablers represents a recent workaround. Both NORSOF 2025102 and SOF 
2030103 describe how SOF teams will likely be smaller, with a core of irregular warfare–
experienced operators assisted by enablers. The enablers would even outnumber the 
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operators. As a result, SOF 2030 argues that “enablers, enhancers, and support staff also 
need to go through a rigorous assessment and selection.”104 Viewpoints of NORSOF 
personnel on drawing external expertise into NORSOF to increase its MA capabilities are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Another organizational recommendation drawn from the literature described as a 
best practice in military advising, is the importance of advising at all different levels of 
command in the mentored force in a coordinated manner (including real-time 
coordination of all day-to-day cases). A RAND study from 2013 identified best practices 
when building Afghan special operations forces and cited NORSOF’s training, assisting, 
and mentoring of CRU 222.105 According to the RAND study, a best practice was to 
engage in “comprehensive mentoring”; advisors followed the different national mission 
unit’s (NMU) communication, requests, and orders, up and down the chain of command 
on a case-by-case basis. When coordination between the advisors at different levels 
became hampered, outcomes suffered.106 We refer to NORSOF’s ability and capacity to 
mentor a force at different levels as “vertical implementation” in this report, and discuss 
it in more depth in the next chapter. 
5. Doctrinal Responsibility for MA in Norwegian DOD 
Another general argument made in the literature is that military organizations tend 
to re-focus on their traditional (conventional) capabilities between wars, while a focus on 
indirect approaches seems to live on, if at all, only in some academic circles. It is striking 
how lessons learned from indirect approaches during World War II (WWII) had to be re-
learned late in the Vietnam era, and how the lessons learned from Vietnam had to be re-
learned again, late in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Tellingly, among the 
approximately 20 “centers of excellence” in NATO, we can find no institution concerned 
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with MA-type operations, like COIN or SFA, with the possible exception of NATO 
special operations headquarters (NSHQ).107  
Doctrinally, MA is a SOF responsibility in NATO, and USSOCOM is the joint 
proponent for all SFA in the United States.108 Hærens våpenskole, the Norwegian army’s 
equivalent of the U.S.’s training and doctrine command (TRADOC),109 has been 
responsible for training programs for conventional forces (CF) advisor teams like 
OMLTs. CF advisor training largely focused on technical and tactical training to achieve 
a necessary level of military competence prior to soldiers deploying.110 According to a 
Norwegian institute of international affairs (NIIA) report from 2012, most of the OMLT 
mentors interviewed saw no branch of the Norwegian defense establishment express a 
specific interest or focused effort to learn from their experiences or expertise, “and 
neither did they expect this to happen.”111 The lack of doctrinal or organizational sharing 
of responsibility for MA-type expertise and operations in Norway seems self-evident. 
Consequently, the organizational dilemma for NORSOF may be described as follows: 
NORSOF is the only entity doing (SOF) DA operations in Norway, and their 
responsibility for codifying and institutionalizing this knowledge is obvious. But MA is a 
mission for both SOF and CF. Doctrinally and traditionally, MA is NORSOF’s domain. 
But the new Norwegian land doctrine will shortly include SFA operations at large for the 
very first time.112 Different organizational solutions to institutionalize MA knowledge, 
therefore, are not just possible, but will be necessary for NORSOF. These are elaborated 
upon in Chapter IV.  
The aforementioned NIIA report also concludes that the Norwegian defense 
system should have a “structure available” to enable Norwegian forces to maintain 
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readiness for MA, and that MA should receive more attention in the curricula at 
Norway’s military academies and staff college. Finally, the report suggests that the 
Norwegian government should coordinate its competence-building when situations call 
for the defense, justice and foreign departments to provide assistance to other countries’ 
security sectors. According to the report, all the initiatives and projects that are 
implemented within “classic” security sector reform from all departments, as well as the 
MA activities that the armed forces have conducted since 2005, should be considered.113 
6. Summary 
In this section, we have reviewed literature regarding SOF’s organization with a 
special focus on the organization of SOF’s MA capabilities. We have argued that the 
GSN could and should be viewed as an extension of NORSOF capabilities. We have 
considered the idea of organizational “vertical splits” between SOF units (separation by 
specialization into direct and indirect approaches), and we have argued that 
organizational “fit” should be taken into account when considering such a solution. We 
have introduced “horizontal development,” a concept borrowed from NORSOF 2025 as 
an alternative to “vertical split.”  
We have described an organizational trend in SOF that has led to an increased 
number of experts and enablers, and also discussed the importance of advising different 
levels of command in real-time (vertical implementation/ comprehensive mentoring). We 
have described the need for an institutionalization of MA knowledge and best practices 
across both NORSOF and Norwegian CF, and we will propose additional organizational 
options later in this report. Finally, we have suggested that NORSOCOM should be the 
coordinating authority in the DOD at the strategic level with responsibility for joint/
interagency operations that encompasses SSR, SFA, and SOF-type MA. 
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C. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL 
Indirect action missions “are very hard to define and prepare for.” 
 —Thomas K. Adams in U.S. Special Operations Forces in 
Action114 
 
The literature on selection, training, and education of military advisors is 
relatively broad. For the purposes of this report, we have chosen to look at three main 
categories: 
 Literature concerning requirements, traits, and skills deemed necessary for 
effective advisors 
 Literature evaluating MA selection and training, both in SOF and CF 
 Literature that mentions selection, training, and education of Norwegian 
military advisors  
The literature that addresses requirements, traits, and skills deemed necessary for 
effective advisors consists largely of concrete “lessons learned/advice for advisors.” 
However, generally these lessons are deduced from an array of research publications, 
military reports, biographies, doctrines, and interviews.115 Personal accounts, like those of 
a very young Ben Malcom in North Korea, prove what can be achieved by young men at 
the tactical-operational level without deep military expertise or strategic oversight; but 
such young people need great interpersonal skills, obvious organizational talent, and a 
young lieutenant’s view that “anything seems possible.”116 When it comes to strategic 
level military advisors, the wile, humor, tact, and strategic understanding of the “curious 
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solipsist” Edward Landsdale, are examples of traits to look for when advising at higher 
levels.117 
1. Professional Skills vs. Cultural and Pedagogic Competence 
Robert D. Ramsey from the U.S. Army combat studies institute has written two 
extensive studies on military advising.118 In the first, Advising Indigenous Forces: 
American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, Ramsey distills the insights 
gained by the U.S. Army from its advisory experiences in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador. Among the key points Ramsey makes is “the need for U.S. advisors to have 
extensive language and cultural training and to adapt U.S. organizational concepts, 
training techniques, and tactics to local conditions.”119 He also notes “how important it is 
for the host nation’s leadership to buy into and actively support the development of a 
performance-based selection, training, and promotion system.”120 We believe NORSOF 
personnel with recent experience as mentors for CRU 222 in counterterrorism operations 
in Kabul would likely agree with his view of a performance-based selection, training, and 
promotion system,121 even though the latter (e.g., a meritocratic promotion system) might 
be utopic in tribal/feudal societies like Afghanistan and Iraq.  
A classic work on military advising, written by individuals who actually advised 
advisors, is Gerald Hickey and Walter Davison’s 1965 RAND Vietnam study.122 Unlike 
Ramsey, Hickey and Davison contend that “the first qualification for anyone serving in 
an intercultural context is professional competence; linguistic and social skills do not 
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make up for lack of professional and technical know-how.”123 Much of the literature 
from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq describes military advisors’ lack of cultural 
awareness and failure to establish rapport as the main obstacles for successful military 
advising. Hickey and Davison, too, describe “cultural empathy” or “cross-cultural 
sensitivity” as important qualities and argue that these traits are more likely to be found 
among minorities, members of groups with a strong tradition of involvement overseas, or 
the offspring of intermarriages.124 The targeted selection of individuals from specific 
groups for special warfare was an important feature when the OSS was established to 
support indigenous forces during WWII.125 It was also a key feature in the establishment 
of U.S. Army SF. First-generation immigrants and naturalized citizens do represent a 
group of people that can have valuable experiences that can be utilized when working 
with indigenous forces, and should  therefore be potentially be targeted through selection. 
Given the current and future operational needs in 2008, Trevor O. Robichaux conducted a 
study where he addressed the potential immigrants and naturalized citizens represented 
for the U.S. SF community.126 We, therefore should ask, is this concern also relevant for 
NORSOF? 
The targeted recruitment of personnel from immigrant communities is possibly 
easier in the United States—where numbers are higher and U.S. SF’s regional focus 
makes targeted recruitment more viable over the long term— than in Norway. 
Nevertheless, NORSOF has operated for more than a decade in Afghanistan without any 
specific effort to recruit individuals from the region. Peter Hellesen also points to this 
untapped potential for NORSOF in his thesis.127 Worth noting is that this category of 
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personnel has played a limited but important role within the Norwegian intelligence 
community.128 
2. MA-specific Traits and Skills 
DA and SR traits and skills are arguably more concrete, tangible, visible and 
appealing to both potential SOF candidates and their evaluators and trainers. In contrast, 
MA traits and skills are harder to conceptualize, measure, exercise, and showcase (for 
recruitment purposes). Furthermore, the literature describing military advisor traits and 
skill sets is diverse, and often-required traits and skill sets depend on the local cultural 
context. Nevertheless, we have striven to search for common denominators mentioned in 
the literature and in discussions on military advising. The purpose of the following is, 
therefore, to present a list of traits (which may be inherent and, therefore, need to be 
selected for), vs. skills (which can be taught, given the right traits). Such a list could be 
used by NORSOF selection personnel (including psychologists) and training wings for 
their consideration: 
 Professional competence and courage. There is a misconception that 
military advising and assistance operations are low-risk operations and 
mainly involve training inside a camp.129 
 Patience, endurance, maturity, and considerable reserves of mental 
stamina because MA missions are slow, messy and invariably political.130 
 Language learning abilities, negotiation skills, empathy. 
 Genuine interest in different cultures, social and military systems, and a 
curious mindset. 
 Ability to build rapport with a purpose, and then to use this rapport. 
 Enthusiasm, adaptability, and navigation skills in both the human and 
physical terrains. 
 Enthusiasm about training, exercises. and operations outside the social 
comfort zone (in addition to the classic SOF training outside the physical 
comfort zone). 
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 Superior organizational skills, along with teaching skills and the capacity 
for adapting and exploiting a wide range of different cultural settings. 
 Writing skills and a willingness to document actions, analysis, assessments, 
etc., so as to create an organizational memory for each MA operation. 
 Humor, wiles, intelligence, and honesty. 
 Minimal personal need for recognition and attention from others. Not 
dependent on regular positive feedback, as it is less likely to be provided 
during MA missions. 
 An opportunistic mindset. The ability to influence one’s own chain of 
command as well as the advised chain of command, an empiric necessity 
based on literature. 
 An “unmilitary” philosophical and reflective bent, to cope effectively with 
ethical dilemmas and moral anguish. 
 
No one has all of these traits and skills, and it is possible a generation gap exists 
between generations X, Y, and Millennials regarding interests and self-realization as SOF 
members.131 This is important, because MA is not about “us”; it is about “them.” The 
purpose of SOF conducting military advisory missions at the tactical level is undoubtedly 
to teach and train foreign military forces (by doing FID), or irregulars (by doing UW). 
Some of the literature we reviewed argues that “teaching SF to teach others” has, to a 
large degree, been left out of training and education, mostly to make room and time for 
tactical training (SR/DA) in non-permissive environments.132 “Teaching teaching-skills” 
was an important part of the U.S. SOF curriculum before 9/11 when, according to the 
literature, a focus on direct action capabilities took over. The subject has had to be put 
back in the curriculum; increased focus on teaching is often included in the term 
“bridging the UW gap.”133  
                                                 
131 Simons, “SOF 2030.” 
132 See, for example, Steven P. Bucci, The Importance of Special Operation Forces Today and Going 
Forward (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2015), paragraph “SOF training and expertise.” 
133 See, for example, United States Army, Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022, Special 
Warfare 26 (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 
2013). 
 39
One specific study, which evaluated CF military transition teams and interviewed 
U.S. Army soldiers from the conflict in Iraq and/or Afghanistan, indicates that the 
soldiers received education in cultural differences, but not any education in teaching or 
presenting material.134 We consider it equally important to NORSOF to ask what degree 
NORSOF is specifically teaching its advisors to teach indigenous forces as well. 
3. Norwegian “Exceptionalism”? 
The extensive U.S. literature on military advising begs the question of whether 
there are differences between U.S. and Norwegian advisor experiences, and whether it is 
possible to discern specific Norwegian cultural or national traits with specific relevance 
to NORSOF MA operations. For future Norwegian advisors, we highly recommend Ola 
Krekvik’s investigation of the ethical dilemmas and practical challenges Norwegian 
OMLTs experienced when working alongside Afghan forces, and the cultural challenges 
of living and operating side-by-side with local forces.135 This particular study argues that 
the common practical and cultural challenges and dilemmas faced by military advisors 
were present, but perceived as manageable by Norwegian CF advisors.136 Living and 
fighting together with Afghan forces was considered to be positive and meaningful. The 
biggest challenges arose when local forces treated civilians unethically, and, to a lesser 
degree, when national constraints caused tactical limitations.137  
Krekvik’s report further suggests that the professional identity adopted by 
Norwegian soldiers and officers may have made it easier for them to understand, interact 
with, train, and help Afghans rather than forces from more centralized, hierarchical, and 
authoritarian military systems. Norwegians are expected to contribute outside of their 
prescribed responsibilities, and flexible and unconventional solutions are perhaps more 
common to Norwegian forces, to include those outside of NORSOF. One reason might be 
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that Norwegian forces are less hierarchically structured and exhibit more informal 
relationships between the ranks. The contrast drawn here is with the U.S. approach.138 
Other evaluations of Norwegian OMLTs confirm this picture, although their validity 
might be questionable since Norwegian interviewees are evaluating themselves in both of 
these reports.139  
We found one unclassified report that evaluates NORSOF’s ability to build 
“indigenous” special forces capacity. A RAND study from 2013 examines best practices 
when building Afghan special operations forces. Examining NORSOF’s training, assisting, 
and mentoring of CRU 222 was an important component of the study.140 The RAND study 
does not evaluate individual advisory skills and traits, but focuses on systemic best 
practices and approaches when special mission units are advised. NORSOF are described 
as concentrating on improving CRU capabilities, rather than on racking up operational 
statistics.141 On the one hand, NORSOF displayed a “tough love” approach to training:  
As one senior Afghan CRU officer noted, the difference between 
Norwegian mentors and others he has worked with is that Norwegian SOF 
“will let you drop, drop, drop, drop and you are about to drown and they 
will then pick you up.” Such a “tough love” approach has shown results: 
“While they saw us drop, they also saw us stand up.”142 
On the other hand, NORSOF also took building personal rapport seriously:  
Building rapport between host-nation and partner units is key to successful 
mentoring and partnering. Norwegian SOF, for example, focused on 
building friendships, playing sports together, and even engaging in Afghan 
dance and traditional activities. … The Norwegian mentor team built a 
small and relatively unsecured enclave inside the larger CRU facility. The 
enclave was adjacent to the CRU’s living quarters and allowed unfettered 
interaction between the mentors and the CRU operators.143 
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The report concludes:  
The advances across these units were aided by a number of sound 
partnership approaches. [CRU] mentors focused on building Afghan 
capacity rather than focusing solely on achieving operational effects. They 
sought to wean coalition support to operations by curtailing the number of 
coalition personnel on Afghan missions and limiting certain levels of 
intelligence enablers to foster a sustainable Afghan approach to 
operations. Rapport and continuity were especially strong areas of 
mentorship, with British and Norwegian troops performing numerous 
repeat tours with their Afghan partners. Such repeat tours played an 
especially important dividend in building strong relationships with Afghan 
personnel.144 
In Chapter III, we discuss some of the quantitative data from the FFI survey 
regarding which factors NORSOF personnel felt constrained them in their advisory 
efforts in this specific MA mission. 
4. Summary 
In this section, we have reviewed the literature on selection, training, and education 
of military advisors. The literature describes “professional competence” as perhaps the 
most important capability during MA missions. Seemingly, this has not been a problem for 
NORSOF during MA missions, as most operations have been a perfect fit with regards to 
NORSOF’s “field of expertise”: building a CT unit with a police mandate.  
Besides professional competence, we have derived a list of different skills and traits 
from a variety of texts. In the next chapter, we discuss to what degree such traits and skills 
are currently part of NORSOF’s recruitment, selection, and education processes. 
Our literature review also reveals that lack of time and resources spent on 
“teaching both SF and CF to teach others” are the main obstacles to effective military 
advising. How NORSOF has dealt with this is also a subject of discussion in the next 
chapter. We also examine factors related to personnel and training which may have 
constrained NORSOF’s performance in MA operations. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE FFI SURVEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast some of the DOTP-P 
challenges and dilemmas identified in the literature in the last chapter with the results 
from a very recent quantitative-qualitative study conducted by FFI.145 The 85 survey 
participants were key NORSOF personnel who previously had participated in NORSOF 
MA operations.  
The FFI survey was designed to quantify different normative attitudes regarding 
the future of NORSOF’s MA capability. The survey was also designed to collect 
qualitative information from these NORSOF practitioners of MA in order to strengthen 
our analysis of the quantitative data. It is important for us to take into account both 
qualitative and quantitative data from this sample when we make our recommendations 
for future DOTP modifications. After all, some of the survey participants are current 
subject matter experts, leaders, or future leaders in NORSOF, and they will shape how 
NORSOF capabilities evolve.  
The FFI survey maybe found in the appendix of this report. The most important 
results are discussed in this chapter. Questions concerning the survey can be directed to 
research scientist Frank B. Steder at the Norwegian defense research institute (FFI). 
B. DOCTRINAL ISSUES 
1. MA in Doctrine 
Reviewing allied and national doctrine describing MA, we found that current 
doctrine does not address the special use of NORSOF for national purposes, and the 
current doctrinal guidance for MA capabilities and operations is not linked to specific 
Norwegian strategic interests: rather, doctrine is retrospective in focus. This issue was not 
addressed directly in the FFI survey. However, when asked to rank 13 factors (in order of 
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importance) which may have reduced the effectiveness of NORSOF MA operations, the 
lack of doctrine and concepts for MA in NORSOF ranked as the third highest factor. This 
does not support the immediate need for a national SOF doctrine, but it does point to a 
perceived weakness in the hierarchy of NORSOF documents regarding MA, which is 
worth considering. The results from this part of the study are presented in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  Factors That May Reduce the Effectiveness of NORSOF MA 
Operations146 
As these results from the FFI study suggest, the two top factors are organizational: 
“Lack of organizational memory and documentation of activities and evaluations,” and 
“lack of vertical implementation on the levels above me in the mentored force.” The 
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latter describes a situation whereby NORSOF does not have mentors at the necessary 
higher levels or support functions in the mentored chain of command. This could reflect 
the fact that NORSOF does not educate enough advisors for higher levels of command, 
or the fact that Norway does not receive enough positions at higher levels in what are 
usually international and coalition constructs. Given these results, a possible future 
national SOF doctrine should insist on both “vertical implementation” and a better 
documentation system as prerequisites for future NORSOF MA operations. 
2. NORSOF on “Strategic Importance of Direct vs. Indirect 
Approaches” 
In Chapter II, we described a common argument regarding the doctrinal use of 
SOF: that indirect approaches yield relatively larger strategic effects than direct 
approaches. We rhetorically asked whether this argument also held true for NORSOF, 
given that NORSOF has extensive national (mainly direct approach) tasks.  
The response to this question in the FFI survey was a bit surprising to us: “Most 
academics who have studied SOF, argue that the strategic effect/importance of the SOF 
indirect approach (e.g., MA) is relatively higher than the direct approach (e.g., DA).” The 
responses appear in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.  NORSOF on Strategic Effect Direct vs. Indirect Approach147 
Sixty-eight percent of the respondents agreed, at least to some extent, that indirect 
approaches have a higher strategic effect than direct approaches for SOF in general. Of 
these, 11% completely agreed with the statement, 71% agreed that the statement was true 
at least to some extent, and for NORSOF in particular 21% were in complete agreement. 
Given NORSOF’s mainly direct action national tasks, our initial hypothesis was that the 
respondents would hold the statement to be less true for NORSOF than for SOF in 
general. But the opposite turned out to be the case, although by a very narrow margin 
(3%). What might explain this result?  
One of the responders clearly objected to comparing the strategic effect of the two 
different approaches for NORSOF without first considering NORSOF’s given roles and 
tasks.148 With the exception of national responsibility for maritime CT and HRO, it is our 
perception that the roles and tasks for NORSOF (e.g., MA) are constantly changing and 
evolving; they are far from set in stone. Since both tactical units in NORSOF officially 
describe themselves as “full spectrum SOF,” we believe the NORSOF responders’ 
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opinions about the strategic importance of direct and indirect approaches matter. When 
examining the qualitative comments related to this question, NORSOF responses point to 
several possible explanations: 
 Some commented that DA is only successful as part of an indirect 
strategy. These respondents pointed to a general phasing of conflicts, 
where direct approaches have higher strategic utility in particular phases in 
order to shape the enemy and set conditions for lasting solutions by, with, 
and through local government forces (FID) or other supported groups 
(UW). Hence, a strategic indirect approach has a higher impact in the long 
term but is often dependent on direct capabilities for shaping. Some 
respondents compared this development with their own experiences in 
Afghanistan. 
 Others pointed to what Hammersmark describes as a political/symbolic 
strategic effect (as opposed to a functional strategic effect);149 Norwegian 
politicians believe MA operations pose less risk to the force and that it is 
easier to gain both domestic and international political goodwill for MA 
activity. Some respondents even argued that it is pointless to discuss 
whether direct or indirect approaches are most valuable at the strategic 
level, as decisions on the use of NORSOF “mainly are based on political 
considerations and not on the strategic requirements in the theater.”150 
 Some respondents commented on the limitations of predominantly direct 
strategies in contemporary conflicts, based on their own experiences in 
Afghanistan. They recognized the strategic effect of killing/capturing High 
Value Targets. At the same time, they acknowledged that such operations 
are rare and pointed to the limited strategic effects of such a strategy if the 
judicial system is corrupt or incompetent. As such, they agreed with the 
findings in the SOF 2030 report, where the problem of “rendition” is 
described as the main obstacle for efficient direct approaches.151  
 Respondents who answered that direct approaches have a relatively higher 
strategic effect than indirect approaches for NORSOF mainly pointed to 
the importance of NORSOF’s national missions. One comment sums up 
this point of view:  
For Norway, the strategic purpose of most MA operations is to 
gain status as a reliable and trustworthy partner to the U.S. and 
NATO. The strategic purpose of the DA capacity is mainly to 
protect vital Norwegian infrastructure and save Norwegian lives, 
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something no foreign capability can do for us. Hence, MA 
capability is a strategic investment. DA capability is a strategic 
insurance. The Norwegian challenge is to balance investments and 
insurance.152 
Seventy-one percent of the responders agreed that indirect approaches have a 
higher strategic utility for NORSOF than direct approaches do. However, when asked to 
rank the different doctrinal capabilities from AJP 3.5 in order of importance for 
NORSOF, the result is seemingly the opposite, as shown in Figure 8 (only first rankings 
are depicted): 
 
Figure 8.  Doctrinal Capabilities Ranked After Importance for NORSOF153 
If we assume that most national tasks are direct in nature, 77% of the respondents 
ranked direct capabilities as most important, while 23% described indirect capability 
(MA) as most important. While this may seem like a contradiction given that 71% agreed 
that indirect approaches had the highest strategic utility for NORSOF, strategy is not the 
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same as capability. When analyzing the qualitative comments, we discern some 
additional explanations for this apparent contradiction:154 
 Several respondents argued that MA capability to a large degree is the 
result of the professional competency derived from training, for practicing, 
and conducting national tasks of SR and DA. Following this line of 
argument, it makes sense to rank the direct capabilities first, as they 
constitute the professional basis for the MA capability. These respondents 
emphasized military professional skills as most important even in MA 
operations.  
 A few respondents commented that developing and maintaining 
capabilities to fulfill the national tasks are most important. These are 
described as “first-responder” and “no-fail” missions in the comments. 
The general argument from this group of respondents is that national 
requirements trump the needs of allies. (See the previous comment about 
insurance vs. investment).  
 Others commented that MA is only successful if it is part of a strategic, 
comprehensive indirect approach, and indicated that this has not been the 
case in contemporary conflicts. We interpret some of the answers to imply 
that, because of the lack of political will in coalitions to do what it takes to 
implement a comprehensive indirect strategy, direct capabilities were 
ranked higher, since they are of national importance and less dependent on 
the comprehensive, uncertain variables which a coherent coalition strategy 
abroad requires. (Our summary of several comments). 
3. NORSOF on Doctrinal Responsibility for MA 
In the last chapter, we described a trend whereby MA had evolved from being 
historically mainly a SOF activity now to involving huge numbers of conventional 
forces—contrary to the DA and SR tasks, which continue to be mainly SOF activities. 
Norwegian conventional forces (CF) have also done extensive MA operations in 
Afghanistan over the past decade and now also in Iraq, and SFA will be described for the 
first time in the upcoming revised Norwegian land doctrine. Given this trend, the 
question is whether MA should continue to be a SOF doctrinal responsibility in Norway. 
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Figure 9.  MA as a Doctrinal Function in NORSOF155 
As the results depicted in Figure 9 suggest, 70% of the NORSOF respondents 
disagreed with the normative statement that there is no obvious reason why MA 
doctrinally is a SOF function in Norway. Also, when MA is presented as a specialist 
function, respondents were asked whether this specialization justifies MA’s doctrinal 
affiliation with NORSOF, and 50% disagreed. These results suggest that a majority 
believe that NORSOF should remain the doctrinal proponent of MA for Norway’s 
defense forces, while only 50% agreed that the alleged need for specialized MA selection 
and training justifies this NORSOF ownership. Therefore, other rationales must inform 
the respondents’ points of view. 
None of the comments elicited by question 11 in the survey spoke specifically 
about justifications for why MA should remain a NORSOF doctrinal function. Most 
responders commented that MA is a task for both SOF and CF, although directed at 
different types of partners (e.g., SOF with special units vs. CF with conventional units), 
and in some cases in different phases of a conflict, (e.g., SOF may initiate the contacts 
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and do the initial assessments of standards and requirements, with CF taking over if CF 
military expertise is a better “fit”).  
Two respondents highlighted the Norwegian conscription model as an important 
first selector: this “guarantees” people with sufficient intellectual and educational 
capacity both in CF and in NORSOF. This was also considered to be a comparative 
advantage that Norwegian CF has when conducting MA missions relative to some other 
nations. As one individual commented: “Not all CF should do MA, but Norwegian CF 
are a product of a modern education system and selection through conscription. The 
foundation is in place.”156 
One respondent argued that leadership in MA operations is linked to the “SOF 
mindset,” focused on humans rather than hardware and emphasizing creativity and 
flexibility, and that this is the main reason why MA doctrinally belongs in NORSOF. 
Two respondents distinguished MA conducted by CF with MA conducted by SOF 
through the use of some of SOF’s characteristic attributes: economy of force, ability to be 
discreet or covert, ability to advise in less permissive environments, and ability to act 
with more autonomy and superior tactical judgment at the lowest level. 
The bulk of the comments about this problem get centered on discussions about 
whether the MA task for NORSOF requires modifications to selection and training. 
Possible answers to this question will be discussed in section D (Training and Personnel) 
of this chapter. 
4. NORSOF on Norwegian Strategic Interests in MA Operations 
In Chapter II, we projected an increased demand for both direct and indirect 
capabilities from NORSOF in the future and argued that this implies that NORSOF must 
look for cost-effective, small footprint MA operations, prioritized toward Norwegian 
strategic security policy objectives. The FFI survey investigated whether Norwegian 
strategic interests have been clear in NORSOF MA operations, and whether this matters 
to NORSOF personnel during operations (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10.  NORSOF on Norwegian Strategic Interests in MA Operations157 
Forty-four percent of the respondents indicated that Norwegian strategic interests 
have been unclear while conducting MA operations, and here we find one of the few 
statistically significant differences between the different strata of respondents: 59% of the 
responders who characterized themselves as “staff” felt that Norwegian strategic interests 
had been unclear during MA operations, while only 40% of those in the group 
“leadership felt similarly.”158 It is difficult to elucidate why “staff” is overrepresented in 
this case.  
Sixty-eight percent disagreed to some extent with the normative statement that it 
is not important to me what Norwegian strategic interests MA operations pursue, while 
32% agreed. There were no statistically significant differences between the strata on this 
issue, although the group that categorized itself as belonging to “leadership” tended to 
disagree more (74%) than the rest (68%). Personnel with higher military education (staff 
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college) disagreed marginally less (64%) than the average (68%), which might come as a 
slight surprise. 
When analyzing the qualitative comments, some explanations can be found: 
 Norwegian political ambiguity concerning strategic interests in 
Afghanistan and Iraq seems to be the dominating factor that explains the 
high percentage of respondents who described strategic interests as 
unclear, across all strata.  
 Some respondents argued that it is not their job to assess Norwegian 
strategic interests, though at the same time they do care that Norwegian 
interests are pursued during any type of NORSOF operation. This suggests 
there may be a problem with the phrasing of question 15b, which has 
implications for the validity of this particular result. 
 A few commented that Norwegian strategic interests are not important; 
what is important to these respondents is simply that NORSOF is the best 
“tool in the toolbox” to do the job asked.159 
 Most respondents argued that clearly stated Norwegian strategic interests 
are important (but not crucial) to motivation when conducting MA; such 
clarity improves the results of the mission. Several respondents did 
describe a lack of clear communication about these interests. A sampling 
of comments is highlighted below:  
The strategic interests have been obvious, but they have not been clearly 
communicated; rather, they have deliberately been made vague. A clear 
example is Afghanistan.  
We lack agreement on the strategic goals to synchronize Norwegian 
diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) efforts. The effect 
could have been much higher if plans and tools were coordinated between 
agencies towards nationally agreed strategic ends.160  
These, and similar comments, reflect some of the viewpoints recommending a 
national COIN or LIC doctrine (as presented earlier in this report).  
Several respondents commented that Norway has no national strategic interests in 
the contemporary conflicts in which NORSOF is involved, except on the basis of 
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reciprocity with our NATO allies in case Norway faces a crisis in the future. This 
comment is illustrative:  
It is difficult to separate Norwegian interests from “the rest of the West’s” 
interests. … Norwegian politicians are, understandably, “band-wagoning” 
on big allies, with one notable, positive exception: Iraq 2. … Diesen is 
right when he said there is a lack of strategic discourse in Norway. If 
Norwegian interests are clearly stated, we could war-game and task-
organize SOF to support national strategic interests in a whole range of 
scenarios beyond those already tried, and push more options to the 
political level.161 
One respondent interpreted “national strategic interest” to be the same as 
“separate national agenda,” which he perceives negatively:  
The strategic goals of the missions have always been clear to me. I am glad we 
have had no separate national agenda during these missions. My experience is that 
the nations that do have such agendas might damage the relationship with the 
mentored force.162 
From our perspective, “separate national agendas” are agendas that may work 
contrary to a coalition’s strategy. Consequently, “national strategy” may simply be to 
fully support a coalition strategy; it does not have to be separate or different. But then, 
this full support has to be made clear, and without caveats.163 
5. NORSOF on the Dangers of Misuse 
In the last chapter, we described a cost-driven trend of shrinking conventional 
forces, who will increasingly be tied to national tasks, particularly given a historic peak in 
political popularity for NORSOF. Based on this, we argued that the possibility of misuse 
of NORSOF might increase. This argument echoes that of Spulak, who argues that 
“applying the principle of economy of force may lead to the misuse of SOF, thinking that 
as more capable elite warriors they are just more economical conventional forces.”164 
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In the FFI survey, the following statement was presented to the NORSOF 
respondents (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11.  NORSOF on Misuse of MA Capability165 
In response of our survey participants, 65% indicated that they fear misuse of 
NORSOF to some extent, while 35% to some degree indicated that they do not fear 
misuse. Although below the threshold of statistical significance, some differences among 
the different strata responding are worth a comment since both those in the operational 
squadrons (78%) and in “leader roles with staff college”166 (74%) feared misuse more 
than did the average at 65%. The latter stratum represents NORSOF officers with the 
highest levels of military education. Presumably some of these officers work in 
NORSOCOM and, as such, are responsible for military advice regarding the use of 
NORSOF.  
                                                 
165 FFI, FFI Survey, question 14a. NOTE: this survey question may lead the survey participant toward 
one partial answer. 
166 The FFI survey categorized the responders demographically. See Appendix A for details. 
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This was the statement in the FFI survey that generated the most comments. Of 
the minority who disagreed (and who not fear misuse of NORSOF in MA operations), the 
following comments are worthy highlighting: 
I agree that not all missions NORSOF has been part of were SOF 
missions. However, with a strategic staff (NORSOCOM) in place, I 
believe the chief of defense will receive sufficient advice on the future use 
of NORSOF. If, then, we are asked to take on missions contrary to the 
military advice, we have to improvise to achieve the best outcome 
anyway.167 
I think SOF should focus on solving problems and not be too busy 
considering if one is “misused” or not. If the Norwegian government 
thinks it is an important mission we should be happy to contribute.168 
The comments from the majority of respondents, who feared misuse to some 
extent, revolve around the political decision to deploy NORSOF to an MA mission in 
Baghdad in 2015. According to some media sources, this decision was taken contrary to 
the military advice of the chief of defense169 and compromised NORSOF identities to 
Iraqi authorities in the process: 
The fact that the Government decided to deploy NORSOF on a basic 
training mission in Iraq, contrary to the advice of the chief of defense, 
proves that NORSOF can be used to serve political and not military 
purposes.170 
I think the Baghdad mission bordered on misuse of the SOF capability. 
The justification for not sending NORSOF was well founded. The 
decision to compromise NORSOF personnel in order to do a political 
mission, contrary to military advice, was disappointing.171 
This was allegedly a case in which Iraqi authorities demanded passports and other 
personal information about NORSOF personnel in order for them to train Iraqi units in 
Baghdad. Despite NORSOF’s protests, the Iraqis’ demands were eventually met: 
                                                 
167 FFI, FFI Survey, comments on question 14b. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Kjetil Stormark, “Advised Not to Send Special Forces to Iraq,” Aldrimer.No, June 12, 2015, 
https://www.aldrimer.no/fraradet-a-sende-spesialstyrker-til-irak/. 
170 FFI, FFI Survey, comments on question 14b. 
171 Ibid., comments 14b. 
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“otherwise NORSOF would not be welcomed by the Iraqi authorities.”172 Worth noting 
is that RAND has found that when the advisor-nation wants a mission more than the 
nation receiving the advisors, the fit is obviously bad and the advisor-nation should step 
back.173 Seemingly, Norwegian politicians wanted this mission more than the military 
did and bowed to Iraqi demands. As the FFI survey suggests, revealing information about 
NORSOF operators may explain about 50% of the skepticism directed at future 
misuse.174  
Judging by the comments, the remainder of the respondents who fear some kind 
of misuse of NORSOF in future MA missions attribute this to a fear of being bogged 
down with operations that other Norwegian forces can do. The comments suggest that 
NORSOF personnel should hand over MA missions to other units when possible. Sixty-
two percent of the respondents agreed to some extent that they have personally conducted 
MA operations where they assessed that conventional forces could have conducted the 
operation.175 
I fear that the political level still think that NORSOF are “elite infantry” 
which are far easier to deploy than CF. There will be MA missions that 
Kystjegerkommandoen (KJK) or Telemark Bataljon (TMBN) are well 
suited to do, but using SOF instead might increase political gains. This 
might restrict our capability to take on more important tasks.176 
I have two fears regarding misuse of SOF: The first is that we are sent to 
do jobs conventionals can do. It was pointless to have SOF instructors 
running a basic recruit school in Baghdad. The second fear is that of being 
deployed with too many political caveats. There will be future operations 
where the demand for direct action will be imminent while conducting 
                                                 
172 NTB, “Norwegian Forces Must Provide ID to Iraqi Authorities,” Aftenposten [Evening Post], sec. 
Innenriks, November 7, 2015, http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Norske-styrker-ma-oppgi-ID-til-
Iraks-myndigheter-8234090.html.  
173 Christopher Paul, “Presentation of RAND Research Project: What Works Best When Building 
Partner Capacity and Under what Circumstances?” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
May 25, 2016). 
174 This estimate is made based on the number of qualitative comments in the FFI study, focused on 
this case in particular. 
175 FFI, FFI Survey, question 19b. 
176 Ibid., comments on question 14b. 
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MA. My fear is that we might be restricted from doing what is right and 
smart in the theater due to political compromise at home.177 
6. Summary 
The FFI survey suggests that “lack of doctrine and concepts for MA” is a 
challenge within NORSOF. Judging by the comments, a better conceptualizing of MA 
“concepts” is a more immediate requirement than written doctrine. 
NORSOF respondents largely agreed with the literature that suggests that SOF 
indirect approaches yield comparatively higher strategic effects than direct approaches, to 
include operations conducted by NORSOF itself. However, the respondents rightfully 
argued that SR, DA, and MA are all important capabilities when an indirect strategy is 
pursued.  
The respondents supported the view that NORSOF should remain the doctrinal 
proponent for MA in the Norwegian DOD. They agreed that NORSOF should remain 
supportive of Norwegian CF doing MA operations and should remain willing to shed MA 
operations to CF when this is feasible. The challenge for NORSOCOM remains how to 
execute and share this doctrinal responsibility with CF.  
Almost half of the NORSOF respondents, all of whom have participated in 
NORSOF MA operations, indicate that Norwegian strategic interests were not always 
clear during MA operations. The need for a clear guidance in regard to national interests 
is described as important, but not crucial.  
Well over half of the respondents (65%) feared misuse of NORSOF in the future. 
The first MA mission NORSOF was sent to conduct in Iraq in 2015 against military 
advice seems to be the main trigger for this skepticism. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF NORSOF 
1. Current Fit for Doctrinal Tasks 
This section begins with an analysis of the NORSOF respondents opinions about 
how well NORSOF is currently organized and trained in relation to the doctrinal tasks 
                                                 
177 Ibid. 
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derived from AJP 3.5. Only the first place rankings are depicted in these two figures. 
There were no significant differences among the different strata of the respondents (see 
Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12.  NORSOF #1 Rankings Organizational Efficiency vs. Training and 
Exercise178 
Since most national missions are either DA or SR, many respondents have 
commented that “national missions” should not be a category in its own right in this 
ranking, and we agree. This explains the difference between these results and those 
depicted in Figure 8.  
We have summarized the main impressions from the qualitative comments related 
to each individual task.179 
 Direct action: This capability is ranked highest, both on organizational fit 
and when it comes to training and exercises. Most comments revolved 
around the necessity for an integrated NORSOF air capacity. 
                                                 
178 FFI, FFI Survey, questions 16a and 17a. 
179 Ibid., comments 16b and 17b. 
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 Special reconnaissance: The main argument in the comments is that 
NORSOF has a lag in its organic intelligence capability development and 
is too dependent on support from the national intelligence service (NIS). 
 National missions: Support to the police, mainly CT support, is practiced 
and conducted via large joint missions. This gives NORSOF and their 
joint partners necessary system-training at the operational and strategic 
levels, as well as tactical training for the squadrons. Some commented that 
the bureaucracy has increased, and that involvement of an even-larger 
joint, interagency organization may have added unnecessary layers when 
time is of the essence. As mentioned, many respondents have categorized 
such operations as “DA” when ranking the capabilities. 
 Military assistance: Some commented that conception that how MA 
missions should be conducted has a greater variance than for the other 
tasks. They argued that SR and DA have several standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), TTPs, and courses that synchronize NORSOF, while 
MA missions are more ad hoc. Some respondents commented that there 
are huge differences in how the different task groups (TGs) conduct MA 
with the same partner (rotating TGs for the same mission). This is strongly 
supported by another finding in the FFI survey: The lack of organizational 
memory and documentation of activities and evaluations was ranked as the 
highest factor out of 13 alternatives and may contribute to reducing the 
effectiveness of NORSOF MA operations.180 
Fixing such an organizational problem requires ownership in the form of MA 
subject-matter experts and instructors. NORSOF uses a system with Master Instructors 
(MIs)181 for most skillsets. The FFI survey also measured to what degree MIs were 
formally established for different skillsets, including MA.182 About 20 different MI 
positions were mentioned in the comments. Of these, three are assessed to have a direct 
relationship with building MA capabilities: one Officer 6 (OF-6) “senior staff officer 
(SSO) MA-Capacity Building” in NORSOCOM, one newly established OF-5 “SSO 
International Relations” in NORSOCOM, and one “MI international operations” in 
FSK’s training wing. In addition, the senior instructors in MJK’s intelligence surveillance 
reconnaissance (ISR) squadron are teaching MA-related skillsets related to rapport 
building, coordinating meetings, and reporting. These positions may form the backbone 
                                                 
180 FFI, FFI Survey, question 20; see also Figure 6. 
181 In Norwegian, Hovedinstruktør (HI). 
182 FFI, FFI Survey, question 23a.  
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of a future “community of practice” network for MA in NORSOF should NORSOCOM 
choose to implement the recommendations from NORSOF 2025 with horizontal 
development of MA specialists.  
2. “Vertical Split” vs. “Horizontal Development” 
In the last chapter, we reviewed literature on the organization of SOF capabilities. 
We described a “vertical split” between SOF units (separation by specialization in direct 
and indirect approaches), featured most commonly in the U.S. literature. We also 
described “horizontal development” as a possible organizational solution and alternative 
to “vertical split.” The latter is a solution whereby SOF personnel mainly focus on DA 
skills early in their career, then evolve into “warrior-diplomats” through education, 
experience, and maturity later in their careers.  
The FFI study included the following statements designed to measure NORSOF 
respondents’ opinions about the “vertical split” option for NORSOF (see Figure 13). 
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Figure 13.  NORSOF on “Vertical Split”183 
Across all strata, an average of 80% of respondents disagreed with a vertical split 
for NORSOF based on the dichotomy between mainly direct vs. indirect capabilities. The 
respondents made several arguments against a vertical split. The following is a summary 
of the most frequently cited arguments: 
 Size & sustainability. Assuming that NORSOF numbers will not increase 
substantially, NORSOF is too small to specialize. This was by far the most 
common argument made.184 To be sustainable over time, to maintain 
capabilities in order to fulfill NORSOF’s role in the defense of Norway, to 
deal with other national tasks, as well as future MA/SR/DA missions 
abroad, will require rotation among all operative elements in NORSOF. 
Another argument made is that specialization will increase the burden on 
the squadrons over time, more than generalization and rotation will, 
relatively speaking. Some also argue that variation of tasks over the course 
of a career is important; this motivates NORSOF personnel to have longer 
careers. In sum, these comments support “horizontal development” rather 
than a “vertical split.”185 
                                                 
183 FFI, FFI Survey, questions 18b and 18c.  
184 Ibid., comments on question 18e. 
185 FFI, FFI Survey, comments on question 18e.  
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 Synergy between direct and indirect capabilities. This is also a function 
of limited size. Several respondents warned against treating MA as 
“something special.” This group’s main argument is that the MA 
capability is a product of NORSOF’s other capabilities. Therefore, a split 
will erode the skills that are foundational for MA. These respondents 
supported the idea of NORSOF personnel conducting MA within their 
field of expertise derived from training for and from executing their 
national missions.186 
The FFI survey measured responses about “horizontal development” with a 
statement related to NORSOF’s ability to mentor at operational and strategic levels (see 
Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14.  NORSOF on “Horizontal Development”187 
When “NORSOF capability to conduct MA at the operational and strategic level” 
is presented as justification for establishing a new “MA career track” in NORSOF, about 
half of the responders agreed, while the other half disagreed. We discuss NORSOF’s 
capability to produce advisors for the operational and strategic levels later in this report. 
                                                 
186 Ibid. 
187 FFI, FFI Survey, question 18a. 
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At this point, however, the results from the FFI study suggest that “horizontal 
development” has a higher rate of support in NORSOF (49%) than does “vertical split” 
(20%). Although few commented on the “horizontal development” solution directly, 
some comments regarding organization were: 
 Rather than designating MA to a unit, self-selection and selection could be 
used to give some NORSOF personnel more education and experience 
within this field.188  
Some respondents commented that “task-organizing” is even more important 
during MA missions than other missions. They argued that modifications to the “normal” 
TG structure is relatively more necessary during MA missions due to the increased 
importance of MA-related personal skills and traits.189 
3. MA Experts and Enablers 
In the last chapter, we described an organizational trend in SOF, whereby the 
numbers of “experts” and “enablers” are increasing in the SOF community. This 
development has also affected NORSOF. It is our hypothesis, however, that such 
“imported expertise” mainly has enabled NORSOF in areas other than MA.  
The FFI survey measured NORSOF response to external recruitment of personnel 
with specific expertise to enhance MA directed toward the operational and strategic 
levels of MA respondents. The results are depicted in Figure 15. 
                                                 




Figure 15.  NORSOF on External Recruitment of MA Expertise190 
Few commented on this question directly. One commented that the NORSOF 
community already has too many “non-badged” personnel who lack a basic “hunter-
spirit.”191 Others commented that bringing in such outside expertise must be mission-
specific. For some MA missions, the necessary expertise will be “in-house,” while in 
other cases external expertise has to be recruited. Others commented that NORSOF 
should always attract talent from wherever it may be found; NORSOF numbers are 
limited and external expertise is a requirement, especially if mentoring above the tactical 
level is an ambition. 
Some respondents recognized the important role non-badged personnel also play 
in MA missions. One reason might be that during DA-operations, non-badged personnel 
almost always have supporting roles, while in MA operations they may be in supported 
                                                 
190 Ibid., question 18d  
191 In Norwegian, Jeger-ånd. Is an expression used in NORSOF to describe “each man’s 
determination to solve the mission regardless of conditions.” Definition from Tone Danielsen and Sigmund 
Valaker, Technological Innovation With Speed And Direction in Special Forces: An Anthropological Study 
(Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Defense Research Institution/FFI, 2012), 23 (our own translation). 
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or even leading roles: “MA provides clearly non selected personnel an opportunity to be 
recognized among the selected operators.”192 
4. Summary 
 The most important factor reducing the impact and effectiveness of 
NORSOF MA operations is organizational: The lack of organizational 
memory and documentation of activities and evaluations.  
 While other NORSOF tasks have “Master Instructors” to help synchronize 
concepts and activities, this is less true for MA. Nevertheless, the top level 
of a potential MA network is currently in place in NORSOCOM. 
 A vast majority of the respondents oppose the idea of a “vertical split” 
between capabilities, while roughly half of the respondents support the 
“horizontal development” model presented in NORSOF 2025. The limited 
size of NORSOF, and the need for sustainability in operations and synergy 
between direct and indirect capabilities appear to account for the 
respondents’ preferences. 
 A majority of respondents agreed that NORSOF needs increased 
recruitment of external expertise if “vertical implementation” at several 
levels of command during MA operations is to be achieved. 
D. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL 
This section discusses the results of the FFI study related to the findings in 
Chapter II concerning the functional factors training and personnel, including selection 
and education. At first glance, the FFI study suggests that there appears to be a gap 
between the perceived strategic importance of indirect approaches (e.g., MA), and the 
attention it receives in selection, training, education, and organization. This apparent gap 
is depicted in Figure 16. 
                                                 
192 FFI, FFI Survey, comments on question 26. 
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Figure 16.  Strategic Importance vs. Implementation193 
While 71% agree that indirect approaches like MA have the highest potential 
strategic effect, only 46% agree that this should be reflected in selection, training, 
education, and organization. There might be many reasons for this gap, and one of them 
has already been discussed: the fact that SR and DA are regarded as the building blocks 
of SOF MA. In Chapter II, we highlighted the discussion in the literature about whether 
military professional skills or cultural knowledge and teaching abilities are the most 
important qualities of military advisors. We argued that, when training, mentoring, and 
assisting indigenous special units, such as NORSOF has done in the Baltic countries and 
Afghanistan, “professional competence” in SR and DA were critical capabilities. As 
depicted in Figure 17, a majority of NORSOF personnel think that professional 
competence at NORSOF tasks is the “backbone” of MA. However, 44% also recognize 
that there is more to MA missions than just teaching basic SR and DA techniques. 
                                                 
193 FFI, FFI Survey, questions 7a and 11b. 
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Figure 17.  NORSOF on SR, DA vs. MA Skills194 
The respondents’ comments may be summarized as follows: The statement is 
most valid at the TTP level; without professional and technical expertise in SR and DA, 
training others is pointless. However, when building supporting functions, that is, when 
assisting a functioning staff and advising leaders at higher levels, the importance of SR 
and DA skills decreases. Officer training, cultural awareness, understanding of power 
dynamics in the mentored force, interpersonal skills, and social tact become more 
important instead. Several respondents commented that the common denominator for 
advisors across different military levels is “cultural understanding and knowledge and 
understanding of SOF.”195 
1. Thoroughness Breeds Confidence? 
Beyond military technical skills, does NORSOF have a systematic approach to 
building MA capabilities? How does NORSOF address MA skills beyond DA and SR? 
Special Operations Forces are commonly known to be innovative and almost unstoppable 
in exhausting opportunities and taking prudent risks, as well as developing different kinds 
                                                 
194 FFI, FFI Survey, question 21b.  
195 Ibid., comments on question 21f.  
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of expertise to conduct SR and DA missions in whatever manner might be required. This 
is also the case in NORSOF. The FFI study suggests, however, that NORSOF’s 
thoroughness with regard to MA may not be at this same level (see Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18.  NORSOF Perceived Thoroughness in Doctrinal Tasks196 
Seventy-two percent of the respondents think that NORSOF’s approach to MA is 
not as thorough as it is for SR and DA. As with most SOF, NORSOF’s primary identity 
group is likely to be the tactical unit, (e.g., MJK or FSK). And, like most humans, 
NORSOF personnel are mainly motivated by status and positive feedback from this 
primary identity group. Since the FFI study suggests that NORSOF’s approach to MA is 
not as thorough as it is for SR and DA, a natural question is whether MA performance 
generates less internal status and/or less positive feedback from within the units. When 
asked whether MA efforts are valued/appreciated differently compared to DA/SR efforts 
in NORSOF, all but one of the comments starts with a “yes.”197 Here are some of the 
most representative comments: 
                                                 
196 FFI, FFI Survey, question 21d.  
197 FFI, FFI Survey, comments on question 26.  
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Yes. MA is valued totally different. No one is valued to think long term! It 
is “all about getting” the DA experience.198  
Yes. MA generally has a low status. MA is a mission thrown at you, with 
orders that basically read: You’ll figure it out.199  
Yes. There are not many medals awarded for MA efforts, for those who 
think medals are a way to measure appreciation.200 
Yes. Naturally, it’s more status with DA. There are few good “war stories” 
from training afghans in operations planning. You get no recognition for 
spending 20 hours per day to slowly build up local capacities. But this is 
natural.201 
Yes. Generally, very little credit is awarded for anything else than DA. In 
the Norwegian armed forces, we are better at appreciating personnel who 
have been in contact with the enemy rather than personnel using 
cleverness to avoid contact.202 
Yes. On one of my tours mentoring CRU 222, we encountered several 
contacts with the enemy, yet none of my soldiers fired their weapons in 
combat during that tour. Our focus was that CRU 222 should do the 
fighting; we would not engage until strictly necessary. We were always 
present, just a few meters from our Afghan colleagues, but we did not take 
active part in the fighting. When I explained this back home, I was 
confronted with how much better it was during the earlier deployments, 
when NORSOF engaged actively in all the fighting. They implied that 
things were better when CRU were worse. This is one example of values 
in my unit.203 
Others drew a contrast between how young vs. more experienced personnel view 
DA and MA.  
MA is perceived as second-class by many, especially the younger ones.204 






203 FFI, FFI Survey, comments on question 26. 
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DA is generally more valued. There is, however, a tendency that more 
experienced personnel appreciate the effects of MA more than the 
personal satisfaction of conducting a successful DA.205  
My response is generic: I think DA is valued higher, perhaps primarily for 
the younger guys. More experienced personnel understand that the real 
long-term effect is best achieved with MA. Medals are awarded for DA, 
rarely for MA. So there is a potential for improvement, to provide formal 
recognition for superior performance in MA missions.206 
Based on these comments, it seems evident that MA efforts provide less status 
and are appreciated less than performing other doctrinal tasks. At the same time, some 
operators seem to develop a deeper understanding of the importance of MA with 
operational experience and age. 
2. Recruitment 
A thorough approach to any NORSOF capability starts with recruitment. 
Recruitment in NORSOF consists of a selection phase and a basic training program of 
12–18 months for personnel in the operational squadrons,207 and targeted or self-
recruitment by application for other categories of NORSOF personnel.208 This last 
category has a separate basic training program. As depicted in Figure 19, about three-
quarters of the NORSOF respondents agree that MA-specific traits and skills play no 
significant role in selection, training, and education: 
                                                 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Norwegian conscripts are selected after testing of all 17-year olds. There is competition to get in; 
more people want to serve than there are positions available. NORSOF selects from this pool of already 
selected people.  
208 Active recruitment: NORSOF reaches out to personnel with required expertise. 
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Figure 19.  NORSOF on MA-specific Traits and Skills in Selection and 
Training209 
While the survey results suggest that a systematic fostering of MA-specific traits 
and skills play no significant role in NORSOF selection, training, and education, 
respondents had numerous opinions about what kinds of traits and skills are most 
important for military advisors.210 Most fall under the categories listed in the literature 
review, Chapter II, section C.2 “Training and Personnel, MA-specific Traits and Skills.” 
Rather then repeat them, we only note additions here:  
 More training with different weapon systems used by mentored forces 
prior to MA operations 
 Assume minimal western information technology (IT) tools and high-tech 
ops rooms; be able to visualize tactics and operations and use aids like: 
modeling tables, mock-ups; know how to use figures, do basic map-
writing, etc. 
 Concentrate on more English language training, to include military 
technical terms; increase training in the use of interpreters 
                                                 
209 FFI, FFI Survey, questions 24a and 24c.  
210 Ibid., comments on question 25. 
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 Develop knowledge of organizational/societal culture and theory (to 
understand foreign military/irregular organizations, as well as foreign 
social systems like tribes and clans) 
 Train in countering insider threats (indicators and behavior to look out for) 
The comments concerning selection for MA split into two groups, reflecting those 
who are fine with the “status quo” and those who seek “minor changes.” Both groups are 
reluctant to make major changes in the current initial selection process.211 Some 
comment that very few people pass the initial selection as it is. Thus, adding “negative 
selection” tests to root out those deemed “unfit” for MA during the initial selection phase 
would be premature in someone’s SOF career.  
Synthesizing points of view from the group favoring the “status quo” yields the 
following synthesis of several comments. 
The current selection provides NORSOF with physically and 
psychologically robust personnel who can work and support a team, who 
have a sense of responsibility and a strong work ethic. The basic course 
provides the necessary basic SOF skills and builds professional 
confidence. It is premature in the initial selection phase to select for MA-
specific traits or de-select those “unfit” for MA. Positive selection and 
self-selection for MA should be done at later stages. Talent management 
throughout the career is important to increase NORSOF’s MA 
capabilities.212 
Here is a synthesis of the views of the second, smaller group that advocates minor 
modifications:  
It should be possible to attract more MA talent to selection if the MA 
operations and skills were also “showcased and advertised” as part of 
NORSOF, on par with those of SR and DA. Targeted recruitment of 
specific groups is another possibility.213 While the technical, social, and 
cognitive requirements of SOF operators have changed over the past 
decade or so, selection has remained largely unchanged. While increased 
negative selection tests should not be undertaken during the selection 
                                                 
211 FFI, FFI Survey, comments on question 24f. 
212 Ibid. 
213 FFI, FFI Survey, comments 24f:The following groups are mentioned as additional talent pools for 
NORSOF: FEH; minority groups; university faculties that have area studies, language, and engineering on 
the curriculum. 
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phase, more positive selection for MA and leadership tasks could be done 
as early as the basic course.214 
Not one respondent in either of these two groups desires major changes, and all 
respondents agree that talent management after initial selection is most important when it 
comes to improving NORSOF’s MA capabilities. However, while comments throughout 
the survey suggests that a vast majority of NORSOF respondents think that “personal 
traits” are relatively more important in MA than in other operations, and that MA units, 
therefore, need to be task-organized with the right individuals, the comments also reveal 
that this is not being consistently emphasized right now. Most respondents describe a 
situation in which the task organizing is done in an ad hoc fashion, by choosing the 
“closest man available, not necessarily the best person for the job.”215 Alternatively, “my 
experience is mixed: from ad hoc task-organizing of personnel with less probability to do 
a good job, to a TF with the right people with the right traits to influence in a great way at 
their respectable level,”216 or; “When we have a great fit in higher MA positions, it is 
because of “luck,” not because of a systematic approach.”217 
3. Training and Education 
If we move past the initial selection phase and focus on subsequent training and 
education, the FFI survey suggests that specific MA training and education has a low 
priority (see Figure 20). 
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Figure 20.  Relative Emphasis on MA Training and Education218 
Again, the importance of the military components of MA (SR and DA) may partly 
explain these results, as some comments suggest.219 However, a majority of the 
respondents who wrote comments about MA training and education argue that a more 
systematic approach is needed; today the focus differs too much between squadrons. The 
main concern is that the current training, education, readiness, and operations regime 
already stretches the squadrons, and especially the staff in the two tactical units, to their 
limits, especially in terms of time. Some comment that a training and education system 
for MA has to be implemented from the top-down: “if this is subject to individual 
squadron planning, it will not be prioritized.”220 These findings concur with the ones we 
highlighted from the literature: SR and DA will always trump MA-specific training and 
education in units that are supposed to master all three skillsets.  
                                                 
218 FFI, FFI Survey, question 21c.  
219 Ibid., comments on question 21f. 
220 Ibid.  
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The FFI survey asked the NORSOF respondents to explain whether they had 
received training or education specifically related to MA.221 The most common answer 
was “No.” Besides pedagogical skills taught to them during basic officer training, a few 
respondents listed courses at NPS, the international special training center (ISTC), King’s 
college, and Joint special operations university (JSOU) as relevant. Others listed basic 
intelligence/liaison courses, which included instruction on culture, communications, 
preparing for meetings, and reporting.222 Several respondents commented positively 
about the effect of both training other Norwegian units during the preparation phase for 
MA operations223 and the learning experience gained from participation in exercises like 
Flintlock in African countries.224 Currently, NORSOF has no internal MA exercise in its 
annual exercise program. Training other military personnel as if they were indigenous 
forces, just as U.S. SF does in its Robin Sage exercise,225 is not a part of any exercise in 
the current NORSOF “official” exercise program.  
“Lack of language skills and competence” was ranked number six of 13 factors 
that affect NORSOF MA operations.226 A very limited number of NORSOF operators 
have done language training in foreign languages other than English as part of their 
overall military training. English is the working language both in coalition operations and 
when working with local interpreters. Currently, there is no NATO STANAG testing or 
English language training of NORSOF personnel who have not been through officer 
training at Norway’s military academies.227 
                                                 
221 Ibid., question 22.  
222 Ibid., comments on question 22. 
223 Ibid., comments on question 21f.  
224 Ibid.; United States Africa Command, “Chad to Host Flintlock 2015,” December 12, 2014, 
http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/article/24027/chad-to-host-flintlock-2015.  
225 One example can be found in Anna Simons, The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army 
Special Forces (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), ch. 5.  
226 FFI, FFI Survey, question 20. See also Figure 6.  
227 Information released from FSK and MJK. 
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4. Pedagogical Skills and Vertical Implementation 
Our review of the literature revealed that while U.S. CF and SF advisors are 
educated in cultural awareness issues, teaching them how to teach others in a different 
cultural setting (MA pedagogy) is increasingly absent from military advisor training. We 
also described how U.S. SF had refocused on this issue through its “bridging the UW 
gap” strategy. The FFI survey did not address the question of pedagogical skills directly. 
From other sources, however, we learned that all enlisted NORSOF receive basic non-
commissioned officer (NCO) training from their service (Army/Navy) within the first 
two to three years of their military service; pedagogical skills are supposed to be an 
important part of the curriculum. Recently, in FSK, this has been reduced to a three-week 
“modified course” to make room for SR/DA training in the squadrons,228 as occurred in 
U.S. SOF during the period between 2001–2014.229 In contrast, MJK has maintained a 
three-month-long course. MJK also has a higher percentage of personnel educated at the 
military academy relative to FSK. Interestingly, both MJK and FSK have trouble 
motivating their personnel to apply for officer training at the military academies,230 
where the development of pedagogical skills is a significant part of the education.  
Based on some of the survey comments, it is possible that a subculture is 
developing in NORSOF (especially among the young operators) that dismisses 
intellectual interests and higher education.231 Other comments suggest that there are 
absolutely no economic incentives for undertaking officer training; on the contrary, the 
incentive system benefits those who stay in the squadrons as long as possible. While this 
holds obvious advantages for NORSOF, it might also impede its ability to produce 
enough SOF officers in the future, and vertical implementation at higher levels in MA 
missions will likely be more difficult.  
As described in Figure 6, lack of vertical implementation in the mentored force 
was rated as the second most important factor preventing NORSOF MA operations from 
                                                 
228 Information released from FSK. 
229 In both tactical units teach pedagogical skills as part of their Patrol Commander training. 
230 Based on numbers received from NORSOCOM, MJK, and FSK via personal communication. 
231 Based on information released from FSK and MJK. See FFI, FFI Survey, questions 23b and 21f. 
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being more effective. Other sources have also critiqued the lack of staff Norwegian 
officers in senior ranking positions on MA operations in which NORSOF has been 
involved, most notably during the debate over NORSOF’s participation in operation 
Inherent resolve in Jordan and Syria.232 
5. Summary 
The FFI survey exposes a gap between perceptions about the strategic effect of 
MA approaches and the lack of MA-oriented selection, training, and education in 
NORSOF. It appears that Norway’s approach to MA (both in terms of capabilities and 
missions) is not as thorough as it is for DA and SR. Reasons for this are several. 
NORSOF members perceive that MA is of lesser status than other doctrinal tasks. This 
perception is more evident among younger personnel than among more experienced 
personnel. A majority of the respondents were of the opinion that MA-related traits and 
skills are not evaluated during initial selection and basic training.  
How to deal with this challenge between the perceived strategic effect of MA and 
the actual training / education in NORSOF is itself challenging. Nevertheless, a majority 
of respondents argue that talent and career management after initial selection are crucial 
to improving NORSOF’s MA capabilities. Details for how to improve processes include 
suggestions such as showcasing the MA part of SOF to attract talent, targeted recruitment 
of certain interest groups, and more positive selection of MA-oriented and leader-oriented 
talent starting as early as during the basic course. 
The FFI survey results suggest that prioritizing MA-specific training and 
education must be implemented from the top-down and must be anchored by some of the 
more experienced formal/informal influencers within NORSOF. Several reasons for this 
are worth highlighting. First, no MA exercise currently exists. Respondents cite both the 
positive effects of training Norwegian CF and exercises like Flintlock, and consider both 
of them good preparation for MA operations. Second, no formal testing of language 
skills, to include English, exists for NORSOF besides the testing done of the officers who 
                                                 
232 Sveinung Bentzrød, “Norway Runs the Risk of Training Rebels Who Will Fight for IS (Interview 
with Officer Tormod Heier),” Aftenposten [Evening Post], October 5, 2015. 
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go through the military academy. Third, NORSOF is no different than U.S. SOF in that 
time spent on learning pedagogical skills has decreased as SR and DA activities have 
increased. Fourth, cultural attitudes and economic incentives are factors that likely will 
impede NORSOF’s ability to produce enough officers for “vertical implementation” at 
higher levels during future MA operations unless a more proactive approach is taken. 
  
 80
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 81
IV. DOTP OPTIONS 
The research question posed to us from our sponsors was: “How can NORSOF 
improve its Military Assistance (MA) capability in order to increase the strategic utility 
of NORSOF?”  
We chose to use the functional capability elements of doctrine, organization, 
training, personnel, and policy (DOTP-P) as our analytical framework. Based on this 
research, we conclude and recommend changes or modifications to NORSOF DOTP in 
this chapter.  
In Chapter V, we propose three different MA CONOPS designed to widen the 
strategic utility of NORSOF, addressing the last P: policy. However, in this chapter we 
offer recommendations for DOTP. 
A. DOCTRINE 
1. National SOF Doctrine 
Our research has shown that current NORSOF doctrine hierarchy does not 
sufficiently address the special use of NORSOF for national purposes and that the current 
doctrinal guidance regarding MA is not directly linked to Norwegian particularities or 
strategic interests; rather, guidance has been reactive. While NORSOF personnel agree 
that an indirect approach, in which MA is a key component, generally yields larger 
strategic effects than direct approaches, the FFI survey also showed us that the “lack of 
doctrine and concepts for MA” is considered by the survey sample of NORSOF 
personnel to be one of the three most significant shortfalls in NORSOF MA operations. 
Our research also suggests that improvement of NORSOF’s MA capability must be 
implemented from the top-down, not bottom-up. Such an implementation starts with an 
authoritative document like doctrine.  
Based on our research, we recommend that NORSOCOM consider writing a 
national SOF doctrine-type document. In our opinion, NATO SOF doctrine is a suitable 
capstone doctrine for NORSOF, but is mainly a NATO SOF “encyclopedia” and not a 
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sufficient guide for future decisions regarding the use and development of NORSOF. 
Future decision-makers may find descriptions in allied doctrines about what SOF, in 
general, can do, but not about what NORSOF in particular can do. Nor will they find 
anything that tells them what separates NORSOF from the rest? The kind of document 
we envision does not have to fit the general understanding of doctrine; it would most 
likely have to be classified, it would not have to be lengthy, and it should be subject to 
more frequent changes than the FFOD. Our point is that such a document would serve as 
a more useful guideline for NORSOCOM than AJP 3.5, especially regarding the 
prioritization of doctrinal tasks and capabilities, criteria for use in support of strategic 
objectives, and for concept development. For instance, given the global SOF network, an 
argument can be made that NORSOF might be better off developing certain niche 
capabilities, rather than duplicating what already exists in other SOF’s, especially when 
these do not create synergies or contribute to Norway’s particular national security needs. 
We believe a national SOF doctrine may increase the strategic utility of all NORSOF 
capabilities, including the MA capability that is the subject of this report.  
Another finding is that with increased demand for NORSOF capabilities in the 
future, and a historic peak in NORSOF’s political popularity (especially for its use 
abroad), likelihood of NORSOF being misused increases. Well over half of the survey 
respondents (65%) feared misuse of NORSOF in the future and according the FFI survey 
many already believe this has already occurred. A national SOF doctrine document that 
offers criteria for NORSOF’s use, as well as a detailed description of the status of 
NORSOF capabilities, could help counter misuse in the future.  
We also believe previous NORSOF officers’ proposals to develop a national 
COIN or LIC doctrine at the strategic level would increase the strategic effect of 
NORSOF MA operations in the future. The process of writing the doctrine would in itself 
force much-needed interagency cooperation. This is supported by other official 
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government reports, which also recommend future Norwegian interagency efforts with 
regard to SSR and MA.233  
2. Overstretch, Synergy, and Size  
All indications are that the demand for both national (mainly direct) capabilities 
and international (mainly indirect) capabilities will increase for NORSOF, and, therefore, 
we have predicted what we describe as an “imbalanced overstretch” in the future. One 
arguments is that costs will drive CF to shrink in size and to focus more on national 
defense, which will increase the political pressure on NORSOF to deploy, both for 
functional and symbolic reasons.234 But at the same time, NORSOF national tasks are 
also likely to expand. A number of measures have to be taken counter such an 
overstretch. 
It is critical to seek synergy between meeting national tasks and conducting MA 
abroad. When Norway has a choice of MA partners, NORSOF should assist, mentor, and 
train maritime SOF or CT units. Whether these are military or police units is not very 
important, although “vertical implementation” for special police units may require police 
officers at higher levels in the mentored chain of command. Training, assisting, and 
mentoring infantry-type forces above the company level, with integrated organic fires, 
engineers, and combat service support (CSS) is most likely a better fit for professional 
Norwegian maneuver units than for NORSOF. Availability of such CF in the future, 
though, will likely be more limited. 
NORSOF’s size obviously matters if future situations of overstretch are to be 
avoided. NORSOF’s growth will most likely need to continue. The amount of skills 
demanded of operators, and time available for current staff and support functions, might 
already be at a breaking point. With a requirement for full-spectrum NORSOF (in which 
                                                 
233 See, for example, Vegard Valter Hansen, Helge Lurås, and Trine Nikolaisen, Within Their Best 
Ability—The Norwegian Forces and their Afghan Partners, Security in Practice 2 (Oslo, Norway: NUPI 
[Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs], 2012b).  
234 These terms are best explained in Hammersmark, “Development of Norwegian Special Forces.”  
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a more professionalized MA capability is one of the added pieces),235 a larger number of 
enablers and experts (especially within intelligence, IO, and other MA-related functions) 
is needed.  
There will be arguments made against continued growth: NORSOF cannot be 
mass-produced; the conscription pool to select from will shrink even more;236 NORSOF 
has already seen exponential growth over the past decade (while other services have 
experienced severe cuts). Nevertheless, NORSOF will continue to be a cost-effective 
toolkit for Norwegian decision-makers relative to the other services, so we believe it is 
safe to assume it will continue to grow. 
3. Cost-effective Solutions, Strategic Objectives 
Over the past decade, NORSOF has “chased missions,” accepted most requests 
and showcased and proved its capabilities. One implication of greater future demand is 
that NORSOF should look for even more cost-effective, small footprint MA operations, 
and limit its operations to only those that clearly support prioritized Norwegian security 
policy objectives. In addition, a more thorough evaluation of strategic utility and impact 
on national readiness and capabilities should become standard.  
Even with ongoing shifts in the geostrategic landscape, Norway’s policy 
objectives of deterrence and reassurance of Russia are unlikely to change. Both represent 
a strategic niche fulfilled by Norway in NATO. We have also described Norway’s role in 
conflict resolutions as another strategic strength, and in preserving international 
institutions and the rule of law as another niche. We believe, the development of the GSN 
will prove important to Norway’s security in the future, but the success of this effort 
depends on a diversity of expertise within individual SOF’s. While the Middle East/North 
Africa (MENA) are likely to remain a focus area for the GSN and NORSOF in the 
foreseeable future, NORSOF would do well to continue to acquire regional expertise in 
the high north and Russia, and increase interagency efforts in support of state department 
                                                 
235 According to FFI, FFI Survey. The two other most important shortfalls are integrated SOF air 
capacity and increased SOF intel capability (in-house). 
236 Following this line of argument, NORSOF should keep its in-house conscription “training units” 
in the future. 
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conflict resolution efforts. If the goal is to increase NORSOF’s strategic utility, a few 
senior NORSOF officers will also need to become “senior MA specialists” for the 
Norwegian DOD. 
Given the experience within Norway’s military and diplomatic communities, 
Norway should be able to provide “vertical implementation” assistance to small countries 
(to strategic, operational, and tactical military and civilian actors alike). The Norwegian 
DSSR projects in Serbia and Montenegro may serve as examples of the kind of 
operations that Norway is well suited to pursue. The best example of a cost-effective 
NORSOF MA effort with a high strategic effect is most likely NORSOF’s recent 
leadership of the NATO-Georgian joint training and evaluation center (JTEC).237 This 
organization has had remarkable achievements over the last year, largely thanks to the 
leadership of one young NORSOF officer. While his achievements might not have been 
the result of a systematic approach to MA education within the NORSOF system, he has 
other very visible “SOF-ish” traits: the ability to work relentlessly, with minimal input; 
belief in his own abilities; and the ability to gain the trust and confidence of those he 
led.238  
We believe NORSOF can increase the strategic utility of its MA capability by 
engaging in several similar, feasible, cost-effective operations in support of the three 
abovementioned policy objectives. Examples are given in the next chapter.  
B. ORGANIZATION  
The results from the FFI survey suggest that NORSOF currently is best organized 
to do DA and SR missions, while MA ranks third. At the same time, the most important 
factor that may reduce the effectiveness of NORSOF MA operations is organizational: 
The lack of organizational memory and documentation of activities and evaluations.  
                                                 
237 Ine E. Søreide, Norwegian Special Operations Forces—From Secret to Desired [Norske 
spesialstyrker—fra hemmelige til ettertraktede] (Oslo, Norway: Regjeringen, 2016). 
238 Joint Training and Evaluation Team, NATO JTEC, Assessment Report Presented to the 
International Staff of NATO HQ on the NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation Center (Tiblisi: 
NATO JTEC, [2015]). 
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1. “Vertical Split” vs. “Horizontal Development” 
In this report, we have reviewed the literature on “vertical splits” between 
NORSOF units (separating then by direct vs. indirect approaches) and concluded that the 
organizational fit should be taken into account if such a solution still is under 
consideration. We have borrowed the idea of “horizontal development” from NORSOF 
2025 as a possible organizational solution. According to the FFI study, NORSOF 
personnel fear that specialization will increase the burden on the squadrons over time, 
and will do so more than keeping everyone generalized and frequently rotating. Some 
also argue that variation is important; this motivates NORSOF personnel to have longer 
careers. In sum, these comments support a “horizontal development” rather than “vertical 
split.”239 
The question NORSOCOM has to consider is, therefore, whether earlier 
recommendations to divide the responsibility for indirect and direct approaches between 
MJK and FSK,240 two (relatively) small tactical units in NORSOF remain relevant and 
applicable for Norway. In numbers, the two units in question equal somewhere around 
1% of U.S. SF. Neither has the capacity to both sustain a NORSOF MA operation (which 
is time-consuming by nature) and maintaining its DA/SR readiness over any relevant 
time on their own. The past decade of NORSOF operations in Afghanistan has proven, 
the tactical units will have to support each other some way or another. Accordingly, most 
NORSOF MA efforts of the last decade have been as part of a COIN campaign. Even 
though MA in order to establish and operate with the CRU in Kabul has been the most 
strategically important contribution, the nature of the conflict also required NORSOF to 
do SR and DA first independently, and then by, with, and through the CRU. This 
argument supports NORSOF 2025’s “horizontal development” solution. 
A similar argument about limited size can be made about NORSOF CT operations 
in a national role. All NORSOF units need SR/DA competence if future terrorist attacks 
are: 
                                                 
239 FFI, FFI Survey, comments on question 18e.  
240 Robertsen, “Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces.”  
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 Deemed to have been carried out by a state actor by the Joint counter 
terrorism analysis center (it is then the responsibility of DOD, not MoI) 
 Offshore  
 Conducted on large or complex infrastructure (e.g., government buildings, 
large hotels, oil and gas installations on land), too big for the Police CT-
unit to handle alone, or 
 Beyond reach of the Police CT-unit because of distance/limited mobility. 
In Norway, all such operations would, by the nature of our limited size and 
command and control (C2) arrangements, be joint/interagency. The only argument left 
for why NORSOF should remain split in two separate tactical units based on former 
service affiliation depends on whether these affiliations are crucial for NORSOF’s tasks 
in other national crisis/war scenarios. In this report we have not discussed the tactical and 
organizational benefits vs. the political and emotional/cultural risks of a full merger at the 
tactical level in NORSOF. According to earlier research, this merger is supported by one 
of the units and strongly opposed by the other.241 Accordingly, our literature review 
suggested that “direct-approach units” trump “indirect approach units” when it comes to 
recruitment, resources, and status. The FFI survey suggests the same. Splitting indirect 
and direct responsibilities between the two NORSOF units would, therefore, not only be 
unwise because of their small size, but would also likely generate emotional and political 
responses like the ones we have seen in the past when earlier proposals were made for 
restructuring NORSOF’s base structure and the merger of units was proposed. We, 
therefore, support the “horizontal development” solution proposed by NORSOF 2025. In 
reality, “horizontal development” is a “talent and career management plan” to better 
utilize NORSOF personnel “for life,” with obvious organizational consequences. As our 
research indicates, while “master instructors” help synchronize concepts and activities 
related to DA and SR, they are virtually absent for MA. This is one reason for why it is 
critically important that dedicated MA specialist positions are established within the SME 
and the warrior-diplomat track.242 Similarly, such positions are also essential for creating 
                                                 
241 Olsen and Thormodsen, “Forging Norwegian Special Operation Forces.” 
242 Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” 54. (See Fig. 32: NORSOF 
Career Management Sub-System). 
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a “community of practice” network for MA.243 The initial structure of this MA network 
is in place and anchored at the top level in NORSOCOM. To reiterate what this 
organizational solution entails:  
 SR and DA are the building blocks early in a career.  
 MA is a more reflective thinking man’s game; experience and credibility 
from having done SR and DA for years adds a lot 
 MA expertise is developed throughout a NORSOF career within the 
warrior-diplomat and SME tracks especially 
A full description of “horizontal development” is beyond the scope of this report, 
and may be found in NORSOF 2025, Chapter VI “People”244 and Chapter VII “Sub-
System: Human Resource Management (HRM).”245 
As our research suggests, another prime responsibility for this network would be 
to collate lessons learned/best practices for MA, and develop MA concepts equivalent to 
concepts developed for SR and DA.  
2. Organizations in Norwegian DOD and MA 
According to the literature we examined, the general argument is that military 
organizations tend to re-focus on their traditional (direct) capabilities between wars, 
while a focus on indirect approaches seems to live on, if at all, only in some academic 
circles. As an example, among the approximately 20 “centers of excellence” in NATO, 
we found no institution concerned with MA-type operations like COIN or SFA, with the 
possible exception of NSHQ.246 This represents a long-lasting cyclic trend that has to be 
broken, especially since we may be caught in an era of ongoing wars during which the 
management of conflicts will be paramount.  
Although more Norwegian CF now have done MA operations than in the past, our 
study supports the view that NORSOF should remain the doctrinal proponent for MA in 
                                                 
243 Ibid., 56 (Fig. 34: Example of a CoP Network). 
244 Ibid., 43. 
245 Ibid., 51. 
246 NATO, “NATO Topic: Centres of Excellence.” 
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the Norwegian DOD. We recommend that NORSOCOM be the coordinating authority in 
the DOD at the strategic level, with responsibility for joint/interagency operations that 
encompass SSR, SFA, and SOF-type MA. The top node of the MA Community of 
Practice in NORSOCOM should bear this responsibility and should utilize any 
opportunity to “shed” operations to CF when possible. The challenge for NORSOCOM 
remains how to “institutionalize” this responsibility with CF.  
The following is a list of organizational opportunities which have not yet been 
touched upon in this report. The list is not prioritized. Nor are the options that are listed 
mutually exclusive. The list is intended as “food for thought” for the future.  
 Establish a SOF training detachment, which encompasses both SR/DA and 
MA, as recommended in NORSOF 2025.247  
 Fill SOF billets with a focus on MA capabilities tailored for SOF in a 
future SFA community at HVS.248 SFA will be described in the new land 
doctrine, and it is likely that the Army will dedicate positions at this 
institution for the purpose. 
 Strengthen the existing SOF education at the Naval Academy as a “hub of 
excellence” for IW/UW/MA operations. The final year of academy 
education for all NORSOF could be SOF-specific. A year of joint 
education between the two tactical units would also “facilitate constructive 
interaction within the whole of NORSOF,” a policy goal for COM 
NORSOCOM.249  
Another recommendation that supports expansion of the GSN is to establish a 
small MA Training unit, joint with U.S. Special Forces, within the Home guard training 
center.250 Norwegian independent company 1 was a British special operations executive 
(SOE) group formed in March 1941, originally for the purpose of performing commando 
raids during the occupation of Norway by Nazi Germany. Personnel from this unit were 
central in the establishment of the Home guard after WWII.251 The Norwegian Home 
                                                 
247 Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” 63–64. 
248 HVS: Hærens Våpenskole (Norwegian miniature Army TRADOC). 
249 Olsen and Thormodsen, “Forging Norwegian Special Operation Forces.” 
250 Heimevernets Skole og Kompetansesenter (HVSKS), Dombås. 
251 Egil Ullateig, Heimevernets The Heath of the Norwegian Home Guard: The Home Guard Training 
Center Dombaas, 1948–1998 (Dombås, Norway: Heimevernskolen, 1998), 21–28. 
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guard has trained with U.S. SF since 1960, first in the United States and then in Germany. 
From 1963 through the mid-1980s, U.S. SF and the Norwegian Home guard conducted 
joint training and exercises at this center as part of the U.S. Military assistance 
program.252 As previously described, U.S. SF has recently refocused its efforts on UW. 
The best way to train for UW is via FID, preferably in a permissive environment. 
NORSOF respondents in the FFI survey also highlighted the importance of training other 
Norwegian forces during preparation phases for MA. The Home guard training center 
trains the “civilian” Home guard in different skills. The potential the Home guard holds 
for Norwegian defense is, in our opinion, underestimated. We believe there may be some 
interesting synergies worth considering by making better use of the Home guard and the 
training center, and we elaborate on this in the first COA presented in Chapter V. 
C. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL 
Our research suggests that a gap exists between the perceived strategic effect of 
MA operations and the willingness to take MA into account when conducting selection, 
training, and education in NORSOF. In this section, we recommend changes and 
modifications to recruitment, training, and education, as well as the framework needed to 
make these changes. 
Or, has been expressed in the U.S.: 
Perhaps the most important changes will be to the personnel system. 
Changes in doctrine, education, training, and even operations will not have 
major impacts unless the various government personnel systems recognize 
counterinsurgency and peacetime advisory billets as career enhancing. 
Further, they must be appropriately rewarded for assuming these 
challenging jobs. Advising and the accompanying increased understanding 
of another culture must be recognized as a critical element in the path to 
flag or senior executive service rank.253  
                                                 
252 Karl H. Brox, The Norwegian Homeguard 50 Years, 1946–1996 [Heimevernet 50 år, 1946–1996] 
(Oslo, Norway: J. W. Cappelen, 1996), 110–112. 
253 Thomas X. Hammes, “Counterinsurgency: Not a Strategy, but a Necessary Capability,” Joint 
Force Quarterly, 65 no. 2 (2012), 48. 
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1. Recruitment and Selection 
While the NORSOF respondents have numerous notions about which traits and 
skills are necessary during MA missions, three-fourths of the respondents were of the 
opinion that none of these are evaluated during initial selection and basic training. Lists 
of traits and skills derived from the literature review and the FFI survey can be found in 
Chapter II, section C.2 Training and Personnel, MA-specific Traits and Skills; and in 
Chapter III, section D.2 Training and Personnel, Recruitment, of this report. Further 
studies and working groups should now be devoted to operationalizing both the screening 
of these traits for career management use, and the development of these skills through 
training, education, and exercises. This is an obvious first task for a future NORSOF MA 
“community of practice.”  
While our study suggests that the initial selection phase probably is too soon, and 
premature, for negative selection of those unfit for MA, later positive selection/self-
selection and talent management are crucial to improved MA capability in NORSOF. 
Advancing MA skills is, possibly, not for everyone. Making MA-related courses and 
education exclusive is one way to change a negative cultural image, especially among 
younger NORSOF personnel.  
Attracting MA talent might be a challenge. Research indicates that MA does not 
have the same appeal for potential SOF recruits as SR and DA. This may, however be 
addressed by showcasing and advertising the MA capability in new and innovative ways. 
For instance, millennial’s have grown up during the globalization era, and some are more 
likely to be interested in language, area studies, and cultural peculiarities than are their 
predecessors. Millennials are also said to be more individualist than collectivist-oriented, 
and notions of “exclusivity” with regards to MA-related courses and education are likely 
to be tempting. Arguably, MJK has already seen something similar with its ISR 
squadron.254 The challenge with MA is that it does not belong to a unit in NORSOF; 
instead, it belongs to a network of skilled individuals across units.  
                                                 
254 MJK’s ISR squadron has a notion of exclusivity about it, which attracts personnel from the other 
squadrons. It also has some of the most senior operators and cultural bearers in its ranks. 
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Targeted, active recruitment of certain interest groups or individuals is another of 
our recommendations. The fact that NORSOF already attracts high numbers of applicants 
should not be an argument for maintaining the current low level of resources spent on 
recruitment. Youth with above-average fitness levels and stamina will still apply for 
NORSOF duty. But, personnel with specialized skills or other personal interests might 
need a poke and an eye-opener. For example, not too many conscript paratroopers apply 
for SOF duty; some feel they have already gone through the toughest conscription needed 
for their CV. However, if they were given a broader understanding of the opportunities 
available in NORSOF at an early stage, even more might seek to attain personal 
fulfillment through a NORSOF career.255 We have also noted an organizational trend in 
SOF of increasing numbers of experts and enablers. Experts will still be needed within 
intelligence, IO and other MA-related functions. As NORSOF 2025 describes, the 
recruitment of such expertise is largely based on word of mouth and personal 
acquaintance; it is not systematized.256 We propose formalizing this process, without 
bureaucratizing it heavily, by adding a separate selection as well as basic training for this 
category of personnel. Fitness levels could be limited to the minimum standards for 
paratroopers, while social/analytical/technical/other required skills could be tested 
through a selection phase more like that used in the intelligence community.  
Another category of personnel with useful attributes are members of minority 
groups from conflict areas. Here, NORSOF has an untapped potential recruiting pool. For 
instance, looking at current Norwegian MA efforts in Iraq and Syria, one suggestion that 
would definitely rock the boat would be to recruit Norwegian Kurds Peshmerga into 
Norwegian forces. According to media sources, there are over 100 former Peshmerga in 
Norway ready and willing to fight IS.257 A program could be launched whereby they 
could be trained and equipped in Norway, and then enrolled in the Kurd Peshmerga 
                                                 
255 This does not only apply to future “warrior-diplomats” who are “horizontally developed” through 
the operational saber squadrons. 
256 Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” 50. 
257 Geir Lid, “Hundred Norwegian Kurds Ready to Fight,” Agderposten, accessed March 15, 2016, 
http://www.agderposten.no/kjop-tilgang?aId=1.1510494; NTB, “Norwegian Kurds Ready to Fight in Iraq,” 
NRK, accessed March 26, 2016, http://www.nrk.no/urix/norske-kurdere-vil-til-irak-1.11819967.  
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resistance forces that are currently being trained by Norwegian advisors in northern Iraq. 
At least one Norwegian politician has already proposed something similar.258 When 
political initiatives like this are debated, NORSOCOM could increase its strategic 
relevance by offering concepts of operations to illustrate how such an idea could be made 
to work.259 While such a CONOPS would likely remain politically sensitive, (which is 
SOF’s niche), it would help political decision-makers appreciate the spectrum of 
opportunities NORSOF can provide, even if they reject the idea. Worth noting is that 
NORSOF has a tradition of trying out unconventional approaches to emerging 
operational requirements, as it did when it established a female unit within the NORSOF 
community for future counterinsurgency and urban surveillance purposes.260 Needless to 
say, such a project also generated important political goodwill for NORSOF in a country 
where gender equality is politically important. 
2. Training, Exercise, Education 
NORSOF training currently encompasses the full range of military skills 
necessary for MA, apart from training to achieve expert-level knowledge about weapon 
systems used in other countries. The larger issue is “non-military” MA-specific training 
and education. The FFI survey results suggest that such training will not be prioritized if 
this is left to individual squadrons, a finding which correlates with what occurs in other 
“full spectrum SOF” units. Prioritization can only be achieved from the top-down and 
needs to be anchored by some of the more experienced formal/informal influencers 
within NORSOF: The MA community of practice network. 
a. Basic Training  
While acknowledging that Norwegian basic training courses are already packed, 
we believe some modifications should be considered. Management of expectations is 
                                                 
258 NTB, “Tybring-Gjedde (Frp) Argues that Norway Should Send Refugees to Fight against IS,” 
Aftenposten, May 8, 2016. http://www.aftenposten.no/norge/Tybring-Gjedde-Frp-mener-Norge-bor-sende-
flyktninger-for-a-kjempe-mot-IS-59880b.html.  
259 Offering a CONOPS is a practice termed “Policy by CONOPS” in the U.S. SOF community. 
260 Elisabeth Braw, “Norway’s ‘Hunter-Troop’: The World’s First All-Female Special Forces,” 
Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/norway/2016-02-08/norways-
hunter-troop.  
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important for all potential SOF candidates; therefore, familiarity with the range of 
missions NORSOF may encounter should be included as part of basic training. We 
propose a course in which NORSOF’s doctrinal tasks are placed in historic and strategic 
context. The course should also offer an introduction about the most important enabling 
functions, such as SOF C2, logistics, intelligence, fires, and so on. Examples should be 
given by experienced instructors of the kinds of personal skills and traits that are 
necessary to do MA, and the strategic importance of NORSOF MA missions should be 
highlighted. Names should be cited, and exemplary individual MA efforts should be 
briefed. Younger SOF personnel tend to mirror their elder ones, and expanding the 
“hero” cabinet to include extraordinary NORSOF MA personnel is culturally important.  
Such a short course could be combined with exercises in discussing opposite 
viewpoints and dilemmas that commonly arise. More emphasis should also be placed in 
note-taking and writing summaries; these skills will help with selection of candidates 
who acquire new knowledge quickly and are able to report the essence of complex 
subjects. These are especially important skills for SR and not just MA, but may help 
NORSOF select officer candidates and candidates for MA at earlier stages. 
Our research also suggests that NORSOF is no different than U.S. SOF in that 
time spent on teaching pedagogical skills has decreased as a result of increased attention 
to SR and DA. Serving in the training units obviously provides great MA training; if 
possible, more junior NORSOF personnel could also be given instruction duties at earlier 
stages in their careers: for example, instructing different conscript units in NORSOF. 
Some operators spend their careers “being taught” and merely move through pre-planned 
events, stages, scenarios, courses, and exercises that others have set up for them. Such 
personnel might function as expert instructors when everything is in place, but planning 
and not just executing is the real MA skill. It is possible that sharing such training 
responsibilities, when appropriate, will teach more NORSOF personnel what it actually 
takes to make great training events and experiences. Creating great training and learning 
experiences is, after all, the crux of MA at the tactical level. Sharing such a responsibility 
early in a SOF career also reinforces other skills: self-reliance, creativity and “figuring 
out things from A to Z.” 
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b. Advanced 
Training for MA has to be ongoing throughout a person’s career. What would be 
most beneficial is to not segregate MA training, thereby causing it to be a distraction 
from all other training; rather, as with most other SOF skillsets, synergies have to be 
found. With regards to more advanced training after the basic course, there are obvious 
synergies between MA training and basic HUMINT/Liaison training. All SOF operators 
are sensors: most will end up doing MA, and some will do liaison duty. Training in 
establishing rapport, expanding the social comfort zone, preparing meetings and talking 
points, developing negotiation skills, using interpreters, and providing accurate reporting/
documentation are skills needed.261 English military language skills are crucial for all 
functions and should be used during such training when possible.262 This training should 
use a generic framework with culturally specific training to be added dependent on the 
theater of operations. Some of the capacity to conduct such training already exists within 
NORSOF; it is possible that elements within the Intelligence community could have 
valuable inputs.  
c. Exercise 
There is currently no internal, separate MA exercise, and no training of 
“indigenous players” in NORSOF’s official exercise program. The respondents 
participating in the FFI survey highlighted both the positive effects of training other 
Norwegian CF and real-life MA exercises like Flintlock during the preparation phase for 
MA operations.263 
Increasing the MA capability (including increasing the numbers of skilled MA 
trainers) calls for an exercise (or several exercises), on top of selection and training. 
Participating in exercises like Flintlock should have a high priority. If possible, vertical 
implementation of NORSOF advisors above the tactical level should be included in such 
                                                 
261 See also list in Chapter 2, Section C.2 Training and personnel, MA-specific traits and skills. 
262 English STANAG testing for all should be considered. 
263 It is debatable whether Flintlock is an exercise or an operation. We believe it should be recognized 
as the latter. 
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exercises. We also envision smaller exercises based on the U.S. SF’s Robin Sage 
concept, whereby NORSOF infiltrate and then train the “civilian” Home guard and other 
reserve units in specific skills or mission-specific tasks for mutual gain. Other Norwegian 
CF should also be the subject of such training on exercises as well.  
d. Education 
The establishment of a credible and knowledgeable MA community of practice 
requires specific education outside of NORSOF. Occasionally, NORSOF attracts highly 
educated personnel with relevant master’s degrees. After a few years on operational duty 
in one of the operational squadrons, these individuals tend to seek other kinds of 
challenges. Officer education in the military academy is not what they are looking for; 
they do not aim to have a career in the NORSOF command track. For those who seek a 
career in NORSOF without becoming commanders, NORSOF could initiate a program 
that offers these individuals spots in the trainee program in the Ministry of foreign affairs 
(MFA).264 Paid for by NORSOF, the intent would be for them to spend three years at 
MFA, then to complete three to six years of obligatory service in NORSOF, working 
specifically with MA and interagency coordination. On-the-job training is an important 
part of the MFA trainee course. NORSOF trainees should work for MFA at embassies in 
areas where NORSOF has, or is likely to have, an MA footprint, in attaché-like functions. 
This suggestion is inspired by the JFK special forces warfare center and its Powell 
program initiative, which provides prospective SOF personnel with opportunities to 
create synergies between the DOD and MFA.265 
There are several options for prospective NORSOF officers. Since SOF-specific 
officers education only can be acquired at the Naval academy, we recommend a 
strengthened SOF-specific education program based on the existing SOF track for all 
prospective NORSOF officers. This SOF-specific education should be the final training 
                                                 
264 Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Aspirants to the Foreign Service,” Department of 
Foreign Affairs/Norwegian Government, accessed 16 MAY 2016. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/ud/
dep/aspirantopptaket/id450753/.  
265 Ronald Dempsey, “The Powell Program: One Step Closer to Cementing Interoperability with Our 
Interagency Partners,” Special Warfare 28, no. 3 (2015), http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/
SW2803/28-3_JUL-SEP_2015.pdf.  
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module of this three-year education. This final year could also serve as a qualifying 
course for senior-level NORSOF NCOs.  
Acknowledging the need for more NORSOF officers in higher positions during 
MA operations (enabling vertical implementation), we recommend a slightly larger quota 
of NORSOF officers to attend the USSOCOM-sponsored special operations and irregular 
warfare (SO/IW) program, and the information strategy and political warfare curriculum 
at NPS.266 Both programs feature a wide range of academic and operational specialties, 
especially relevant for indirect approaches, but also for other SOF functions and tasks. 
NORSOF Intel specialists could be considered for certificate programs (which can be 
completed in three to six months) at the CORE lab at NPS, which specializes in data 
collection and analysis of the human domain in support of SOF.267 Datasets relevant for 
NORSOF MA operations could be utilized in direct support of the NORSOF J-2.  
We also support the previous recommendations from the Norwegian institute of 
international affairs suggesting that that MA should be a larger part of the curriculum and 
receive more attention at the Norwegian military academies and at the Staff college,268 
and we believe this could become reality as a consequence of the new focus on SFA in 
the forthcoming Norwegian land doctrine. The SOF chair at the Norwegian Staff college 
is a natural proponent of SOF MA in these efforts. 
Finally, we recommend that NORSOCOM establish a working group consisting 
of SOF personnel from Forsvarets høysskole (FHS), people with extensive MA 
experience and deep knowledge about NORSOF, to propose a more balanced education 
system for NORSOF based on NORSOF 2025 and this report.  
3. Incentive Systems  
Our research suggests that “cultural attitudes” and “economic incentives” are 
factors that likely will impede NORSOF’s ability to fill the “MA community of practice” 
                                                 
266 “DA Department Curricula,” NPS, accessed January 4, 2016, http://my.nps.edu/web/da/curricula.  
267 NPS, “About the CORE Lab,” accessed July 4, 2016, https://my.nps.edu/web/core/the-lab.  
268 Hansen, Lurås, and Nikolaisen, “Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT),”  
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positions suggested in NORSOF 2025, as well as NORSOF’s ability to educate enough 
officers for “vertical implementation” at higher levels during future MA operations. 
To shift cultural attitudes toward MA, especially among the younger personnel in 
NORSOF, we recommend the following: 
 Targeted recruitment of personnel with potential interest 
 Increasing knowledge of MA requirements and effects through a course 
offered as part of basic training 
 Highlighting successful MA efforts, expanding the NORSOF “hero” 
cabinet, and initiating storytelling related to these successful efforts 
 Rewarding extraordinary MA efforts on par with extraordinary SR and 
DA efforts  
 Making MA an exclusive, selective assignment and making education for 
MA more attractive. Positions in the MA community of practice are, after 
all, not for everyone. 
Finally, this is a leadership challenge. If there exists a subculture in NORSOF (as 
the survey suggests) that frowns upon MA activity and officer training, countering this 
trend is a task for NORSOF leaders and influencers at all levels. We believe NORSOF is 
easier to change than some of its more bureaucratic SOF peers. The power-distance 
between officers and enlisted is more compressed in NORSOF, and key officers have 
considerable “informal” power as well as formal power, they can utilize.  
Economic incentives are also important for building MA capabilities. Currently, 
MA is not highlighted as an important task in its own right, and very few positions and 
exercises are dedicated to this activity. A large portion of NORSOF pay is activity-based. 
Economic “codes” do not exist for many of the components of MA activity. For example, 
a sniper can experiment with a chronograph to measure ammunition velocity late in the 
evenings, register this as work, and receive pay. It is difficult, however, for an NCO who 
is reading volumes about Syrian-based opposition groups and Jordanian culture in 
preparation for his upcoming MA mission to file the time spent as paid work. This is both 
a cultural and technical problem; such activities must be valued on par with other 
operational preparations, and the necessary resources have to be allocated to such 
activities. The main recommendation is, therefore, to recognize the “warrior-diplomat” 
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and “SME” tracks recommended in NORSOF 2025 in the human resource management 
systems; if these career tracks go unrecognized, it’s doubtful NORSOF personnel will 
become MA experts on their own initiative. 
We have also described the challenge in NORSOF of motivating personnel to 
apply for officer training at the military academies. For vertical implementation in MA 
operations to be possible in the future (as well as to select the best personnel for 
command-track careers), economic incentives must be used. Few are willing to lose one-
third of their pay once they leave the operational squadrons. It is beyond the scope of this 
report to recommend changes to the pay system; however, it seems evident that some 
economic benefits should be kept for personnel who go through such education. 
D. SUMMARY 
Production of a doctrine-like document for NORSOF will have at least four 
outcomes. It will produce coherence within NORSOF, educate policymakers, enhance 
interagency coordination, and elevate decision makers’ understanding of how to use 
NORSOF most effectively in the future. Another recommendation is to emphasize the 
importance of seeking synergies between national (mainly direct) and international 
(mainly indirect) missions. Small-footprint missions directed toward national 
strategically important objectives, along with partners who fit NORSOF, will benefit 
Norwegian interests the most. Demand for NORSOF to conduct MA missions is not 
likely to decline, which leads us to also recommend an increased number of enablers and 
experts within several areas of expertise, in addition to an increased numbers of 
NORSOF officers. The latter recommendation is made mainly to render vertical 
implementation of NORSOF possible in future operations.  
Two distinct options for how to organize NORSOF have been discussed in this 
report. We recommend organizing NORSOF via “horizontal development” in the future. 
A comprehensive commitment to horizontal development will most likely require 
changes in some NORSOF attitudes. If this approach is to succeed, changes to initial 
SOF-selection, basic SOF training, advanced SOF training, and the SOF exercise 
schedule must be operationalized. In addition, the importance and recognition of some 
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types of academic education must be stressed. Also, the SOF personnel management 
system, the SOF talent management system, and various incentive systems would need to 
be adjusted. In short, a range of changes would need to be made which would be 
supported by, and not just initiated from, the top-down and by key influencers. 
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V. MA CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the purposes of this report has been to explore how NORSOF can increase 
its strategic utility through the development of its MA capability. We have described a 
future requirement for more cost-effective MA operations directed at key strategic 
objectives. One of the main findings of NORSOF 2025 was that the organization should 
be utilized more when opportunities arise to support Norwegian strategic objectives.269 
NORSOCOM is a newly established organization, and even though NORSOF currently 
has considerable credibility with the political elite,270 it would be fair to say that 
knowledge about NORSOF’s capabilities is still limited among key government decision-
makers. This knowledge must be maintained and even broadened, especially because 
NORSOF will need to change and evolve with the times.  
One way to contribute to achieving Norwegian security objectives, while at the 
same time educating and challenging decision-makers on the smart use of NORSOF, is to 
“recommend operations in support of policy and to influence policy by identifying 
opportunities in sync with national interests.”271 This is also known as “policy by 
CONOPS.” One example has already been proposed. In the previous chapter we 
described an option for mentoring, training, and assisting willing Kurds in Norway to 
enroll fighting IS in northern Iraq.  
In this chapter, we describe three MA CONOPS that support security policy 
objectives. Our aim is to propose feasible, new concepts for future NORSOF MA 
operations. By doing so, we do not want to imply that current NORSOF MA operations 
in Afghanistan, Jordan/Syria, and the Baltic states do not represent a smart use of the 
NORSOF MA capability for strategic purposes. On the contrary, we believe they do. Our 
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270 Hammersmark, “Development of Norwegian Special Forces.” 
271 Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, “Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025,” 71.  
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aim here is to investigate additional options, broaden the field of possibilities, and offer 
food for thought. 
The proposed courses of action are limited to unclassified descriptions, and they 
draw on some of our findings from the previous chapters. Consequently, they seek to: 
 Utilize the GSN as an extended capability for NORSOF  
 Exploit synergies between national tasks and skillsets, and MA operations 
 Exploit cost-effective solutions with a small NORSOF footprint 
 Seek Norwegian vertical implementation joint/interagency when possible  
 Support Norway’s most important security policy objective: credible 
deterrence of Russia 
 Support Norwegian strategic niches/comparative strengths in the 
international system: reassurance of Russia and taking advantage of 
Norwegian conflict resolution capabilities 
One final caveat is that these COAs are not fully developed; what we present must 
instead be viewed as initial drafts. 
B. COA 1: MA IN SUPPORT OF DETERRENCE 
The Norwegian Home guard was the institution that pursued the Company 
Linge heritage after the Second World War.  
 —NORSOC 2015272 
 
A developed network of Home guard soldiers will potentially provide 
essential support to NORSOF in national crises. 
 —NORSOC 2015273 
                                                 
272 Forsvarets spesialkommando, The National Home Guard’s Role in the NORSOF Mindset after 
1945 [Heimevernets rolle i norsk spesialstyrketankegang etter 1945], 1st ed. (Oslo, Norway: Forsvaret, 
2015), 9. 
273 Ibid., 15. 
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1. Strategic Context 
To set the scene: Russia has established strategic objectives that violate the 
sovereignty of its neighbors and threaten the stability of the international system. Russia 
has selectively employed tools across the full range of state power–—including the overt 
and covert use of force—to consolidate these objectives.274 According to the latest 
assessment from the Norwegian Intelligence service, Russia has lately reopened bases in 
the High North and re-established arctic brigades and command structures.275 The same 
assessment states that; “Russian threat arise from a combination of capability and 
intention, and though Russia is increasing its capabilities, it is difficult to envision any 
rational basis for Russian military action against Norway in the short to medium 
term.”276 It also points out; “Intentions, however, can change over time.”277  
According to the Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy:  
credible deterrence must build upon allied engagement from the very 
outset of a severe crisis. Escalation must be as seamless as possible, 
ensuring that the build-up of Norwegian forces and allied reinforcements 
takes place simultaneously and in an integrated manner.278  
The Norwegian defense strategy may be described as a threshold defense, one 
which functions to close the gap between crises which are too large for Norway, but too 
small for NATO. The 40,000 man Norwegian Home guard (NHG) has important roles to 
play in the defense of Norway and may prove effective against elements of Russian 
“hybrid” warfare: these roles may range from making use of civilians with local networks 
to detect and report abnormal activity, to securing key infrastructure and working with 
allied reinforcements, as well as providing a well-organized and equipped resistance 
movement in case strategic areas are occupied. 
                                                 
274 Stephen Dayspring, “Countering Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’: Acknowledging the Nature of Modern 
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2. COA Purpose/End State 
To deter future Russian aggression against Norwegian strategic interests, the 
credibility of the Norwegian “threshold defense” should be strengthened. To achieve this, 
NORSOF will utilize its current position and contacts in the global SOF Network to 
facilitate U.S. SF military assistance of Norwegian territorial Home guards. The 
assistance will be directed toward prioritized NHG capabilities and districts.  
Deterrence is about signaling. U.S. SF development of Norwegian Home guard 
capabilities sends an important signal about the priority and credibility of the NHG. This 
signaling effect would not be the same if anyone other than U.S. SF conducted this 
training. 
The desired end state would be achieved when the NHG’s capacity to counter 
Russian proxy “hybrid” warfare elements is proved credible, and when Russia’s cost/
benefit analysis with regard to aggression toward Norway had been influenced in 
accordance with Norwegian interests. 
3. COA Outline 
Through their contacts in the global SOF Network, including the NORSOF U.S. 
SOCOM LNO and NSHQ, NORSOF would investigate whether training the Norwegian 
Home guard to counter elements of Russian full-spectrum warfare could be authorized as 
part of the “Green Beret Volckman Program,”279 or whether it could be justified as a 
contingency plan under another U.S./NATO operation. NORSOF and Home guard staff 
would work out training and assistance requirements, with a particular focus on 
countering Russian hybrid threats, and would meet with U.S. SF representatives to 
discuss options. The Home guard training center might be one possible organizational 
hub for facilitation, as described in Chapter 4 DOTP Options, Section B2 Organizations 
in Norwegian DOD and MA. DOD strategic IO would then coordinate an IO plan with 
the U.S. embassy in Norway. We propose that the scope of such an operation would be 
                                                 
279 Eric P. Wendt, “The Green Beret Volckman Program,” Special Warfare 24, no. 3 (2011): 10–16.  
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“small footprint, long duration” for all involved parties: U.S. SF, Home guard, and 
NORSOF. 
4. Secondary Effects 
A number of secondary effects might be derived from this COA. First, U.S. SF 
would have the opportunity to train in unconventional warfare by conducting foreign 
internal defense with “civilian indigenous units” in a permissive environment, yet with a 
strategic purpose in a NATO flank country. “Bridging the UW gap” is an integral part of 
U.S. SF capability development.280 Second, U.S. SF would gain considerable 
geographical familiarity with the NATO country with the longest border (sea/land) with 
Russia, and would build important networks with and through their Norwegian 
counterparts. Third, NORSOF would participate in the training of the Home guards as 
part of the MA capability development described in this report, and use this as an arena 
for basic MA training. Fourth, U.S. SF, NORSOF, and Norwegian Home guards would 
develop greater levels of coordination and cooperation, and the historic bonds between 
these organizations would be strengthened. 
5. NATO Justification 
This COA fits well with COM JFC Brunssum’s 2015 initiative for NATO SOF to 
develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint “hybrid defense” approaches to counter 
“Grey zone/phase 0” challenges in Europe. General Domrose particularly emphasized the 
importance of MA operations, led by SOF officers who were adept in working within 
both civilian and military structures.281  
The Commander of NSHQ expressed in the NSHQ hybrid warfare seminar in 
June 2015 that he viewed NATO SOF’s objectives related to countering future hybrid 
threats to be: 
1. To Understand: “Get out there and figure out what is happening.” 
                                                 
280 United States Army, Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022, 13. 
281 Hans-Lothar Domrose, COM JFC BS’ NATO SOF Symposium Speech 2015: The Russian Hybrid 
Warfare Model; Using SOF for “Hybrid Defense” (Mons, Belgium: NSHQ, 2015).  
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2. To Enhance: “Show that you are out there and use your network.” 
3. To (En)counter: “Use force if necessary, but it should not be necessary.”  
According to LG Webb, MA is a prioritized task for NATO SOF. He argued that 
NATO SOF should embrace operational and strategic-level MA activities through the 
conduct of long-lasting MA operations with a wide spectrum of partners. LG Webb 
further argued that such activities are most relevant and less challenging to approve in 
NATO before a conflict erupts, and that SOF is well positioned to fill this role through 
utilizing opportunities made available via the global SOF Network.282 
6. Historic Justification 
NORSOF´s origins lie in the Independent company 1, also called the “Linge 
company” after its first leader. This was a British special operations executive (SOE) 
group formed in March 1941 with Norwegian special forces soldiers, who performed 
raids, sabotage, and training of indigenous units in Norway. These men were crucial in 
the development of the Norwegian Home guard after WWII.  
William E. Colby, the legendary director of the Central intelligence agency, met 
the forerunners of the current Home guards (Milorg) when his OSS Jedburgh team 
jumped out of an airplane together with soldiers of Norwegian descent over Trondheim, 
Norway, in 1944 as part of operation “Rype” (Grouse).283 He later praised the importance 
of the Norwegian Home guard organization, and one of the NHG units in Trondheim 
carries the name “Rype” to honor this operation.284 
As previously noted, Norwegian Home guard and early NORSOF units trained in 
guerrilla warfare with U.S. SF since 1960, first in the U.S. and then in Germany. From 
1963 through the mid-1980s, U.S. SF and Norwegian Home guard conducted joint 
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training and exercises as part of the U.S. Military assistance program.285 From September 
1970, 10th Special forces group soldiers with recent experience in Vietnam contributed 
significantly to the courses taught at the Home guard training center at Dombås. At the 
time, this activity fell under the Flintlock umbrella, the same exercise which continues in 
a number of countries with NATO SOF participation.286 
7. Impact for NORSOF MA Capability Development 
This NORSOF-USSF-NHG COA is different from other NORSOF MA 
operations in the sense that it would be carried out in Norway, and mainly by the largest 
partner in the global SOF network. NORSOCOM participation would be limited to the 
initiation phase, though the SOF-to-SOF connections would be maintained throughout 
the operation. For instance, NORSOF tactical units would participate in different phases 
of the operation, and would make use of the training arenas to prepare their own MA 
trainers for future MA deployments abroad. The network of MA practitioners in 
NORSOF could use the operation as an opportunity to expand their network, and to 
recruit and educate other elements in DOD for NORSOF MA purposes. 
C. COA 2: MA IN SUPPORT OF REASSURANCE 
We must think differently, seek greater understanding of local, regional 
and global contexts, and strengthen trust through interagency and partner 
cooperation. 
—Adm. William H. McRaven, SOCOM 2020287 
SOF represent diplomacy conducted by other means, and as such are 
usually subject to strict political or military control at the highest levels. 
—Maurice Tugwell and David Charters288 
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1. Strategic Context and Background 
Norway has a common border with the Kola Peninsula, perhaps Russia’s most 
strategically important area. From a Russian perspective, this necessitates maintaining 
strategic defensive depth beyond its immediate border areas. Norwegian defense and 
security policy throughout the postwar period has been characterized by deterrence 
through membership in NATO, and reassurance through a number of self-imposed 
restrictions, including both a basing and nuclear policy that have restricted allied 
operations on Norwegian territory close to the Kola Peninsula.  
It has been Norwegian policy to engage Russia through cooperation whenever 
possible. The strategic objective has been to ensure stability and predictability, especially 
in the High North. From the early 1990s, Norway and Russia have cooperated on the 
“safety side” of the security spectrum in managing non-military crises, search and rescue 
in the North, oil spill response, and border control.289 Beginning in 1998, the Norwegian 
Coast guard and the Russian border units (FSB/FPS) developed a partnership through the 
annual bilateral exercise, Barents. Military cooperation increased after 2000, and a major 
Nordic-Russian exercise, Barents rescue, was initiated in 2001.290 There were also 
student exchanges between the Norwegian and Russian military academies.291 Starting in 
2008, Norway has participated in what was originally a U.S.–Russian exercise, Northern 
eagle. Norway established a separate bilateral exercise with Russia in 2010, and this 
exercise, POMOR, has included preparations for joint operations, as well as anti-
terrorism and anti-piracy operations.292 Significantly, despite all of these exercises and 
exchanges, NORSOF and RUSOF have never participated in any of them. The only 
known encounter between Norwegian special operations forces and the Russian military 
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occurred in 2008. NORSOF personnel parachuted together with the Russian 76th Air 
land division in Pskov as part of a program led by the Ministry of the foreign office. 
According to the NORSOF officers who participated, this visit seemed like a one-time 
event—a symbolic act—without any long-term strategic purpose.293  
From the Norwegian perspective, military cooperation was a key factor in the 
normalization of relations between NATO and Russia after the Cold war. This period was 
not without bilateral challenges and incidents, yet progress was real. Perhaps the most 
important result of Norway’s policy was the settlement of the 40-year-long border dispute 
between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea, signed by Prime minister Dmitri 
Medvedev, Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, former Prime minister Jens Stoltenberg 
(now secretary-general of NATO), and former foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre in 2010 
(see Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21.  Norway and Russia Sign Maritime Delineation Agreement294 
                                                 
293 Information from NORSOF officer present at the actual exchange 
294 Source: Thomas Nilsen, “Norway and Russia Sign Maritime Delimitation Agreement,” Barents 
Observer, October 20, 2010, http://barentsobserver.com/en/sections/spotlights/norway-and-russia-sign-
maritime-delimitation-agreement.  
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As described in the preceding COA, Russia has recently established strategic 
objectives that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors and threaten the stability of the 
international system. Russia has selectively employed tools ranging from the overt to 
covert use of force—to consolidate its objectives.295 Together with other NATO 
countries, Norway consequently placed most of its bilateral cooperation efforts with 
Russia on hold in 2014. However, Norway has maintained limited contact in the northern 
areas, and the Norwegian joint headquarters still maintains open channels with the 
Russian northern fleet in order to de-conflict military activity in the High North. In short, 
Russia is a geographic and geo-political fact and will remain the dominating factor in 
Norway’s security strategy for the foreseeable future.  
The COA we are about to describe would require, but would also help to bring 
about, a different political atmosphere between Norway and Russia than the one that 
currently exists. 
2. COA Purpose/End State 
The strategic purpose of this COA is to re-establish trust between Norway/NATO 
and Russia sometime in the future, based on common security interests in the High North. 
As is the case with deterrence, reassurance is all about signaling. Few, if any, bilateral 
military activities signal trust or the credibility of intent more effectively than cooperation 
between special forces. In this COA, NORSOF will use its experience with maritime 
counterterrorism operations to conduct joint CT training and exercises with RUSOF 
during future bilateral exercises like POMOR.  
Based on bilateral energy agreements, it is still possible that future transnational 
oil and gas fields in the Barents sea will be exploited as a joint venture; personnel from 
both countries at the same installation is therefore a future possibility.296 Furthermore, 
                                                 
295 Dayspring, “Countering Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare.’” 
296 Bjorn Midtkandal, “Changes in the High North: What Challenges and Opportunities Lie in the 
Application of Norwegian Special Forces?” (master’s thesis, Norwegian Defense College, 2012), 
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the Northern sea route297 will likely become a vital route for global shipping and arctic 
tourism in the future. HRO at sea, with both Norwegian and Russian lives at stake, is 
therefore also a real possibility. Cooperation with Russia could (and arguably should) be 
developed through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that would enable joint 
actions to be taken against terrorism and/or sabotage on Snøhvit (Snowhite) and future 
Shtokman oilfields, and the protection of petroleum transport and shipping in the Barents 
sea.298 NORSOF has the experience, knowledge, and procedures to implement integrated 
operations with other countries’ military forces—to include countries with whom Norway 
normally does not share intelligence and information.299  
The end state to be achieved via this COA would be to see Norway’s and Russia’s 
mutual security concerns regarding infrastructure at sea be jointly met without bilateral 
misunderstandings. The end state would also be achieved when mutual trust is re-
established and when Russia’s cost/benefit analysis with regards to aggression toward 
Norway has been influenced in a positive way for Norway. 
3. Secondary Effects 
While the strategic purpose of this COA is to use a strategic asset like NORSOF 
to re-establish trust between Norway/NATO and Russia in the future, there are also some 
secondary effects. 
First, countering terrorism is a shared policy objective both in Norway/NATO and 
in Russia. It is therefore possible that joint CT training is not as politically sensitive as 
other military activity. Both NORSOF and RUSOF units have repeatedly fought Islamist 
terrorists willing to die for their cause, yet have done so using different equipment, 
different ROEs, and different TTPs. RUSOF also have valuable COIN and MA 
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operational experience.300 The sharing of experiences might be tactically beneficial for 
both parties.  
Second, Russia’s ambition is to assert itself as a regional actor, and possibly re-
establish itself as a global actor. RUSOF is currently active in conflicts where NATO 
SOF is present. NATO has recently encountered substantial challenges in de-conflicting 
Russian and NATO activity in a “shared” battlespace, most notably in Syria. Norway has 
operational experience with such de-confliction, primarily through its routine NJHQ 
communications with the Northern fleet, to include personal visits between commanders. 
Over time, the COA we have described could contribute to the establishment of similar 
person-to-person relations and trust between NORSOF and RUSOF commanders. In the 
future, NORSOF personnel might assist not only with de-confliction, but perhaps even 
cooperation between RUSOF and NATO SOF by utilizing these ties in places like Syria. 
However, persistent engagement is needed to build such levels of trust: it cannot be 
rushed.301 
Third, Serdiukov’s establishment of the new, small, and lean Russian special 
operations command was inspired by western SOCOM models.302 Although it might 
seem far-fetched today, Norway should not exclude the possibility of exchanging 
perspectives on the use of SOF, doctrinally speaking, in a distant future. Russians have a 
well-deserved reputation for being innovative military thinkers and producers of efficient 
doctrine. It is likely that the West could learn from this, but also influence Russian 
perspectives, particularly if the current geo-political environment changes. If so, this 
COA might position Norway as a potential bridge between NATO and Russia. 
In short, future cooperation between NORSOF and RUSOF is an investment in 
“diplomacy by other means” which could help bridge the mistrust that currently exists 
between Russia and Norway/NATO. 
                                                 
300 Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Dr. Tor Bukkvoll 
made a presentation entitled “The Russian Military since 2008 and Russian Special Operations Force” to 
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4. NATO Justification 
Of all of NATO’s partner relations, none holds greater potential than that 
between NATO and Russia. But today that potential is not being fully met. 
—Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
NATO Secretary General 2009–2014303 
The basic problem, I think, is very simple. It is the lack of trust. It is the 
lack of trust on both sides. 
—Marek Menkiszak 
Head, Russian Department, Centre for Eastern Studies304 
 
SOF-related challenges similar to those described in this COA have been 
discussed between NATO and Russia for years. The NATO-Russia council (NRC) 
provides a “mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision-
making, and joint action.”305 Russia shares borders with several of the countries in which 
terrorists are clearly being mobilized and trained. According to former Norwegian foreign 
Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, the NRC has benefited from Russia’s knowledge of 
Afghanistan in connection with the fight against illegal drugs, issues relating to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Russia’s prior experiences with 
terrorist actions,306all of which are SOF-related challenges. 
James Sherr argues that:  
Russia is a multinational state which is threatened by extremism and the 
growing sophistication of globally organized terrorist movements, and that 
the work that NATO and Russia can do together is obviously important.307  
                                                 
303 Source: NATO Review, “NATO and Russia: Uneasy Partners?,” March 12, 2014, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Russia/NATO-Russia-Uneasy-Partners/EN/index.htm.  
304 Source: Ibid.  
305 NATO, “About NRC,” accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.nato.int/nrc-website/en/about/. 
306 Jonas G. Støre, Foreign Policy Speech on Relations between Norway and Russia, Oslo 18 June 
2008 (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008).  
307 Interview with James Sherr, Associate Fellow, Chatham House, in NATO Review, “NATO and 
Russia.” 
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Wilhelmsen argues that the radicalization of Russian Muslims, both in Chechnya 
and other areas, is the biggest internal security threat facing Russia. Russian researchers 
estimate the real number of Russian IS fighters to be nearly 8,000, a substantial 
number.308 
One initiative NATO and Russia have unveiled is the STANDEX project, “which 
aims to prevent terrorists from gaining opportunities to use explosives against commuters 
on mass transit systems.”309 Both the STANDEX project and the cooperative airspace 
initiative are examples of successful NATO-Russian cooperative efforts.310 Both work 
well because of two important elements, which are also present in our proposed COA: 
first, both sides benefit equally. Second, neither involves extremely politically sensitive 
issues. Both these projects are technical in character and address real challenges.311 We 
believe the COA we have described also addresses concrete, technical problems related 
to common security interests in the High North, and, therefore, it should be welcomed by 
both parties and NATO. 
General Robert Mood is Norway’s senior military representative at NATO HQ. 
He recently argued that Norway’s military dialogue with Russia should be strengthened: 
“There is no reason why there should not be closer links both between Russia and NATO, 
and Russia and Norway. It is a dialogue that is required, not least in crisis.”312 
The former SACEUR, General Philip Breedlove, describes Norway as occupying 
an extremely utterly important strategic niche: “In NATO, we see Norway’s leadership in 
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the way it handles relations with Russia. Norway has a long history of working with 
Russia in the border areas. You have experiences that we can learn from in NATO.”313 
5. Impact for NORSOF MA Capability Development 
This Russia-Norway-NATO COA we have described would create synergies 
between national tasks and MA capabilities. It would require NORSOF senior officers 
deeply knowledgeable about Russian doctrine, military organization, and the history of 
prior Norwegian-Russian relations, to develop this knowledge in younger NORSOF 
operators. Gaining proficiency in the Russian language would certainly help build mutual 
trust over time. Selected NORSOF officers could be chosen to invest in this skill. When 
appropriate, NORSOF officers at NJHQ could use the dialogue between NJHQ and the 
Northern Fleet as a springboard to that trust, especially if personal visits between these 
two organizations commenced in the future. 
D. COA 3: MA IN SUPPORT OF NEGOTIATIONS 
You need a network to fight a network.314 
—Dr. John Arquilla 
1. Strategic Context 
Norway is often described as a “superpower” when it comes to conflict resolution. 
Norway has a well-developed diplomatic reputation for neutrality, and the requisite 
financial resources, patience, endurance and network.315 Arguably, Norwegian 
involvement in a series of negotiations is what has granted it stature, standing, and 
strategic access beyond its size. Since 1993, Norway has been involved in more than 20 
peace processes or attempts to reconcile warring groups in places as disparate as South 
                                                 
313 A. Langved, “Interview with SACEUR General Philip M. Breedlove, Titled: “Bakkestyrker Er 
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Sudan, Sri Lanka,316 Somalia, the Philippines, Israel/Palestine, Nepal, Myanmar, 
Guatemala, Colombia, Afghanistan/Taliban,317 and Libya.318  
One of the more tangible successes in Norwegian peace diplomacy was the peace 
agreement in Guatemala in 1996, which was reached after years of negotiations. It came 
in the wake of the groundbreaking peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians three 
years earlier. Despite the later collapse of the “Oslo agreement,” this was still viewed as a 
strategic victory for a small nation in light of the difficulties of attaining any kind of 
lasting peace in the Middle East. 
The 2005 peace agreement in Sudan confirmed Norway’s reputation as a small 
superpower that highly successfully was able to negotiate and get a peace agreement 
signed. The cooperation with the United States was especially close during these 
negotiations. One favorable side effect was that Norwegian “soft power” opened doors 
for Norwegian politicians to the “hard power” Washington yields. For example, in the 
case of Afghanistan, Norway established contacts with Taliban leadership in 2007319 and 
worked actively to influence internal processes in Washington until 2011, when the 
United States for the first time called for negotiations with the Taliban. Norway then 
mediated contact between the parties and conducted high-level meetings with the Taliban 
leadership in Pakistan, Oslo, and Doha, Qatar.320 
In the case of Libya, Norwegian diplomats were involved in secret negotiations 
with Muammar al-Gadhafi’s son from 2010. Allegedly representatives of the rebels and 
Saif Gadhafi met about 30 times in Tunisia, Istanbul, Paris, and Oslo without reaching an 
agreement before operation Unified protector reached its most intense phase in 2011.321 
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Norway has also been involved in the peace and reconciliation efforts in 
Colombia for decades. Norway is the official facilitator, along with Cuba, for the talks 
between the Colombian government and FARC-EP.322 These talks finally resulted in a 
peace agreement between FARC and the Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, 
being signed in June 2016.323 A number of hostages were released over the course of this 
process, often with direct Norwegian involvement.324 
Worth noting is that of the 61 conflicts that ended during the last 35 years, 77% 
did so through a peace agreement, and 16.4% through military victory by one of the 
parties.325 The culture of negotiation has thus become an important reality, and Norway 
has been a major, even integral participant. However, as Helgesen argues, “Norway 
struggles to square the circle of being a loyal military team player, helping to demonstrate 
a united international front against terrorism, while at the same time supporting 
negotiated solutions to conflicts in which one side is labeled a terrorist organization.”326  
Interestingly, the NORSOF community is positioned in the middle of this seeming 
contradiction between (military) counterterrorism and (civilian) negotiations, and thus, 
potentially may help bridge it. NORSOF has capabilities that may support one or both of 
these lines of effort. 
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Figure 22.  SOF Bridges to Other Agencies327 
In Figure 22, which is borrowed from SOF 2030,328 the Norwegian intelligence 
service (NIS) provides full spectrum intelligence support to the Norwegian government, 
including support for negotiations.329 The Norwegian Ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) 
engages in overt and clandestine diplomacy and negotiations, and development and aid 
through government and non-government organizations. SOF’s role, in contrast, is to deal 
with the armed “others”–—whether foreign militaries (e.g., FID) or supported groups 
(e.g., UW), or anti-state/system actors like terrorists (e.g., SR/DA), as described in SOF 
2030.330 All of these are important actors in negotiations. 
2. COA Outline 
In this interagency COA, MFA is the supported agency; NIS and NORSOF are 
supporting agencies. Through the interagency liaison network in Oslo and at select 
embassies, NORSOF MA experts will provide MA to MFA and NIS in support of 
specific negotiation efforts. NORSOF may offer a range of services: 
 NORSOF can increase the reach and capability of the negotiating teams 
through their contacts in the global SOF network (GSN). The GSN offers 
alternative access to critical information (especially host nation information 
[HNI] and friendly forces information requirements [FFIR]). The GSN 
offers a global, physical, and clandestine SOF infrastructure that may be 
utilized for negotiation purposes, as well as SOF resources that enable 
physical access to hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. 
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 NORSOF can provide MA expertise to negotiating teams, especially with 
regard to assessments of what is feasible and possible to achieve through 
“traditional” disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 
processes, for which MA is a critical component.  
 NORSOF can support “second generation DDR” activities if the 
preconditions for traditional DDR are not in place.331 This includes the 
establishment of liaisons between parties in semi/non-permissible 
environments, quickly securing personnel, or infrastructure important for 
the negotiating efforts, and supporting local negotiation programs using an 
evidence-based approach332 (much like recent SOF efforts in Afghanistan).  
 During negotiated cease-fires, NORSOF can assist in assessing the 
disposition of specific forces (e.g., strength, locations, and morale). 
NORSOF could also be used to establish liaisons with local commanders to 
ensure the mapping process can be completed.  
 NORSOF can locate and mark suitable drop zones for food/medical drops, 
ensuring that the much-needed aid reaches the right people, and so as to 
establish trust while negotiations are underway. NORSOF also has a “role 
2” hospital platoon that it could insert by airdrop (this includes the 
infrastructure and the surgeons).333 The hospital platoon might even serve 
as a high-end confidence-building measure to support a cease-fire and/or 
establish trust during negotiations. 
 NORSOF can help increase HRO readiness and forward-deploy HRO 
capabilities during high-risk negotiations. NORSOF can also assist with the 
build-up of escape & evasion (E&E) networks for civilian actors engaged in 
the negotiation efforts, and provide relevant E&E training in Norway. 
 If the end result of a peace agreement is that one or more of the opposing 
actors engage in some kind of security sector reform (SSR), NORSOF can 
assume a traditional MA role, directed at several levels of the mentored 
organization, hereby achieving vertical implementation of MA.  
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3. Historic Justification 
According to “traditional” views, MA is normally associated with training, 
mentoring, and assistance of military or police-like organizations or groups. This COA 
broadens the spectrum of who might receive military assistance, to include negotiators 
and intelligence agencies. This is not something new; in reality, this COA just readjusts 
Norway’s focus back to full spectrum interagency support to negotiations. 
For instance, during the negotiations on Sri Lanka, “Norwegian military experts 
helped work out the military technicalities of de-escalation, advanced positions, and front 
lines.”334 In the Balkans, NORSOF acted as liaisons and advisors between the 
peacekeeping force and the former warring parties. Under the “Joint commission 
observers” (JCO) program, NORSOF established contact between hard-to-reach 
decision-makers from all parties, often preventing episodes from turning into open 
conflict.335 Other SOF roles in the Balkans included assessing the disposition and 
strength of specific forces, often through directly liaising with warring commanders, and 
locating and marking suitable drop zones for UN food drops.336 NORSOF also has 
organizational experience with DDR processes, both in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. 
For example, during operation Essential harvest in Macedonia in 2001, NORSOF 
contributed to the allied collection of over 50,000 weapons.337 
4. Implications for NORSOF MA Capability 
Because this interagency COA requires increased knowledge about and trust in 
NORSOF capabilities across the Norwegian interagency community, it would depend on 
the establishment of a “MA network of practice” in NORSOF, and the creation of “SME” 
and “warrior-diplomat” career tracks. 
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VI. VISUALIZATION 2025 
Having presented our main recommendations in Chapter IV, and having offered 
three different courses of action for how MA can be put to new strategic use on behalf of 
Norway, here we conclude with a visualization of what an improved NORSOF MA 
capability might look like in 2025. Our visualization is based on the findings and 
recommendations in this report, but we have allowed ourselves to speculate quite a bit 
concerning geo-strategic developments. Fasten your seatbelts and project yourself into 
2025… 
By adopting a systematic, thorough approach to the development of individual 
MA specialists, MA officers, and task organizations for MA across both units and 
sections beginning in 2017, MA today is an inseparable part of what NORSOF does, just 
as with SR and DA. “The MA mindset” has been woven into the NORSOF fabric starting 
with recruitment. Expectations are well managed. Operators understand the lifelong 
opportunities available to them; they have been learning about MA since selection and 
basic training. Throughout their advanced training and education, this vital capability in 
the NORSOF toolbox has been clearly defined. Pride in MA is discernible throughout 
NORSOF, and this thoroughness breeds confidence in NORSOF and is well appreciated 
by political decision-makers who continue to strongly support NORSOF, thanks in large 
part to MA successes. The strategic utility of the force has increased. So has its size. 
Traits and skills important for MA operators prominently mentioned in 
NORSOF’s recruitment campaigns are directed at a new generation of increasingly 
individualistically oriented Norwegians who have grown up during the era of 
globalization at the beginning of the fourth industrial revolution. The overall message is 
that NORSOF is for a select few. Physical and mental stamina far above average is 
essential, but not enough. NORSOF needs the brightest minds: people with cultural 
knowledge, language proficiency, and technological skills as well. DOD recruiters are 
actively advertising and screening for SOF talent in institutions concerned with foreign 
area studies, foreign languages, technology, and engineering.  
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The Norwegian defense has been attracting increasingly higher numbers of 
recruits from minority groups, and the best end up in NORSOF, where diversity in human 
potential is valued and pragmatically exploited. At the same time, Norway’s “Powell 
program,” continues to send, motivated, and educated NORSOF personnel to slots in the 
MFA trainee program. We now have more than a decade and a half’s worth of SOF 
personnel who have worked in and with the Interagency.  
The initial NORSOF selection process still mainly focuses on physical, mental, 
and psychological stamina and the ability to work in a team, but the positive selection and 
training for MA starts during the basic course. From the outset, prospective NORSOF 
candidates are introduced to the range of possibilities a life-long NORSOF career can 
offer. MA is one of those possibilities, and candidates learn that this track offers several 
opportunities for life-long learning at exclusive institutions.  
“Planning and teaching how to teach others” is introduced to candidates step by 
step, while NORSOF simultaneously screens for officer talent. Combined exercises are 
introduced early on; infiltration followed by training of Home guards or other units in a 
tactical setting. Sometimes this is done jointly with U.S. SF. This increases NORSOF 
personnel’s self-reliance and ability to plan and to take a holistic approach to tasks. More 
experienced personnel train them in basic HUMINT, liaison, and other MA skills. The 
focus is on building, exploiting, and influencing human relationships for information, 
coordination, and cooperation purposes. Reporting and information management related 
to progress and results are integral parts of such training. 
The ratio of enablers/supporting personnel (qualified subject-matter experts) to 
operators has increased; this has been necessary to keep the range and number of operator 
skills required to a manageable level, and to insure these skills do not erode over time. 
Enablers are recruited when required since their competencies are not developed best in 
the NORSOF system, but elsewhere. Enablers are trained to the standard of paratroopers, 
while the “hunter spirit mindset” is cultivated in such a way as to assisting in solving the 
social, analytical, technical, and human domain problem in which they are experts.  
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NORSOF officer candidates and senior NCOs go through their final year in a 
SOF-specific track at the Naval academy. The Naval academy has attracted a small but 
recognized cadre of faculty and guest lecturers who have a particular focus on SOF and 
unconventional warfare. The program also “facilitates constructive interaction across the 
whole of NORSOF.” The numbers of NORSOF officers attending the master’s level 
programs at the Naval postgraduate school and King’s college have also increased.  
NORSOF’s career management system oversees a tailored education and training 
program for MA experts and officers that focuses on individual aptitudes to fully exploit 
the potential of each individual operator. By taking a lifetime perspective, it aims to 
maximize the output of all NORSOF personnel over careers that can span up to 38 
years.338 Education increasingly pays off in the long run, and incentive systems and pay 
are regulated to reward lifelong learning. After a long career in the operational squadrons, 
a number of senior NORSOF specialists and officers are now MA specialists and see 
further operational development of NORSOF’s MA capabilities as their main focus. 
These people advise, train, and influence the rest of the NORSOF system through their 
internal “MA network of practice.” The seniors in this network represent NORSOF as 
well as the rest of the Norwegian defense forces in interagency arenas and in working 
groups concerned with MA concepts and strategic opportunities.  
In 2018, Norway adopted a classified national SOF doctrine, which is not covered 
in NATO doctrine. Perspectives on NORSOF specialties and niches and NORSOF’s 
position in the global SOF network are explained. This document serves as a useful guide 
for prioritization among doctrinal tasks and capabilities, criteria for use in support of 
strategic objectives, and NORSOF concept development.  
NORSOF is still active with MA efforts in the MENA area, especially in the 
smaller maritime countries, and works in concert with other Norwegian agencies. The 
symbolic strategic significance of doing this is reciprocity toward the United States and 
NATO. The functional strategic significance is to counter threats to the alliance in their 
places of origin. NORSOF’s ability to assist through “vertical implementation” is well 
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respected; NORSOF MA officers are represented at the highest levels of command in the 
mentored forces as well as in the mentoring organization. NORSOF MA specialists are 
able to assist across the full range of military and police functions (the local variants of 
NATO’s 1–9 functional structure).  
Norwegian conflict negotiation efforts continue around the globe. NORSOF is 
supporting MFA in these efforts through enabling physical access and communication 
between negotiators and parties, and by providing security and facilitation of meetings in 
a discreet or covert manner when needed. NORSOF supports the negotiation teams with 
deep knowledge of DDR processes and with the advice about what is feasible and 
achievable through military assistance, as DDR or SSR permits. 
By 2025, U.S. SF and NORSOFs efforts to advise the Norwegian Home guard 
have contributed to the development of increased strategic relevance for a networked 
Home guard, which has enabled the Norwegian Defense to finally abandon its 20th 
Century ambition to mirror U.S. Air-land-battle doctrine (with its focus on winning 
tactical victories with small armored forces, in mountainous terrain over vast distances 
without strategic movement capability against an initially superior aggressor). The Army 
and parts of the Navy have, just like the Home guards, started to evolve into a swarm-like 
networked structure. The Norwegian strategy has shifted from a focus on tactical 
victories to avoiding decisive battles while protracting the fight in order to achieve 
cumulative strategic effects over time (with NATO’s support). NORSOF leads the way in 
this doctrinal change through its MA efforts with its own Army, as small unit guerilla 
tactics augmented by superior firepower are another NORSOF specialty. Russia 
calculates that this new strategy makes it harder to achieve its strategic goals via military 
aggression on Norwegian territory. NORSOF’s deterrent effect continues to prove its 
worth. 
Simultaneously, Norwegian efforts to reassure an ever more bankrupt and 
desperate Russia that both its elites’ and its population’s interests are best served through 
increased cooperation with Norway and NATO (especially in the High North) is showing 
progress. Personal contacts between NORSOF officers at NJHQ and RUSOF 
representatives from the Leningrad military district (LEMD) have been established. 
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Based on common security interests in the High North, the first small unit exchange 
between NORSOF and RUSOF is now being discussed at the highest political levels. The 
basis for possible future cooperation is maritime counterterrorism in the Barents area. 
NATO HQ is informed about the progress, and the effort gains support through 
discussions in the NAC. Norway’s niche as a functional partner engaged in dialog with 
Russia is strengthened, and Russia is reassured that its security interests in the economic 
sector in the High North are best taken care of through cooperation, not aggression. 
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APPENDIX. FFI SURVEY: ON MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE IN NORSOF 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This capstone report has used data from a pre-collected survey, On Military 
Assistance in NORSOF,339 conducted by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment 
(FFI). The survey was constructed jointly by FFI and NORSOCOM, related to 
NORSOCOM’s desire to enhance NORSOF MA capabilities. The data from this survey 
is assessed to be highly relevant for this capstone report, and it is used mainly in Chapter 
III.  
The survey was directed toward NORSOF personnel possessing MA experience, 
and it was organized as an anonymous and volunteer survey consisting of 27 overarching 
questions. This survey is categorized as a perception study among the population of 
Norwegian MA-experts from the SOF/community. The respondents were given the 
option to comment on all of the overarching topics. This means that the dataset from the 
survey consists of both quantitative and qualitative data regarding the status and 
viewpoints regarding MA in NORSOF. The questions used in the survey fall within six 
different categories: Doctrine, Organization, Training and Education, Personnel, and 
Policy (Use/Misuse of SOF).  
The survey consisted of questions of different character. For instance, some 
questions asked the respondents to rank different factors relatively to each other; other 
questions asked the respondents to state whether they agreed with qualitative 
statements—on a 6-leveled scale ranging from “completely agree” to “completely 
disagree”—while some topic-related questions solicited qualitative answers in an 
“unlimited” comment field.  
                                                 
339 Forsvarets Forsknings Institutt (FFI), FFI Survey: On Military Assistance in NORSOF, ed. Frank 
B. Steder (Kjeller, Norway: Forsvarets Forsknings Institutt (FFI), 2016). 
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B. PURPOSE 
The main purpose of the pre-collected survey was to gain insight to how MA-
experienced members from NORSOF view and understand a range of issues, especially 
related to the future use of NORSOF within the MA mission set. 
Additionally, the survey was conducted both to identify potential gaps between 
NORSOF understanding and common perceptions within the broader SOF literature in 
order to determine whether NORSOF, “as a whole,” is (actually) motivated to enhance its 
MA capabilities; and to identify potential differences in opinion/understanding across 
different demographic categories of personnel within NORSOF. (For example, is there a 
difference in opinion between selected operators and non-selected personnel, or is there a 
difference in opinion if personnel are categorized by level of military education?)  
C. RESPONDENTS/POPULATION 
NORSOCOM assisted in identifying the population for this pre-collected FFI 
survey. The population that best fit the FFI survey was described as “NORSOF personnel 
above platoon-level, with personal experience with Military Assistance operations.”340 
The three main reasons for defining the population in this fashion were: (1) several of the 
questions asked, and topics addressed in the survey, demanded personal MA experience 
for a respondent to be able to answer them. (2) Putting MA experience as a prerequisite, 
ensured that the respondent was a military employee within NORSOF, having at least 
five years of military experience. (This relates to the particularities of the Norwegian 
selection, training, and education system). (3) The personnel in this population were 
assessed to consist of the current and, most likely, future leadership in NORSOF. 
Eighty-five respondents filled out the survey, which represents a substantial 
number of respondents when the total numbers of NORSOF are taken into account. Of 
the 85 respondents who participated in the survey, 15 did so in a manner by which their 
surveys can only be defined as “incomplete.” Also, only 69 of 85 respondents stated that 
                                                 
340 Defined by FFI and Chief of Staff NORSOCOM, Brigadier Eirik Kristoffersen. 
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they had the relevant MA experience required to be able to answer the survey in a 
relevant manner. 
As noted earlier, 15 surveys were registered as incomplete. The reasons for doing 
so varied, and a few of those reasons are technical in nature. First, within this category 
(of 15 respondents) some respondents answered the whole survey, but did not push/
choose the “register as complete” direction which followed the last “question” on the 
survey. Second, some respondents only opened the survey; in other words, they initiated 
the survey, but decided to quit before answering any questions at all, or after answering 
only a few. 
The reasons why personnel without the relevant MA experience were issued this 
survey are not known, but we assume that NORSOCOM wanted to reach as many 
respondents as possible and issued the survey to a wider “population” than necessary. 
That being said, the survey was constructed in a way that identified personnel who lacked 
the relevant experience early and did not give them a chance to answer the remaining 
questions.  
D. USE OF THE DATA 
This capstone report has used the data from the pre-collected survey by 
conducting several types of analyses. The first analysis was an overall frequency analysis 
related to the individual questions—simply what percentage of NORSOF agreed/
disagreed, or ranked a factor as number 1. The second analysis was a more detailed 
frequency analysis based on how different demographic categories and sub-groups 
answered individual questions. The third level of analysis consisted of f-tests, t-tests, and 
regression analysis. These compared the differences in opinion across the demographic 
categories in order to evaluate whether the differences were statistically significant or 
not.  
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1. Demographic Categories 
This survey was constructed so that it is possible to categorize the respondents 
demographically in several ways. It was constructed this way to be able to identify 
differences in opinions/perceptions across different categories of personnel. 
This specific capstone report has mainly utilized three different demographic 
categorizations to confirm whether there are any differences in opinions/perceptions: (1) 
military educational level; (2) selected operator vs non-selected personnel; (3) current 
function within NORSOF. 
2. Sensitivity Analysis of the Different Demographic Categories 
1. Military Educational Level 
The survey made it possible for the respondents to give their military educational 
level in four different sub-groups: Level 1, officer candidate school or equivalent; Level 
2, military academy or equivalent; Level 3, command and staff college or equivalent; and 
Level 4, other military education. 
This resulted in the following distribution. 
 Level 1, officer candidate school or equivalent: 10 respondents 
 Level 2, military academy or equivalent: 35 respondents 
 Level 3, command and staff college or equivalent: 21 respondents 
 Level 4, other military education: 1 respondent. 
2. Selected Operator vs. Non-Selected Personnel  
The survey made it possible for the respondents to indicate which personnel 
category they belong to within NORSOF, the selected operator category, or the not-
selected personnel category. 
From that question, the following distribution was derived: 
 The Selected operator category: 42 respondents. 
 Not selected personnel category: 25 respondents.  
3. Current Function within NORSOF 
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The survey made it possible for the respondents to identify their current function 
in NORSOF, by choosing from five different functions: Leadership, Staff, Support, 
Operative Sabre Squadron, and Other Functions. (For the category other functions, the 
survey made it possible to describe the current function in more detail). 
This led to the following distribution regarding respondents’ current function in 
NORSOF: 
 Leadership function: 21 respondents. 
 Staff function: 23 respondents. 
 Support function: 5 respondents. 
 Operational Sabre Squadron function: 11 respondents. 
 Other function: 7 respondents. 
The number of respondents in each category is not the same, which means that 
one respondent’s answer in one category appears more valued than another respondent’s 
answer in another category when presented in different types of analyses. For example, 
let us use the category of Military Educational Levels to explain. In a frequency analysis, 
one respondent from the level 1 group, which consists of 10 respondents total, constitutes 
10%, while one respondent from level 2, which consists of 35 respondents in total, 
constitutes 2.9%. 
Another noteworthy matter in regard to the military educational level category is 
that only one respondent was stated to hold, “other military education.” This makes this 
specific category irrelevant, since it will be impossible to conduct any statistical analysis 
based on only one respondent. 
Because of these aforementioned facts/conditions, this capstone report has 
conducted several types of statistical analyses: f-tests, t-tests, and regression analysis. The 
t-tests were used to confirm whether any identified differences across categories are 
statistically significant or not. A significance level of 95% is used to determine whether a 
difference across categories is significant.  
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In the next two sections, the survey is presented, first, as a compressed overview 
of the different questions in five tables, and second, as the survey appeared to the 
respondents when they conducted completed the survey.341  
                                                 
341 FFI, FFI Survey 
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Table 1.   FFI Survey, Questions 1–11e342 
No. Question/Topic 
1a Intro and Consent 
1b We recommend that you copy the link below! (info) 
1c Definitions: Capability and Capacity. 
1d Definition: Military Assistance 
2 At what level do you have personal experience with Military Assistance? (highest level) 
3 Have you conducted the Norwegian Special Operations Operator Selection Course? 
4 Categorize your current function?  
5 What is you highest level of military education? 
6 Do you have civilian education at higher level than High School?  
7a To what extent do you agree with this statement related to SOF in general? 
  
Most academics who have studied SOF, argue that the strategic effect/importance 
of SOF indirect approach (e.g. MA) is relatively higher than the direct approach (eg 
DA) 
7b To what extent do you agree with this statement related to NORSOF specifically? 
  
Some academics who have studied SOF, believes that the strategic effect/
importance of SOF indirect approach (e.g. MA) is relatively larger than the direct 
approach (e.g. DA) 
8 Personal complementary comments related to the strategic effect of MA operations versus other SOF operations: 
9 Rank the importance of the following capabilities for NORSOF: 
10a Most of the time during NORSOFs operations abroad the last 15 years have been used to capacity building, or Military Assistance, in one shape or form.  
10b Most of NORSOF future operations abroad will consist of capacity building, or 
Military Assistance, in one sense or the other. 
10c Personal complementary comments: 
11a 
SR/DA should be NORSOF’s “Core capabilities.” MA capability is a “Bi-product” 
of this, and should not be maintained/developed if it will diminish the SR/DA 
capabilities.  
11b MA is where SOF has the highest strategic utility. This should be reflected in NORSOF selection, training, education and organization. 
11c 
MA could principally be conducted/solved by conventional forces. It is therefore no 
obvious reason why MA doctrinally is a SOF-function within the Norwegian armed 
Forces. 
11d MA is a specialist function that requires tailored selection and training. Hence, the function belongs in NORSOF 
11e Personal complementary comments: 
                                                 
342 Source: FFI, FFI Survey 
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Table 2.   FFI Survey, Questions 12a–17b343 
No. Question/Topic 
12a Today, NORSOF is best suited to conduct MA directed at the tactical level with the 
respondent. 
12b Today, NORSOF is best suited to conduct MA directed at the operational level with 
the respondent. 
12c Today, NORSOF is best suited to conduct MA directed at the strategic level with 
the respondent. 
12d Personal complementary comments: 
13a NORSOF has an untapped potential within MA directed at the strategic level with 
the respondents. 
13b NORSOF has an untapped potential within MA directed at the operational level 
with the respondents. 
13c NORSOF has an untapped potential within MA directed at the tactical level with 
the respondents. 
13d Personal complementary comments: 
14a 
I fear that the extensive focus on MA among the political- and military decision 
makers will lead to misuse of NORSOF, where political gain becomes more 
important than preconditions to succeed with the mission. 
14b Do you have any concerns regarding possible misuse of NORSOF-capacity in the 
future?  
15a 
I have experienced that it has been unclear to me which Norwegian strategic 
interests the specific operation I have been a part of is supporting, while conducting 
MA-operations. 
15b 
It is not terribly important to me which Norwegian strategic interests MA 
operations supports. It is not my job to assess Norwegian strategic gains of every 
single mission.  
15c Personal complementary comments: 
16a Which of the following doctrinal tasks is NORSOF currently best organized to 
solve? Rank in order from 1–4.  
16 
b Personal complementary comments: 
17a Rank the doctrinal tasks in order based on how effectively NORSOF as a system is 
prepared to solve them. 
17b Personal complementary comments: 
                                                 
343 Ibid. 
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Table 3.   FFI Survey, Questions 18a–20344 
No. Question/Topic 
18a 
Optimization of NORSOF capability to conduct MA directed at the operational and 
strategic level of the respondents, requires a career new career-track within 
NORSOF where suitable personnel are educated as MA-officers in parallel to, or 
after the period as SR/DA “specialist” has come to an end.  
18b 
MA is fundamentally different from SR/DA. Optimization of NORSOF capability 
to conduct MA at the operational and strategic level of the respondents requires a 
specialized unit within NORSOF, where personal traits/abilities and expertise to 
conduct MA operations is the main focus during selection and education. 
18c 
Like in the U.S., NORSOF should be divided in two where some specialize within 
indirect approach operations (including MA) while others specialize within direct 
approach operations (including DA).  
18d 
NORSOF is dependent on external recruitment of personnel with specific expertise 
to enhance the MA-capacity directed towards the operational- and strategic level at 
the respondents.  
18e Personal complementary comments—personal opinions on the organization of MA in NORSOF: 
19a 
NORSOF’s MA operations have been an unconditional success. If the capacities we 
have contributed to establish are not functioning, it is because of shortcomings in 
overarching strategies/internal power struggles/other factors beyond our control, 
not because of the way we solved the mission.  
19b I have contributed in MA operations where the training has been of such a character 
that other Norwegian professional military units, besides SOF, could have done it.  
19c I have missed having NORSOF personnel at several/multiple levels within the 
respondent organization at the same time (also known as “vertical implementation”) 
19d 
It is not possible to separate the importance of MA specific or SR/DA specific 
skills. Professional SR/DA skills has been a required, inseparable part of the MA 
operations I have participated in.  
19e Personal complementary comments: 
20 Several actors below may have contributed to reduce MA-effect in operations. Pick 
three factors and rank them in importance. 
 
                                                 
344 Ibid. 
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Table 4.   FFI Survey, Questions 21a–26345 
No. Question/Topic 
21a 
The current selection, training and education of personnel makes NORSOF best 
suited to conduct SR/DA. Therefore, they can also carry out MA towards the 
tactical level. If NORSOF ambition is to perform MA aimed at the operational and 
strategic levels at the respondents, it requires some new thinking regarding 
selection, training and education. 
21b 
To be a competent Military Advisor, one must master SR and DA, because MA is 
primarily to train local security forces in the basic techniques we already master 
because of the SR and DA skillsets. 
21c MA specific training and education is emphasized to the same extent as SR/DA training and education. 
21d 
One of the tactical units in NORSOF has “Thoroughness Breeds Confidence” as 
their motto. Regardless of your unit affiliation, to what extent do you agree/
disagree with the following statement: “Our approach to MA is as thorough as it is 
for SR, DA and other national tasks”? 
21e Currently, NORSOF produces officers who specialize in MA aimed at operational and strategic levels  
21f Personal complementary comments—your personal opinion regarding training/education within MA.  
22 Do you have training/education specifically related to Military Assistance? Explain briefly what this is:  
23a Has your unit formally established a “Master Instructor (HI)” position within the various tasks/mission sets? 
23b Personal complementary comments: 
24a 
Selection and training in my unit is MOSTLY based on operational requirements 
related to SR and DA. MA specific traits are not part of the current selection 
criteria. 
24b Perfection of NORSOF’s MA-capability requires other types of SOF personnel 
than we select and educate today 
24c In my unit, we have identified specific MA related traits and skills, and we evaluate these during selection, training and education  
24d We are primarily a combat system. MA activity is something we do when we have to, not because we want to. 
24e I have never experienced a lack of English proficiency in the unit as a problem during MA missions 
24f Should there be a separate selection process for MA personnel? 
25 What personal traits and skills do you think are most important for Military Advisors? 
26 Are MA efforts valued/appreciated differently compared DA efforts internally in NORSOF? 
                                                 
345 Ibid. 
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Table 5.   FFI Survey, Questions 27a–27c346 
No. Question/Topic 
27a 
In various literature and articles NORSOF personnel are described as a mix of 
“Warriors” and “Diplomats.” If you MUST choose one of these two identities, what 
do you choose? 
27b When you press “Forward” your answers will be final. You are no longer able to change your answers! 
27c Thank you very much for your time 




Figure 23.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 1347 




Figure 24.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 1b348 
 
Figure 25.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 1c349 





Figure 26.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 1d350 
 
Figure 27.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 2351 





Figure 28.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 3 and 4352 
 
Figure 29.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions  5 and 6353 





Figure 30.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 7a, 7b, and 8354 
 
Figure 31.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 9355 





Figure 32.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 10a, 10b, and 10c356 
 
Figure 33.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 11a, 11b, 11c, 11d, and 11e357 





Figure 34.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 12a, 12b, 12c, and 12d358 
 
Figure 35.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 13a, 13b, 13c, and 13d359 





Figure 36.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 14a and 14b360 
 
Figure 37.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 15a, 15b, and 15c361 





Figure 38.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 16a and 16b362 
 
Figure 39.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 17a and 17b363 





Figure 40.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 18a, 18b, 18c, 18d, and 18e364 




Figure 41.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 19a, 19b, 19c, 19d, and 19e365 
 
Figure 42.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 20366 





Figure 43.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 21a, 21b, 21c, 21d, 21e, and 
21f367 




Figure 44.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 22368 
 
Figure 45.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 23a and 23b369 





Figure 46.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 24a, 24b, 24c, 24d, 24e, and 
24f370 
 
Figure 47.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Questions 25 and 26371 





Figure 48.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 27a372 
 
Figure 49.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 27b373 
 
Figure 50.  FFI Survey, Screenshot of Question 27c374 
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